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Abstract 
 
Intense growth in American Indian gaming over the past two and a half decades has 
resulted in suggestions of impact on non-Indian communities with a resulting growth in 
tribal-local government interaction.  Although there is mounting evidence of both 
positive and negative socio-economic impacts on non-Indian communities as a result of 
Indian gaming operations, to date, there has been very little exploration of the actual 
fiscal impact on non-Indian governments as a result of these operations.  This thesis 
serves to examine this impact. 
 
This study uses a combination of an extensive literature review, tribal-local government 
survey, GIS techniques and a quantitative examination of data ranging from casino 
factors to the Census of Governments to explore this topic.  The primary method of this 
examination includes a longitudinal difference in difference model looking at the impact 
of the opening of an American Indian gaming operation between the years of 1983 and 
1997 on non-Indian government revenues and expenditures within a 50 mile radius of the 
operation. 
 
The results of this research indicate that at an aggregate level there is no significant 
correlation between revenues and/or expenditures in non-Indian governments (within a 
50 mile radius of an American Indian gaming operation) and the opening of American 
Indian gaming operation.  There is, however, evidence to support increased sales and 
property taxes as well as decreased local welfare expenditures correlated to the opening 
of an American Indian gaming operation.  The model also demonstrates a correlation 
between the opening of an American Indian gaming operation and decreased State 
intergovernmental revenue transfers.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
I. Introduction 
What is the fiscal impact of American Indian gaming operations on neighboring 
non-Indian governments?  Indian gaming has become a sizable enterprise over the past 
two decades.  There are 562 federally recognized American Indian tribes within the 
United States that operate as sovereign nations providing services to their citizens.  Of 
these, 224 operate gaming operations for a total of 354 Indian gaming operations in 28 
states (National Indian Gaming Association, n.d.).  The monetary impact of these 
activities for tribal entities is significant with a total of 19.4 billion dollars in revenue in 
2004 (National Indian Gaming Commission, n.d.).  Given the magnitude of these 
activities it is not surprising that Indian gaming2 (like other forms of gaming) has 
generated arguments regarding the effects it might have on the areas surrounding these 
operations.    Issues surrounding Indian gaming are both salient and controversial.  As 
evidence of the saliency of this issue, in a review of over 120 articles on tribal and non-
tribal government interaction there were at least 53 articles directly related to tribal and 
non-tribal3 municipal government interactions, specifically with regard to gaming 
operations.   
One area of particular controversy with regard to Indian gaming is the suggested 
impact it has on the non-Indian community.  In many ways, it is simply a “Tragedy of the 
Commons” argument as to whether “common” resources such as roads leading to casinos 
bear overexploitation if the benefit of the casino does not result in resources devoted to 
 
2 American Indian gaming, Indian gaming and Native American gaming may all be used to reference 
gaming conducting by Federally recognized American Indian tribes within the continental US.   
3 Tribal/Non-tribal will be used: Tribal (American Indian Tribes) and Non-tribal (Non American Indian 
Governments). 
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the maintenance of that road (Hardin, 1968, pp. 1243-1248).  If an Indian casino located 
on tribal lands attracts non-Indian patrons from non-tribal lands, who will pay for any 
increased traffic needs experienced by the adjacent non-Indian community?   
Although each community, tribal and non-tribal is unique, there are more 
similarities than differences in these arguments.  There have been arguments suggesting 
both positive and negative effects from Indian gaming operations.  In the review of the 
literature the suggested externalities in non-Indian communities related to Indian gaming 
included infrastructure and development issues.  These proposed negative externalities 
have led to the growth of a number of intergovernmental transfers or revenue sharing 
arrangements aimed at addressing or pacifying these issues.   
When these interactions step beyond gaming development, they often center on 
negotiations, agreements and disputes related to the impact of Indian gaming operations 
on the adjacent non-Indian governments and community.  These discussions are 
obviously not falling on deaf ears.  By 2005, 16 of the 28 states had negotiated revenue 
sharing4 arrangements into their compacts with tribal communities (Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin) 
(Meister, 2006).  Out of these, 7 states have documented revenue sharing arrangements 
(formal or informal) with local governments (Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Oregon and Washington).  Many of these agreements have occurred in very 
recent years.   
 
4 Although intergovernmental transfers may be a more suitable description, revenue sharing is the 
commonly found terminology in this literature. 
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The basis for these revenue sharing agreements is often very subjective.  There 
appear to be relatively few financial models clearly demonstrating negative fiscal impacts 
not offset by positive effects, specifically with regard to local governments.  Much of 
what has been written regarding the impact of Indian gaming focuses on the socio-
economic impact, not the fiscal impact or changes in governmental costs with relation to 
Indian gaming operations.  Therefore, this work will serve to objectively examine the 
impact of Indian gaming operations on non-Indian government revenues and 
expenditures through a “difference in difference” model.  It will look at revenue and 
expenditure changes in communities within a 50 mile radius of an Indian gaming 
operation and those outside this area.  This thesis serves to argue that although there may 
be demonstrable impact from Indian gaming operations on non-Indian communities, it is 
only appropriate to suggest revenue sharing agreements where negative effects and costs 
to the impacted governments can be demonstrated to outweigh the positive effect and that 
these revenue sharing agreements do not constitute “rent seeking”  (Krueger, 1974, pp. 
291-303) by demanding unjustified revenues.  The primary research question is: 
What is the effect of American Indian Class II and III gaming5 operations on non-
Indian local government expenditures and revenues within a 50 mile radius of 
these operations? 
 
Secondary to this: 
 
1. If there is an effect on local government expenditures and revenues that is 
correlated to the opening of an Indian gaming operation, is it a negative 
or positive effect? 
 
5 “The term “class III gaming” means all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming 
(Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2703, 8).”  Class I would include “..social games solely for prizes of minimal 
value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, 
tribal ceremonies or celebrations (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2703, 6)”.  Class II would include bingo 
and card games (IGRA, Sec 2703, 7). 
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2. To what degree do increases in local government revenues that can be 
attributed to the opening of an Indian gaming operation potentially offset 
any additional associated expenditure?  
3. Is there any evidence that the local government  fiscal effects of the 
opening of an Indian gaming operation are directly tied to specific 
expenditures (crime, social welfare and/or infrastructure) or revenue 
sources (taxes: incomes, sales, property)?6   
4. What role do state-local intergovernmental revenue exchanges have on 
the fiscal effect of gaming?  Are tribal-state revenue sharing agreements 
reflected in the data such that there is a trickle down effect from the state 
to the local area or do all fiscal affects stem from changes in the local 
economy?   
5. What role does time play in the fiscal effects of Indian gaming?  Example: 
Does the longer a gaming operation has been open affect the impact it has 
on local government expenditures or revenues? 
6. Is there a geographic component to this effect?  Does the degree of 
rurality (as indicated by the scalar Urban Influence Codes (UIC)) of a 
community impact the effect? 
 
This dissertation seeks to answer these questions through a complex quantitative model, 
stimulated by a thorough review of the literature.  This dissertation will examine 
American Indian policy, including highlights from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.  
This dissertation will not, though, argue the politics of Indian gaming.  This area has been 
well explored by authors such as Judy Cornelius and William Eadington (1998); Steven 
Andrew Light and Kathryn Rand (2007); and Dale Mason (2000). 
II. Statement of Significance 
The primary significance for this research is the need for objective research to 
guide policy discussions and support equitable policy decisions.  This is important 
particularly with regard to those decisions which necessitate compensatory contributions 
from tribes to non-tribal governments, given the potential impact these contributions 
could have on either entity.  It is important to search for a reliable mechanism to estimate 
the governmental costs posed by Indian gaming for the purposes of: 
 
6 In order to mitigate any state specific effects the comparison group will be chosen from the same states as 
the treatment group. 
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1. Providing an objective measure of related local government revenues and 
expenditures. 
2. Promoting voluntary and mutually negotiated compensation for costs incurred by 
non-Indian adjacent governments not recouped in related revenue changes. 
 
Without this, both American Indian and non-Indian governments may face less than 
equitable circumstances, which can lead not only to tension between the communities, 
but result in expensive legal battles.  Further, these tensions create a hostile environment 
that reduces the capacity for mutually beneficial community development. 
III. Overview of Methodology 
 The questions posed in this dissertation will be examined through a longitudinal 
“difference in difference” regression model which examines the impact of a specific 
event.  This model utilizes panel data on local governmental finances from the Census of 
Governments (COG).  These data are combined with data on the opening of Indian 
Gaming Operations (The Taylor Policy Group’s Gaming Data7), Decennial Census, 
County Business Patterns and Urban Influence Codes (UIC).  The local government data 
from the COG is aggregated at the county level using the county federal information 
processing standard code (FIPS).  Data for communities with gaming operations opening 
between 1983 and 1997 (treatment group) will be contrasted with data for similar 
communities (comparison group) not receiving an Indian gaming operation during this 
time period.  The treatment group is determined through the use of GIS.  To control for 
the vast differences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan communities, this 
research will only focus on non-metropolitan communities (as defined by the UIC) as 
they are more often in direct contact with tribes and share more similar characteristics. 
 
 
7 Obtained from Jonathan Taylor. 
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IV. Outline of Dissertation 
In Chapter 2 we begin this dissertation with a discussion of the broader context in 
which Indian gaming occurs.  This includes a brief overview of U.S. American Indian 
policy and a detailed look at the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).  This chapter 
demonstrates the long relatively varied history of United States American Indian policy 
and sets the stage for the broader context in which tribes and local non-tribal 
communities operate.  The chapter concludes by examining governance in tribal and non-
tribal municipal governments and economic development in American Indian and non-
Indian communities.  This chapter establishes the basis for current tribal-local relations 
and the connection between economic development and public finance, showing how 
development activities can potentially impact neighboring communities.   
In Chapter 3 we will examine current tribal and local government relations, 
especially as they relate to Indian gaming.  Included is a survey of tribal-local 
government relations.  This will firmly establish the way in which they relate, providing a 
foundation for understanding the potential for impact and mitigation.  This chapter then 
moves to a more pointed discussion of the current anecdotal evidence for and against any 
mitigated8 or unmitigated impact from Indian gaming.  This chapter concludes with 
evidence of fiscal impact and known examples of impact mitigation. 
In Chapter 4 we begin to shape the quantitative analysis for this dissertation.  This 
chapter outlines in detail the research questions posed, data used and how the model was 
developed.  Here we explore the each of the 5 different data sources:  Census of 
Governments, Decennial Census, County Business Patterns, Urban Influence Codes and 
 
8 Offset or compensated for. 
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The Taylor Policy Group’s Indian gaming data.  We also look more closely at the use of 
the difference in difference model and define the form of the regression equation.  
Finally, this chapter discusses the sampling of the data used. 
In Chapter 5 we begin by descriptively examining the key variables.  This 
includes looking at total revenue, sales and property taxes.  Income tax revenue is not 
included given a wide variance in the collection of this revenue source at the municipal 
level and the limited collection in non-metropolitan areas.  We continue this examination 
by looking at the impact on county area expenditures.  This includes total expenditures, 
social welfare, infrastructure, transportation and police.  Chapter 5 concludes with an 
examination of the impact of opening an Indian gaming operation on revenues, 
expenditures and the ratio of total revenues to total expenditures in these communities.     
In Chapter 6 we pull together the evidence of these chapters to provide clear 
results of the fiscal impact on non-Indian governments presented by the operating of an 
Indian gaming operation in an adjacent community.  This research will describe the 
direction, magnitude and potential sources of impact.  It will also examine the potential 
for positive impacts that may mitigate any negative impacts imposed on non-Indian 
governments adjacent to Indian gaming operations.   This information can be used by 
both tribes and policy makers to guide discussions regarding development of Indian 
gaming operations and any potential revenue sharing agreements that might ensue.   
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Chapter 2: US American Indian Policy, Governance, Economic Development and 
Public Finance 
 
I. Introduction 
In order to understand the potential for fiscal impact on non-tribal municipal 
governments from development activities, specifically gaming on American Indian 
reservations, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the politics and conditions 
that govern the fiscal environment in which Indian gaming occurs.   Why do we need to 
know about these matters? It is not necessary to simply suggest a fiscal impact, but it is 
necessary to suggest an “unmitigated” impact.  We have to know first how it is possible 
to have an unmitigated impact.  This includes understanding the history of American 
Indian policy in the United States, including Indian gaming policy.  Also, in order to 
suggest a mitigated or unmitigated impact on non-Indian governments from Indian 
gaming operations, it is necessary to establish the connection between governance, public 
finance and economic development.  This is necessary to suggest that there is something 
that can occur such as a business development that can directly or indirectly influence 
public finance.  Essentially what drives local government revenues and expenditures?  In 
tribal communities this is somewhat simpler as there is often a direct connection as tribal 
governments can often act as corporate entities.  In non-tribal governments, this can be a 
bit more complex and demands an overview of both theoretical and applied arguments 
for factors that impact both economic development and public finance.   Beyond simply 
outlining American Indian Policy, this chapter will establish that there is a clear 
connection between economic development and public finance; second, there is clearly 
room to suggest that tribal development can potentially impact outside communities as 
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any development activity of significant size can; third, there is motive for local 
governments to seek revenue sources given the increasing demands they face. 
II. United States American Indian Policy 
There have been six clearly recognizable policy periods in U.S. American Indian 
Policy:  
Table 1: United States American Indian Policy Periods9 
Period Time Span 
Treaty Making 1492-1828 
Relocation and Removal 1828-1887 
Allotment and Assimilation 1887-1934 
Indian Reorganization 1934-1953 
Termination 1953-1968 
Self-Determination 1968-Present 
  
(Pevar, 1992, pp. 2-9)   
The policy perspective of the United States towards American Indians has been 
continually changing.  American Indian Policy has not always appeared to carry a 
consistent theme as will be demonstrated by the differences in each of the policy periods.  
The Relocation and Removal, Allotment and Assimilation and Termination periods all 
demonstrate clear national level control of tribes, whereas the Treaty Making, Indian 
Reorganization and Tribal Self-Determination periods demonstrate much looser national 
control and the control of Indian Affairs being nested within tribes. This balancing act 
between national and tribal control involves issues relating to federalism. Here we 
examine how policy towards American Indians developed in the U.S. in an effort to 
 
9 There is discrepancy in the literature in reference to the first three periods, some view these as only two 
periods referred to as Treaty Making and Formative.  I opted to utilize Pevar’s description of the periods 
starting in 1828, and to keep the initial periods combined, as the division did not serve great purpose. 
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understand the arguments for and against impact from Indian gaming on non-tribal 
municipal governments. 
a. Role of Federalism 
 First, federalism is an important concept in the discussion of American Indian 
policy.  The American political system is defined as a federal system, “...one in which 
constitutional authority is divided between a national government and state governments: 
each is assumed to derive its powers directly from the people and therefore to have 
sovereignty (final authority) over the policy responsibilities assigned to it (Patterson, 
1996, p. 30).  This concept further directs that the federal government should not interfere 
in the policies of the state (Patterson, 1996, p. 36).  The powers granted in this system to 
the national government are expressed in the implied powers granted in Article 1 of the 
constitution and the implied powers rest on the “necessary and proper clause” (Patterson, 
1996, pp. 37-38).  State authority is vested in reserved powers found in the 10th 
Amendment granting states those powers not expressively given to the national 
government (Patterson, 1996, p. 39).  At times American Indians, within the concept of 
Federalism, have held a separate status similar to that of states or sovereign nations 
(Treaty Making, Indian Reorganization and Self-Determination Periods) and at other 
times not (Allotment & Assimilation and Termination).   
b. Policy Periods 
i. Treaty Making 
 The foremost policy developed towards American Indians finds its roots in 
colonial times.  Upon the arrival of the Europeans was the Doctrine of Discovery.  This 
policy, 
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Promulgated in its basic in 1493 by Pope Alexander IV in two bulls, Inter 
Caetera, which granted Spain all lands not under a Christian prince, and Inter 
Caetera II, which set a demarcation line at one hundred leagues west of the 
Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, beyond which all future discoveries of land 
not held by a Christian prince on Christmas 1492, would belong to Spain 
(Deloria, 1985, p. 240). 
 
This quote is important because American Indians were not Christian.  Therefore they did 
not hold rights to their land and the rights to American Indian land as of Christmas 1492 
were held by Spain.  In this the Pope became God’s representative, thus giving him 
ultimate authority in all matters (O’Brien, 1989, p. 38).   
Under the concepts implied in the Doctrine of Discovery it would appear that 
American Indians should be subjects of the national government in place in U.S. territory.  
However, contrary to this between 1607 and 1776 tribes were treated as sovereign entities 
and there were approximately 175 treaties enacted between colonists and tribes (Utter, 
1993, p. 45). These treaties were signed with tribes, with tribes acting as independent 
agents themselves not subjects of a national government.  The first national attempt 
aimed at controlling American Indians as subjects developed when the Department of 
Indian Affairs was created in 1775 and restricted and controlled Indian involvement in 
the Revolutionary War (O’Brien, 1989, p. 49).  According to Utter, as the agency sought 
to manage American Indians it also added negotiating capacity for treaties as the U.S. 
negotiated with tribes as independents.  The first treaty between the United States and an 
American Indian tribe (Delaware) was in 1778 and treaty making between the US and 
tribes did not officially end until 1871 (Utter, 1993, pp. 45-53). 
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ii. Relocation and Removal 
 During the Relocation and Removal period U.S. policy towards American Indians 
became institutionalized within the Constitution and within the federal system.  Power 
over Indian affairs is transferred during this time from the states to the national 
government.  Prior to the development of the U.S. Constitution, the Articles of 
Confederation dictated that states in and of themselves could manage the tribes with their 
boundaries (O’Brien, 1989, p. 49).  However, with the advent of the U.S. Constitution, 
this relationship was re-aligned through the Indian Commerce Clause (U.S. Constitution 
art I, s8, cl. 3) and this clause dictated the relationship between tribes and the new 
country “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with Indian Tribes (Tribal Sovereignty, 1993, p. 24).”  According to Deloria, this 
established the concept of tribal sovereignty by separating the tribes from the states and 
placing them independently in this framework. This sovereignty, however, was limited as 
was that of the states in relation to the national government. Although the Department of 
War negotiated with tribes as foreign nations, they were also under the authority of the 
national government (Deloria, 1985, p. 240).  This is the beginning of a long history of 
conflict over state versus federal control of American Indians.   
The Removal period which began in the 1830s demonstrated another era of 
national control over American Indians.  During this period two strains of American 
Indian policy developed, one through law and the other through executive and 
Congressional policy.  This period is noted by Vine Deloria as “the first instance in which 
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a political platform became realized on the national agenda” regarding American Indians 
(Deloria, 1985, p. 242).  Prior to, this most dealings with American Indians were 
situational and centered on a specific issue or tribe.  The Removal Act, which was aimed 
at moving tribes west of the Mississippi in order to accommodate a growing American 
population, was a direct effort to deal with all tribes in one manner. This bill was passed 
by only 6 votes due to its potentially conflictual nature with previous treaties and policy 
declarations (Deloria, 1985, p. 242).   
The conflict around the Removal Act includes two key court opinion issues by 
Justice Marshall in 1831 and 1832.  In 1831, Justice Marshall ruled in Cherokee v. 
Georgia that American Indian tribes were not sovereign nations, but were “domestic 
dependent” nations.  In Worcester v. Georgia in 1832, (Justice Marshall) the court ruled 
that tribes were sovereign nations.  These cases were important not only in the manner in 
which they established the basis for tribal sovereignty but, also because they were 
national attempts to interfere in and manage state vs. tribal disputes.  In these cases, 
Justice Marshall made it clear that states rights were limited in reference to American 
Indian tribes.   “In 1832 the Supreme Court held that state laws “can have no force” 
within an Indian reservation unless Congress has authorized the state to apply them there 
(Pevar, 1992, p. 111).”  
 Even after the tribes had been removed to the West, conflict continued and 
between 1866 and 1891, there were “more than one thousand battles” between the 
Western Tribes and the United States (O’Brien, 1989, p. 62).  This was in great part the 
result of settlers in pursuit of land and gold, encroaching on tribal lands.  In 1871, treaty 
making with Tribes was officially ended on March 3 by an act of Congress stating, 
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“hereafter, no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty (O’Brien, 1989, p. 71).” At this point, with treaties 
not an option and land needs growing, a shift in policy development was necessary, 
leading to the period of Allotments and Assimilation. 
iii. Allotments and Assimilation 
 The period of Allotments and Assimilation began in 1887.  This period is marked 
by a clear transition to mass legislative handling of tribes as one group and was clearly 
focused on assimilating American Indians for the purpose of securing space for the 
growing Euro-American population.  One of the mechanisms implemented in the attempt 
for assimilation was the Dawes Act of 1887 (Petosky, n.d., p. 34).  According to O’Brien, 
the Dawes Act attempted assimilation through property ownership, farming and the 
United States concept of individualism, by dividing land among individual Indians 
(O’Brien, 1989, p. 77). This secured space for the growing population by allowing for 
any leftover land to be used for other purposes (O’Brien, 1989, p. 77).  By allotting 
individual land ownership, it was hoped that Indians would learn the value of private 
ownership, thus reinforcing the concept of individualism.  Land that remained was 
available for purchase by the government. As land was removed from the tribes this 
diminished one of their most valuable resources (O’Brien, 1989, p. 78). This process also 
dramatically changed the process of governance between American Indians, American 
Indian tribes and the federal government: 
Politically, the allotment process seriously eroded the role and authority of tribal 
government.  In earlier times the federal government had dealt with tribal leaders 
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and tribal governments when providing goods and services to tribes.  After the 
passage of the Dawes Allotment Act, the government furnished supplies, food and 
payments directly to individuals, ignoring tribal governments.  Tribal 
governments subsequently declined in importance, the vacuum that was left being 
filled by the BIA agent on the reservation. 
(O’Brien, 1989, p. 78) 
No longer was there the necessity for interaction between the tribe and the federal 
government.  Now assistance could go directly to the individual and this weakened the 
American Indian’s need for tribal government.  In 1903, the national government’s sole 
control over tribal affairs was further enforced when the United States Supreme Court in 
the Lonewolf opinion re-embedded the concept of absolute plenary power by the United 
States over tribes, allowing for complete control of all tribal relations and assets 
(Churchill, 1997, p.  291). 
 Prior to 1924, the concept of egalitarianism or “a belief in human equality 
especially with respect to social, political and economic rights and privileges” was not 
extended to American Indians through citizenship (Webster Dictionary).  In 1924, the 
Indian Citizenship Act was passed giving all Indians full citizenship.  Although they are 
to be considered full citizens, this is not to interfere with their tribal citizenship (Deloria, 
1998, p. 3). This Act changed the development of American Indian policy, because 
American Indians could be affected by policies aimed not solely at them, but in those 
aimed at all citizens.  This restricted the need for separate policy, and throughout the New 
Deal, American Indians are dealt with within policies enacted for the benefit of the 
general public. 
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iv. Reorganization 
 From the Reorganization period forward we see the national government’s 
complete authority over tribal governments reiterated with almost all Indian affairs being 
handled at the national level.  The period of Indian Reorganization began in 1928 with 
arrival of the Meriam Report that detailed the horrific conditions plaguing the Indian 
population and led the government to recognize that assimilation had not worked (Utter, 
1993, pp. 254-255).  Following this was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. (Petosky, 
n.d., p. 34)  The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 established constitutions for those 
tribes desiring to do so.   In accordance with the Act, most tribes developed constitutions 
and governments similar to that of the US federal government.  This policy, which the 
US enacted to develop institutions within tribes, was completely contrary to some tribes’ 
cultural values.   The Navajo10 present an example.  According to O’Brien when the 
Navajo tribe was assessing whether or not to adopt an IRA constitution, many traditional 
tribal members would not vote because they did not believe in the process of voting 
(O’Brien 1989: 2). 
v. Termination 
 In the Termination period from 1943 to 1961, there was a drastic return towards 
assimilation and another classic example of the value of individualism within the United 
States (Petosky, n.d, p. 34).  In 1943 the Senate surveyed Indians, finding conditions 
similar to those referenced in the Meriam Report (Utter, 1993, p. 255).  With attributing 
these conditions to the ineffectiveness of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and believing that 
 
10 Arizona 
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some tribes no longer needed national protection, House Resolution 108 in 1953 
terminated tribes, and their relationship to the United States government (Utter, 1993, p. 
39).  This policy returned American Indians to the status of individuals responsible to the 
United States governmental structure, with no rights specific to their tribe.  This policy, 
however, failed in general, and by the 1960s government policy had turned to self-
determination, although terminated tribes still attempt to achieve federal recognition in 
present times.  During this period, criminal jurisdiction over American Indians came into 
question.  Who possesses the right to control behaviors of American Indians, tribes, the 
national government or state governments?  This question was answered most directly in 
1953 with Public Law 280, which mandated six states (Alaska, California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin) to assume criminal jurisdiction in regards to tribal 
members and reservation territory, other states were given the choice of adapting this 
policy or variations on this policy.  Simply said, some states hold criminal jurisdiction in 
reference to tribal members, federal jurisdiction covers all tribal members, and civil 
jurisdiction is left in the hands of the tribe (Pevar, 1992, pp. 129-131, 158-160).  
Considering that federal jurisdiction covers all tribal members in those states not 
participating in Public Law 280, American Indians are covered by federal jurisdiction and 
tribal jurisdiction. 
vi. Tribal Self-Determination 
 The self-determination period from 1961 to the present is a continuation of 
national level control over American Indian affairs and is marked most clearly by two 
pieces of generalized legislation applying to all tribes.  The first is the Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968.  This legislative Act in many ways allows tribes to adopt civil rights 
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pursuant to their cultural beliefs and not the beliefs of the United States government.  
This was exemplified in 1978 in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo11 v. Martinez. (Tribal 
Sovereignty, 1993, p. 46)  This case resulted when a Santa Clara woman’s children were 
denied tribal membership as their father was not a tribal member.  The Santa Clara 
Pueblo trace tribal membership in a paternalistic fashion, regardless of whether or not this 
is in violation of other laws or cultural norms.  The court upheld this decision, respecting 
a tribe’s right to have rules and regulations inconsistent with the broader public as 
directed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Tribal Sovereignty, 1993, p. 46).  
The second important piece of legislation was introduced in 1975, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Act. This Act encompassed an ideological perspective that 
resulted from treaty re-assessment and reports of destitute conditions on American Indian 
reservations.  This Act was aimed at rehabilitating Indian education programs that had 
been allowed to deteriorate and to aid tribes in self-determination by allowing them to 
administer these programs, further this Act was also important in that it allowed tribes to 
operate outside of federal contracting laws and extend civil service benefits to workers  
(Deloria, 1998, p. 220).   
National versus state control over tribal functions once again surged to the 
forefront with the advent of Indian gaming in the 1980s. In 1982, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that Indian bingo operations could continue as long as the state laws 
in which the reservation is located allowed bingo (Oswalt, 1996, p.  69). In 1987, the US 
Supreme Court again ruled on the side of American Indians in California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians12.  In this ruling the court once again denied states the ability to 
 
11 California 
12 California 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 28 
 
 
 
regulate American Indian gaming (National Gambling Impact Study, 1999, pp. 2-9).  In 
Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin the federal district court also supported this 
philosophy under the premise that the state only had the right to intervene in criminal law 
issues and not in civil law.  The court asserted that gaming fell under civil law 
(McFadden, 1996, p.  809). The policy that resulted is the 1988 Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, which dictates that if a state in itself does not allow gaming then the tribe 
is not allowed to participate in gaming.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is the latest 
legislation, which demonstrates the difficulties posed with regard to the vagueness of 
powers granted to the national and state governments within the federal system. 
 Historically, U.S. policy towards American Indians has fluctuated from 
assimilation to trust responsibility and tribal sovereignty.  The rights of federal, state and 
tribal governments are not wholly distinguishable within the federal system. This might 
rest upon the limited constitutional law governing the relationships between tribal, state 
and national government as most Indian policy in the United States is derived from 
legislation and domestic law.  Evidence of this is seen in state and national conflicts as 
early as Justice Marshall’s decisions and as late as the Indian Gaming and Regulatory 
Act.   It might also appear that American Exceptionalism13 affects the development of 
American Indian policy through the emphasis in American culture on the individual as 
seen during the Assimilation and Termination periods.  However, the lack of egalitarian 
principles and liberty in the Removal period and citizenship laws of American Indians are 
not supportive of the exceptionalist creed of America.   
 
13 “Simply stated, American Exceptionalism is a theory which asserts that certain American institutions and 
practices are so distinctive that a specifically discrete set of explanations are required to understand 
American history (including political thought) (Abbott, 1995, p. 17).“  
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 Through the recount of the development of US Indian policy we enhance our 
view of the environment in which tribes and local governments coexist.  We see a clear 
pattern of ‘us’ and ‘them’ with no reference to local relations being defined.  Does this 
then dictate that the tribes and local governments interact as sovereigns?  As we move 
forward in Chapter 3, we will examine the more specific functioning of these 
governments and the interrelationships. 
III. Gaming Policy (IGRA) 
There are a plethora of articles discussing gambling and its impact on American 
Indian reservations.  And for many reservations gaming has become the prominent base 
for unprecedented levels of reservation economic development. 
Games of chance have played a part in American Indian life since pre-history.  
The Iroquois14 played lacrosse, betting on the outcome (Oswalt, 1996, p. 407).  The 
Chipewyan’s15 had a hand guessing game (Oswalt, 1996, p. 92).  The Tlingit16 also had a 
hand guessing game played by teams, which involved wagering their possessions on the 
outcome (Oswalt, 1996, p. 253).  These games occurred well before the European 
concept of legalized gambling or gaming arrived in America.   
In more recent times, gaming in Indian Country has taken on the form of legalized 
casino gaming.  The first tribe to actively pursue some form of large-scale gaming was 
the Seminoles17.  The Seminoles had gaming in the form of high stakes bingo as early as 
1979 and by 1982, their bingo operation had an annual net of 2.7 million dollars (Utter, 
1993, p. 134). According to Oswalt, by 1984 as many as 80 tribes ran bingo operations.  
 
14 Northeast 
15 Canada 
16 Northwest 
17 Florida 
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By 1985, 100 tribes in 19 states had bingo operations.  By 1986, Indian gaming had 
become the largest unregulated legal business in the United States and between 1985 and 
1995, the number of American Indian bingo operations doubled (Oswalt, 1996, p. 69).  
Currently, tribes with gaming operations have doubled, 224 tribes are engaged in Indian 
gaming (National Indian Gaming Association, n.d.) and gaming revenues increasing by 
256% since 1995 (National Indian Gaming Commission, n.d. b). 
Legal precedence regarding Indian gaming has also grown during this period.  In 
1982, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Indian bingo operations could continue 
as long as the state laws (in which the reservation is located) allowed bingo (Oswalt, 
1996, p. 69). In 1987, we have the California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians ruling 
as mentioned previously.  According to McFadden, in Oneida Tribe of Indians18 v. 
Wisconsin, the federal district court also supported this philosophy under the premise that 
the state only had the right to intervene in criminal law issues, not in civil law on 
American Indian Reservations.  The court asserted that gaming fell under civil law 
(McFadden, 1996, p. 809).  This was a very important assertion.  In most states, the state 
can only legally intervene in criminal matters; otherwise states hold no jurisdiction over 
civil matters.   
The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) gives states a mechanism to 
influence tribal gaming.  This act dictates the manner in which almost every aspect of 
American Indian gaming is to be handled.  It determines who holds power and control 
over not only how gaming revenues are to be achieved, but also how revenues are to be 
spent.  This policy also created and delegated control of fundamental aspects of Indian 
gaming to the American Indian Gaming Commission.  Furthermore, this act also requires 
 
18 Wisconsin 
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state-tribal compacts for gaming, allowing for revenue sharing agreements to be fostered.  
These compacts are important to understanding the fiscal impact of Indian gaming on 
non-Indian governments as compacts are one of the primary tools for formalizing19 
revenue sharing agreements.   
a. Policy Objectives 
 The policy objectives of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act are clearly stated in 
Section 2702 of the act.  They are:  
1. to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a 
means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal governments;  
2. to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe 
adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to 
ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, 
and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator 
and players; and  
3. to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for 
gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on 
Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are 
necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such 
gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.  
(Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2702).  
 
19 Formalized used to indicate those revenue sharing agreements that are legally binding by some outside 
authority and persistent across time. 
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Through the IGRA, the combined regulatory power of the tribe, state, commission and 
federal government, these objectives can be achieved.  
Intentional or not, IGRA removes to some degree a tribe’s independence in 
regulating and governing their own sources of economic development.  This occurs by 
allowing the state to impact the tribe’s decision to pursue gaming.  If a state in itself does 
not allow gaming then the tribe is not allowed to participate in gaming.  This clearly 
imposes the choices of the state upon the tribe. If the state chooses not to negotiate a class 
III gaming compact with the tribe, the tribe cannot file suit against the state.  This makes 
the process of obtaining a compact increasingly more difficult and expensive.  
Furthermore, states may negotiate revenue sharing agreements for issuing the compact.  
In Connecticut, 25% of the gross revenues from tribal gaming operations go to the state, 
in New Mexico 16%, Nevada 9.5% and in New Jersey 6.25% (Giovanna, n.d.).  In 
addition to this, a State can suggest or mandate conditions under which they will ‘agree’ 
to allow on and off reservation Indian gaming.  These ‘conditions’ have implications at 
the local level.  For example, in Minnesota for off reservation gaming the State requires, 
“County and local governments must support the casino...” and “Tribes must agree to 
make specified financial reimbursements to county and local governments” (Walters, 
2000, p. 01B).  In California, new compacts have a focus on local governance.   
The compacts then require that agreements be reached between tribes and affected 
communities for off-reservation mitigation and public service responsibilities, 
including law enforcement provided by local governments.  These agreements are 
subject to binding arbitration of disputes between tribes and local government, 
which encourages both sides to take reasonable positions about gaming 
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expansion.  Equally important, the agreements are enforceable in court. (Jacob, 
2004, p. B9) 
 
Another result of IGRA is that tribes are now assessed fees to support the 
commission.  The policy does not limit the amount of fees that can be assessed to a tribe; 
however it does give the Commission the power to deny or remove licensing if the fees 
are not paid (McFadden, 1996, p. 809).  
b. Process of Governance 
 The Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act directly changed the process of 
governance.  Gaming began as a tool created by and utilized by tribes to enhance their 
economic development.  With the creation of IGRA, an entirely new process of 
governance over gaming began. American Indian gaming is now under the control of 3 
different entities.  Class I gaming which includes traditional tribal games is still under the 
governance of the tribe.  The National American Indian Gaming Commission and the 
tribe now regulate class II gaming, which includes bingo.  Class III gaming “means all 
forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming” and is most often referred 
to as casino gaming and high-stakes gambling (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2703).  This 
form of gaming is now under the control of the tribe, commission, state and federal 
government.   
c. Control and Decision Making 
 The Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act does not change the ownership of 
American Indian gaming; it reinforces the concept of tribal ownership.  However, it does 
provide a platform in which tribal capacity for seeking outside investors can be limited.  
IGRA dictates many changes in the control of gaming as a resource within American 
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Indian gaming relevant to issues of sovereignty by removing tribal control and awarding 
these powers to the commission, state and federal government. 
The National Indian Gaming Commission maintains the power of issuing a 
gaming license.  The Commission is headed by a chairman “...appointed by the President 
with the advice of the Senate...” and further supported by a committee of “two associate 
members who shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior” (Title 25, Chapter 29, 
Section 2704, b).  The chairman maintains the upper hand in class II gaming, with the 
right to close gaming, “levy and collect fines”, “approve tribal ordinances or resolutions” 
and “management contracts” (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2705).  The Committee 
supports the actions of the chairman and also maintains the rights to monitor and inspect 
Class II gaming facilities (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2706).   
The Commission can allow the tribe to conduct self-regulation of Class II gaming 
activities if the tribe has proven that:  its accounting is accurate, it is “safe, fair and 
honest“ in operations and there is no criminal activity.  Furthermore, the tribe must 
demonstrate that it has sole proprietary interest, meaning that the revenues from gaming 
go directly to tribal government operations, tribal welfare, and charity or to “promote 
tribal economic development” (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2710).    
The regulations above also apply to Class III gaming but, Class III gaming also 
includes additional regulations.  In this case tribes must approach their state and request a 
tribal-state compact be established to permit such gaming.  The state is expected to 
negotiate with the tribe in “good faith”.  Once the state has approved a compact, it must 
also be approved by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.  The state cannot refuse to 
negotiate a compact for Class III gaming if the state allows Class III gaming elsewhere in 
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the state. Class III gaming on Indian reservations is then subject to be taxed by the tribe at 
a level comparable to that at which the state taxes other gaming facilities.  The state, 
however, cannot “tax, fee or charge” Class III gaming operations on reservations.  If the 
state and tribe encounter difficulties in negotiating a compact, the federal government can 
assign a mediator.  Both the tribe and the state must submit a compact to the mediator.  
The mediator then chooses one of the compacts.  The Secretary of Interior must also 
approve the compact in light of federal law (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2710). 
IGRA also directly impacts the management of gaming facilities on reservations.  
The Chairman must approve all management contracts.  Prior to approving the contracts 
the Chairman has the right to information involving the contractor.  This includes their 
experience and financial statements (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2711).   
d. Use of Tribal Gaming Revenues 
Revenues from gaming have not suffered many changes as a result of the IGRA and 
these revenues continue to increase at a significant pace.  The tribe is required to use the 
funds for five purposes: 
1. to fund tribal government operations or programs  
2. to provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members 
3. to promote tribal economic development  
4. to donate to charitable organizations  
5. to help fund operations of local government agencies  
(Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2710)   
The tribe may choose to allocate revenues for per capita payments to members.  
However, these payments are subject to federal taxes (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 
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2710).  This is an important aspect involving the policy, because traditionally American 
Indians have not been subject to federal or state taxation. 
IV. Tribal Governance, Economic Development and Public Finance 
In the following discussion we will see that we have different types of 
governments (tribes and cities and counties) providing services to their populace.  Each 
of the different types of governments shares a rather different history that has shaped 
their development and the governance power of each varies.  Outside these differences 
though, there are three common threads.  First, both tribal and non-tribal government is 
an extension of a larger government that has seen growth in their independence over the 
years.  For tribes this revolves around the movement to self-determination and for non-
tribal governments this is a result of the expansion of their role possibly tied with the 
devolution movement.  Second, each is facing the need for resources to meet the 
increasing demands of their populace.  The availability of these resources clearly has the 
potential to impact local governance.  Third, each is playing a larger role within the 
global economy.   What role these differences and similarities play in their relations and 
the impact they have on one another is yet to be explored.   
American Indian tribes practice self-government and are outside both the scope of 
state and local governance and taxation.  American Indian tribes functions as “quasi-
sovereign” nations with political powers and jurisdictional responsibilities.  Many tribes 
have constitutions fostered initially by the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934.  
This Act may very well be viewed as the rebirth of tribal self-governance (Haas, n.d.).  
Not all tribes opted to be covered by this Act, but for those that did, it provided economic 
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development resources including access to funds and designation as a corporation for 
development purposes (Robertson, 2001).   
This is a very important point.  Although economic development and government 
finance are tied together in both tribal and non-tribal communities, in tribal communities 
this connection is often much more concrete with tribal governments acting as 
corporations.  To some degree Indian governments hold considerably more power and 
responsibility than some non-Indian local governments and may more closely parallel the 
responsibilities of a combined federal, state and local government.  Unlike non-Indian 
local governments, the states play an extremely limited role in tribal governance.  Tribal 
governments hold a direct federal-tribal relationship and in most regards have little 
regulations or intervention from state governments.  In addition, in most cases American 
Indian tribes are outside the scope of state and local taxation.  There are variations in the 
role of tribal governments, but overall tribes have the capacity within their jurisdiction to 
define membership, establish tribal laws or codes and administer justice, regulate 
business within their jurisdiction and enact taxes (O’Brien, 1989, pp. 197-233).  They are 
responsible for administering social services to their populace, in combination with those 
services provided by the federal government (O’Brien, 1989, pp. 238-254). 
Economic development in tribal communities is difficult at best.  Tribes continue 
to suffer from historical difficulties, such as those that have resulted from the reservation 
movement.    These difficulties make prosperous economic endeavors very appealing.  
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics from the 2000 Census are presented in 
Tables 2-5. 
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Table 2: Educational Attainment 
 
Population 25 years and over 
Geographic 
area 
 
Popula- 
tion 
16 to 19 
years-- 
Percent 
not 
enrolled 
in 
school 
and not 
a high 
school 
graduate 
 
Popula-
tion 
18 to 24
years-- 
Percent
enrolled
in 
college 
or 
graduate
school 
 
Percent 
with 
less than
a 9th 
grade 
education 
 
Percent 
high 
school 
graduate 
or higher 
 
Percent 
with 
bachelor's 
degree 
or higher 
 
Popula- 
tion 
25 to 34 
years-- 
Percent 
with 
bachelor's
degree 
or higher 
              
American 
Indian 15.1 16.3 10.7 72.8 13.3 10.7
Rural 9.2 21.7 7.9 78.8 16.4 16.4
Urban 10 36.4 7.5 80.8 26.6 29.9
US 9.8 34 7.5 80.4 24.4 27.5
 
Table 3: Percent in Labor Force and Percent Unemployed  
 
Population 16 years and over-
- 
Percent in labor force 
Geographic 
area 
 
Female 
  
 
Total  
Total 
 
With 
own 
chil- 
dren 
under 
6 years 
 
Civi- 
lian 
labor 
force-- 
Percent 
unem- 
ployed 
American 
Indian 56.5 52.2 60.1 13.6
Rural 63.1 56.4 63.2 4.9
Urban 64.1 57.8 61.6 6
US 63.9 57.5 61.9 5.8
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Table 4: Median Income and Per Capita Income  
 
 
Median income 
in 1999 (dollars) 
 
Median earnings in 
1999 of full-time, 
year-round 
workers (dollars) 
Geographic 
area 
  
 
House- 
holds 
 
Families
 
Per 
capita 
income 
in 
1999 
(dollars)  Male 
 
Female 
American 
Indian 29,097 31,929 12,452 29,193 22,253 
Rural 40,041 45,914 19,285 33,972 23,511 
Urban 42,574 51,285 22,198 38,094 28,337 
US 41,994 50,046 21,587 37,057 27,194 
 
Table 5: Those With Income Below Poverty Level 
 
 
Income in 1999 below poverty level 
Geographic 
area 
 
Percent of population 
for whom poverty 
status is determined 
  
 
All 
ages 
 
Related
children
under 
18 
years 
 
65 
years 
and 
over 
 
Percent 
of 
families 
American 
Indian 28.4 35.5 20.7 23.5
Rural 11 13.8 11 8.3
Urban 12.7 16.8 9.5 9.4
US 12.4 16.1 9.9 9.2
 
American Indian communities are less educated, have lower incomes and more than 
double the unemployment and poverty when compared to other communities.  Rural 
communities although similar in other aspects to urban communities, were also less 
educated.  Numerous individuals and groups have theorized why poverty levels are high 
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and per capita income is low among Indian tribes.  Issues include access to employment, 
cultural barriers, policy circumstances and human capital needs.  Research would suggest 
that tribal economic development is aided by a “cultural match” in their institutions, 
deregulatory status and access to capital, but at the same time economic development is 
inhibited by limited market access and tribal infighting.    
Historically, many of the activities on Indian lands were driven by outside forces.  
In more recent years, self-determination has brought about a change in the dynamic of 
Indian development.  In American Indian Policy of Government and Economic 
Development, edited by Lyman H. Legters and Fremont J. Lyden, there is a chapter 
“Redefinition of Property Rights on American Indian Reservations: A Comparative 
Analysis of Native American Economic Development” by Joseph Kalt and Stephen 
Cornell.  Its authors assert, “The central change in Indian economic affairs that self 
determination has brought is that for first time, development programs are being designed 
directly by Indian tribes instead of the federal government (Legters & Lydon, 1994, p. 
122).”   
With the aforementioned change in framework (external to internal economic 
development drivers) the research in this area has become more focused on the internal 
dynamics within tribes that drive economic development.  Kalt and Cornell acknowledge 
that a tribe’s ability to economically develop is differentiated by cultural and political 
factors.  These authors, as well as Miriam Jorgensen (2000) and Jonathan Taylor (2000), 
have produced significant research in the examination of economic development in 
American Indian communities.  Central to their work is the connection between 
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institutions, culture and economic development.  In “Where’s the Glue?  Institutional 
Basis for American Indian Development” Cornell and Kalt begin to develop their theories   
First, we have argued that institutions of self-government are the key to (i.e., the 
necessary condition for) economic development by sovereign societies.  This 
follows since it is the system of incentives and constraints that emanate from 
institutions that promote or inhibit specialization and exchange, and promote or 
inhibit destructive rent seeking. 
Second, we have argued that culture “matters in a particular way: Cultural 
norms for the glue that holds a society’s formal and informal institutions of social 
control and organization together.  Granting the conclusion that successful 
economic development requires effective institutions that can channel resources 
and effort into productive ends, we could reasonably expect that a society’s 
formal institutions would be more effective the closer is the match of those 
institutions to the informal institutions that emanate from cultural norms.  
 (Cornell & Kalt, 1991, p 20-21). 
They further develop this argument suggesting the following are “Necessary and 
sufficient for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations”: 
1. Specialization and Exchange: A willingness to specialize and engage in trade 
with the broader off reservation economy. 
2. Limits to Power: A formal non-Athenian20 governmental structure that 
provides some mechanism of confining the government to the third-party 
enforcer role and shuts down rent seeking; 
 
20 “Athenian democracies (known as general councils in Indian Country) provide no separation of powers 
or other organizational constraints on rent seeking through the political arena (Cornell 1995, p. 21).” 
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3. Cultural Legitimacy: A match between cultural norms governing political 
affairs and the present formal governmental institutions. 
4. Resources: A non-trivial stock of at least one resource (e.g., human capital, 
natural resources). 
(Cornell & Kalt 1995, p. 25).   
They suggest that economic development in these communities can be undermined or 
enhanced by the degree of “cultural match” between the community and institution 
(Cornell & Kalt 1995, p. 23).  They add, that,  
However, because tribes differ so much culturally one from the other, the formal 
governmental structures that are legitimate for one tribe may not be for another.  
As a result, tribes with the same governmental form perform differently in the 
development arena; and these differences can be explained by differences in the 
underlying social contract regarding the norms of legitimate authority (Cornell & 
Kalt, 1995, p. 48). 
This argument comes to full fruition in more recent works, with the discussion of “Nation 
Building” as a platform for economic development in tribal communities. 
A "nation-building" approach to development doesn't say "let's start a business." 
Instead, it says "let's build an environment that encourages investors to invest, that 
helps businesses last, and that allows investments to flourish and pay off." A 
"nation-building" approach requires new ways of thinking about and pursuing 
economic development. Telling the planning office to go get some businesses 
going doesn't begin to crack the problem. The solutions lie elsewhere: in the 
design and construction of nations that work. (Cornell & Kalt, n.d., p. 8) 
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The ties between culture and the pursuit of Indian gaming have been established to be 
relatively strong (Jorgensen, 2000, p. 30).  This study finds, 
On the one hand, it seems that the power of this cultural determined taste cannot 
be understated.  On the other hand, careful examination of the model and 
empirical results shows something else of great importance—that having a 
cultural taste for bingo participation does not predestine later choices.  The reason 
for building in culturally based preferences was to see how they played against 
other forces.  The finding is that the tastes coded by GAMEINDEX support 
choices that are already tilting in one direction or offer a devil’s advocate-like pull 
away from choices that are tilting in the other direction.  They do not fully 
determine choice nor are they irrelevant in the face of market forces.  Indeed, 
“high enough” opportunity costs can still win the day. 
(Jorgensen, 2000, p. 32) 
Beyond the dynamics of culture and institutions, there are advantages for tribes 
pursuing economic development.  Tribes can establish a federally chartered corporation 
for the management of tribal enterprises (Legters & Lydon, 1994, pp. 123-126). “That is, 
in a number of important respects reservations are far more “deregulated” at least with 
respect to non-tribal governments that the vast bulk of the rest of the economy (Legters & 
Lydon, 1994, p. 126).”  Although tribes have had difficulty attracting capital and the 
Bureau of Indian affairs controlled economic development has rarely been successful,  
“The essence appears to be that the combination of more secure property rights, the 
access to (potentially) profitable market niches, and the ability to take control of tribal 
resources from federal and state governments have meant that the tribes themselves are 
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increasingly bearing the opportunity cost of their investment in management decisions 
(Legters & Lydon, 1994, p. 127).”   
 Another interesting source, Economic Development as the Foundation for Self 
Determination, by Theresa Julnes (as cited in Legters & Lydon, 1994) suggests that for 
self-determination to occur it is first necessary for there to be economic development.  
This study was based on a survey that sample leaders of tribal nations and tribal 
corporations on issues relevant to economic development.  “The purpose of this study 
was to report how development decisions in Native Nations have been made and manage 
the past and to examine what obstacles may be hindering future economic development 
(Legters & Lydon, 1994, p. 151).”  Julnes points out in the beginning that tribal 
government is often less bureaucratic than other state and local governments and 
therefore the enterprises they pursue also tend to be less bureaucratic.  This theory raises 
an interesting question when tribes have greater participation in a larger market that 
potentially requires them to adopt a larger bureaucracy to maintain these enterprises, how 
will this impact tribal governance?  The study had the following findings: 
1. Almost all tribes said that they lack capital (96%), 83 percent said they lacked 
financial resources, 76 percent said they lacked trained personnel, and 57 percent 
perceived a lack of natural resources that could be developed (Legters & Lydon, 
1994, p. 155). 
2. Over 94 percent of the respondents felt their tribe needed programs to help 
develop technical skills they were to undertake development plans. Nearly 92 
percent expressed a need or desire for programs to help develop management 
skills to assist in economic development plans. Nearly 87 percent felt that help 
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was needed from both outside agencies and internal kinship groups. 
Approximately 82 percent indicated that they needed help from outside 
consultants for both planning and implementing economic development. Fewer 
than 51 percent of the tribes felt they had the information necessary to develop 
market products (Legters & Lydon, 1994, p. 156).   
3. Over two-thirds of the responding tribal governments reported some economic 
development (see question No.4.  However, nearly 60 percent reported that 
economic development provided 10 percent or less of the funds needed to finance 
their government. (see question No. 2)  Additionally over 60 percent of these 
tribes netted less than $250,000 from these efforts.  Fewer than 10 percent made 
over $1,000,000,000 on such ventures. (see question No. 6)  Thus, while many 
tribes have profited from economic development, few have made enough money 
to support the tribe's self-governance (Legters & Lydon, 1994, p. 156). 
We glean from this that tribes are still in great need of capital of all types and 
educational programs to enhance the capacity to generate and utilize resources.  Given 
this knowledge, what are the existing sources of capital for tribal governments?    One 
source of tribal capital is government grants. However, it appears that these grants may 
be under direct scrutiny from a variety of different angles.  Tribal grants from federal 
agencies in 1998 as were from: 
• BIA  
• Health and Human Services  
• Department of Education   
• Department of Housing and Urban Development   
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• Remaining agencies  
(GAO, 1998, pp. 10-11) 
A significant portion of the monies received by tribes comes from the BIA’s Tribal 
Priority Allocations Fund.  In “Indian Programs: Tribal Priority Allocations Do Not 
Target the Neediest Tribes”, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigates 
at the request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations that tribes with additional 
resources should become more sufficient and that these allocations should go to the 
neediest tribes (GAO, 1998, p. 1).  The GAO responds that, “To determine an equitable 
distribution among the tribes, several types of data may be considered, such as (1) the 
economic status of each tribe, (2) the needs of each tribe, and (3) the government’s 
responsibility to each tribe (GAO, 1998, p. 2).”  The GAO acknowledges that the 
information needed to make these decisions is not readily available. Information on tribal 
revenues, as recorded within the Single Audit Act is unreliable (GAO, 1998, p. 8).  They 
also noted that in order to determine government responsibility all relevant treaties would 
need to be reviewed (GAO, 1998, p. 10).   
Tribes also generate revenues directly and indirectly through business activities 
and taxation.  Total revenue from American Indian/Alaskan Native business excluding 
those that are tribally owned in 2002 was $26.9 billion, with California having the most 
AI/AN businesses and revenues (U.S. Census, 2006b).  Where do these revenues come 
from?  According to the Census report they stem from (in rank order) “construction”, 
“other services (except public administration)”, “health care and social assistance”, 
“professional, scientific and technical services” and “retail trade” (U.S. Census, 2006b).  
According to John Ritter they,  
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... go after tourist dollars with campgrounds and resorts.  They market Native 
American arts.  They develop mineral deposits and oil and gas production.  They 
nurture small businesses on the reservation. (Ritter, 2000, p. 21)  
This statement is supported by numerous articles, which provide recent evidence of these 
endeavors.  Reservation leaders are becoming increasingly active in pursuing other 
business opportunities as demonstrated by the council representing the Mandan, Hidatsa 
and Arikara21 touring businesses (Triola, 1999, p. 18).  The Blackfeet22 have established a 
bank, with the intention of attracting revenues and developing jobs (Ritter, 2000, p. 21).  
Dennis Banks, of the Leech Lake Indian Reservation23 is negotiating to potentially sell 
his maple syrup to Japanese food markets (Furst, 2000, p. 1).  Northwest Native Designs, 
created by Ernie Apodaca is marketing Native American furniture designed by various 
Native artists (Montana, 2000).  And of course, revenues come from gaming.  As 
mentioned previously, Indian gaming currently generates over 19 billion dollars in 
revenue (National Indian Gaming Commission, n.d.). 
Finally, there are two barriers to economic development worthy of mention.  First, 
tribes need market access for development.  Given the rural nature of most tribes, one 
potential mechanism for connecting to the market is internet technology.  The use of 
satellite web links helps remove the barriers such as the lack of telephone connections in 
isolated rural areas, and allow tribes such as the Navajo and Hopi to access the internet 
(Sink, 2000).  These advances could remove reservation boundaries and allow for internet 
based education and jobs to enter.  To date though, these advances have not influenced 
tribes to enter the online gambling arena. 
 
21 North Dakota 
22 North Dakota 
23 Minnesota 
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 Second, another potential barrier supported by anecdotal evidence is that of both 
non-tribal and tribal development competition.  Tribes can face competition from other 
governments and businesses.  For example, the Ho-Chunk’s24 gaming revenue has 
decreased by 80% because of riverboat gaming competition (Kenworthy, 2005).  Tribes 
also face competition from other tribes.  "Where once we could count on such efforts 
being pursued only by state and local governments, we now see such efforts being 
pursued by tribes against one another” (Doyle, 2000, p. 4b).  This statement is 
referencing inter-tribal competition resulting from the pursuit of casino land in 
Wisconsin.  Gaming is not the only root of infighting. The Seminoles have also been 
party to this behavior as they have tried to resolve conflict between Seminoles with and 
without African ancestors over a $56 million dollar payoff for land taken in 1820 
(Glaberson, 2001, p. 1).  In more recent years similar racial tensions have come to surface 
in the Cherokee25 community (Reid, 2007, p. 31).  Not only are tribes competing over 
land and money, they are also competing for resources as demonstrated by the Torres 
Martinez Band26 and Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.  These two groups both want to 
build power plants.  However, limited water and electricity supplies could mean that only 
one will win.  This situation also draws forth another, issue-jurisdiction.  The Torres 
Martinez Band's plans question who will license the project, in light of sovereignty 
issues, believing this should be the federal government or specifically the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (Kraul, 2000). As demonstrated above, tribes not only have to compete 
with the local community they must also compete with one another. 
 
24 Wisconsin 
25 Oklahoma 
26 California 
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 We see here that tribal governance and economic development are very clearly 
tied together given the structure of tribal governments.  Although often difficult, tribes 
are engaging in economic development activities that bear the potential to impact other 
communities.  Like other non-metropolitan communities, tribes face challenges including 
limited market access and competition from other development actors.  Gaming has 
clearly become a very significant form of economic development for tribal governments, 
in what has historically been an extremely challenging environment.   
V. Non-Tribal Municipal Governance, Economic Development and Public Finance 
 Tribes are clearly pursuing development activities.  How then is it, that tribal 
development activity could impact non-tribal governments?  In order to answer this 
question we need to understand the overall structure of non-tribal municipal governance, 
how municipal governments generate revenues, decide upon expenditures and what role 
economic development activities play in these factors.  
 First, there are 87,849 local governments in the United States (Census of 
Governments, 2002, p. 1).  These are divided into 3, 034 counties, 35,937, towns, and 
municipalities and 48,878 special district governments.  Each of the different governing 
types holds different responsibilities to their constituents.   Powers to govern at a local 
level are given from all levels of government (local, state and federal) (Kemp, 2002, p. 
70).   Historically, counties have functioned to provide state services and have had very 
little direct authority, unless they have “home-rule” which provides for greater authority 
(Kemp, 2002, p.119).   Most counties are headed by 3-5 person committees elected 
locally (Kemp, 2002, p.120).  There are four prominent types of city governance: “strong 
mayor, commission type, mayor-council and council-manager (Kemp, 2002, p.65)”.  The 
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responsibilities of cities and their development are tied to the urban migration of the 
second half of the 19th century.   
There is a diversity of theories on not only what drives local government finance, 
but how local government revenues and expenditures impact one another.   Some 
assumptions seem relatively safe to make.  Given that local governments are an extension 
of the state, one could safely assume the State (and any policies that impact the state) 
could have an impact on local government finances.  In addition to this a state may limit a 
local government’s capacity to tax.  For example, in many states the state restricts the use 
of ‘non-property taxes’ and limits the amount of property tax that can be collected 
(exceptions include home-rule states) (Florestano, 1981, pp. 122-123).  Local government 
taxes are also self limiting through competition with other local governments.  Fear of the 
populace fleeing to an area with lower local taxes may keep local governments from 
increasing their tax rates (Florestano, 1981, p. 123).  Although local government 
financing and budgeting is highly diversified and informal in many cases some 
generalizations can be made (Mikesell, 1999, pp. 118-119).  For local governments the 
biggest part of their budget is education expenditures, while the remainder of their budget 
is fragmented with welfare and police expenditures only accounting for approximately 
10% of the budget (Mikesell, 1999, p. 116).  Local governments often face balanced 
budget requirements, although they have rather difficult hurdles to overcome when 
implementing new financial decisions (Mikesell, 1999, pp. 123-124).  Local governments 
also have limited abilities to run deficits (Mikesell, 1999, pp. 125). 
Like tribal governments, non-tribal governments also face impact from local 
development.  Sources of local government revenues include property taxes (decreasing), 
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“current charges” or user fees (increasing) and “intergovernmental fiscal transfers” 
(Kemp, 2002, p. 133).  It seems logical to suggest that anything that impacts the populace 
or businesses in a given area has the potential to impact government revenues and 
expenditures, since these are reliant on the populace and/or business base.   
To what degree revenues influence expenditures and vice versa are not always 
clear.  There are three prevalent theories: 
1. Revenues and expenditures change together. 
2. Revenues change first. 
3. Expenditures change first.  
(Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen, 1989, p. 415) 
 
Holtz-Eakin et al. suggest that the first hypothesis is incorrect.  Their research suggests 
although revenues can influence expenditures, expenditures do not influence revenues to 
the same degree (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1989, p. 428).    
Given the reliance on community aspects such as business and population growth 
(development), we must now ask what drives development in these communities and how 
these developments then impact the community.  Development efforts in non-Indian 
communities face similar challenges.  One primary theory is “location theory”.  This 
theory suggests that there are a lot of factors that influence where businesses locate, and 
that the diversity of these factors has increased with the changes in technology (Bingham, 
1993, p. 3).   Given that this research focuses on non-metropolitan communities, many of 
these theories are less applicable as they are largely centered on metropolitan 
communities (Bingham, 1993, p. 61).  Of the 3,034 counties in the US, over 2,000 are 
considered non-metropolitan (“Measuring Rurality: Urban Influence Codes,” 2003).  
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Non-metropolitan or rural communities arose as more single purpose, unlike the more 
diverse metropolitan environment (Bingham, 1993, p. 61).  Lorna Aldrich and Lorin 
Kusmin found the following factors to be related to rural economic growth in the 1980s:   
Table 1 -- Factors that may affect rural economic growth 
 
Policy factors 
• Taxation 
• Public spending 
• Public capital stocks 
• Branch banking laws 
• Availability of industrial-revenue bond financing 
Other factors 
• Wage levels 
• Unionization levels 
• Unemployment levels 
• Labor force quality (measured by education) 
• Proximity to higher education institution 
• Access to highways, airports, and other transportation 
• Proximity to metropolitan area 
• Per capita or family income 
• Population size and density 
• Urbanization 
• Minority population concentration 
• Temperature and precipitation 
• Energy prices 
• Industry mix or concentration 
• Availability and price of land 
• Labor productivity 
• Local fire protection ratings 
• Small business activity measures 
• Population age distribution measures 
Source: Compiled from Kusmin (1994), pp 16-21. 
 
(as cited in Aldrich & Kusmin, 1997, p. 2) 
 
The overall message from Aldrich and Kusmin is that rural economic growth centers on 
private business needs and the more favorable the environment for business, the greater 
the growth potential.   Positive growth factors include, “…low initial labor costs 
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(earnings per job), retirement county status, high education spending per pupil, and the 
presence of a passenger service airport within 50 miles.”, “..State right-to-work laws, the 
percentage of adults who had completed high school, and access to the interstate highway 
system.”, and negative growth factors include “…large transfer payments to county 
residents and the relative size of the African-American population..” (Aldrich & Kusmin, 
1997, p. 1).  It seems safe to say, that given the importance of transportation and market 
access, rural locations are at a disadvantage when it comes to economic development 
(Bingham, 1993, p. 3).   
 All of this suggests that given that Indian gaming has the potential to impact both 
the populace and business climate, it bears the potential to influence the fiscal nature of 
non-Indian governments surrounding them, while the conditions in the communities 
surrounding the gaming operation also have the potential to influence the gaming 
operation.  Given that rural communities are often “single purpose”, Indian gaming may 
very well provide an economic stimulus in cases where there has been a decline in the 
original purpose, such as a loss of a manufacturing plant.  In these cases non-Indian 
communities may benefit.  Given the advantages of more limited regulation in tribal 
communities, tribal communities may have an advantage over non-tribal communities in 
business opportunities allowing them to pursue endeavors that may transfer resources 
from the surrounding community to the reservation community.   
 As we discuss the potential for mitigated and unmitigated impact, we must bear in 
mind any potential “rent-seeking” or unsubstantiated demands for tribal resources.  What 
could cause local governments to engage in such behaviors?  The role of counties has 
been expanding in recent times.  One of the greatest challenges given this expanded role 
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is finding resources to meet these expanding needs (Kemp, 2002, p. 121).  Cities, like 
counties, are facing an expanded role in local governance compared to their role 
historically.  Cities’ responsibilities have continued to grow and have necessitated 
resources beyond those initially provided for by property taxes (Kemp, 2002, p. 63).  
After the Great Depression these needs were aided by federal assistance until the end of 
the 1970s when pressure to downsize the federal government contributions ended general 
assistance.   The prevailing trend over the past two decades has been one of “self-
reliance” and cost reductions (Kemp, 2002, p.64). 
 On the flip side of the coin, as previously mentioned local governments frequently 
argue tribes face an unfair advantage in attracting business ventures.  First, inter-
jurisdictional competition is by far not a new phenomenon.   
States, regions and cities are engaged in a very aggressive competition for new 
investment and the retention of existing businesses. This competition has been 
ongoing since the inception of the country. It is precipitated by the mobility of 
capital and the institutional structure of the United States. While private capital is 
free to move from city to city, state to state, and even nation to nation, the 
economic health of the majority of communities in the United States is dependent 
on the ability of those political jurisdictions to retain and attract private capital 
(Peterson 1981; Jones and Bachelor 1993). (as cited in Louishomme, 2005, p. 63) 
This competition in many ways must be intensified in rural areas where there are a very 
limited number of resources or business development opportunities. Second, to obtain an 
edge in this competitive environment, local governments may employ a variety of 
techniques. 
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In the drive to retain and attract private capital, subnational governments in the 
United States, including states, regions and cities, engage in a wide variety of 
activities and spend a substantial amount of public dollars. The range of economic 
development programs administered by these jurisdictions range from traditional 
“smoke stack chasing” activities such as grants of free or low-cost land, tax 
abatement, tax increment financing, industrial revenue bonds, and custom tailored job 
training programs  – what Eisinger (1988: 10) calls “supply-side incentive” programs 
– to activities that are intended to foster modernization of production facilities, the 
transition of academic and scientific knowledge into business opportunities, and 
expansion of export markets - what Eisinger (1988) calls entrepreneurial policies. 
(Louishomme, 2005, p. 4) 
Are tribes at an advantage when it comes to “supply-side incentives”?  At this point there 
is yet to be any decisive research in this area.  Yes, tribes may provide tax incentives to 
businesses, but are they greater than the tax incentives provided by non-tribal 
governments?  Further, do these supply side incentives matter?    
Despite the enormous amount of public revenues involved, there is no systematic 
evidence that this investment results in the creation of new jobs, the reduction of 
unemployment, or is a critical factor in corporate location decisions. Indeed, there 
is strong evidence that these expenditures do not stimulate economic growth or 
influence corporate location decisions.(Louishomme, 2005, p. 65) 
 
The answer appears to be maybe or maybe not. 
 
As the preceding paragraphs suggest there is clearly motivation for both counties 
and cities to seek new revenue sources.  Whether or not they see tribes as a potential 
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revenue source and the degree to which tribes possess a ‘supply-side incentive’ advantage 
is yet to be seen.  In addition to these competitive angles, there are non-revenue seeking 
changes that counties and cities have sought to assist with the decreasing revenues and 
expenditures ratio.  Given that both counties and cities facing increasing resource issues, 
some counties and cities have begun consolidating services (Kemp, 2002, p. 135) and 
there are also models of “regional” governance (Kemp, 2002, p. 161).  These regional 
governance models bear relevance to the topic of this thesis.  They can closely parallel 
some of the needs and issues faced by tribal communities with regard to their local 
government neighbors.  When discussing the importance of regional cooperation 
Hershberg says,  
The fear and frustration felt by so many suburbanites about the problems of big 
cities is understandable, but their economic interests are not well served by 
turning their backs and ignoring the troubles next door.  Such a course guarantees 
that problems will grow, opportunities will be lost, and, in the long run, everyone 
will be worse off.  The time has come to recognize the mutual interests across the 
region and to begin a rational dialogue about what is required to work with each 
other to shape a prosperous future (as cited in Kemp, 2002, p. 177). 
 
To what degree this statement rings true for tribes and local governments can only be 
partially explored here, for the complexity of this suggestion demands volumes.  
Regardless, it seems safe to say it has some bearing given the increasing importance of 
local “regions” in the global economy (Kemp, 2002, p. 179).   
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VI. Conclusion 
There are numerous tribes in the US that function as “quasi-sovereign” entities 
directly adjacent to communities within the scope of municipal governments.   The way 
in which these tribes operate is governed by a long history of somewhat conflictual US 
policy.   Given that formal Indian policy for the most part only dictates a federal-tribal 
relationship many of the activities between tribes and local governments are off the radar 
and happen in an informal manner.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is one of the 
more significant Indian policies put forth in the latter half of this century.  This Act has 
direct bearing on the potential utilization and operation of Indian gaming facilities.  This 
Act directly influences the way in which Indian gaming operations are established and 
the manner in which the revenues from Indian gaming are used.  The potential for 
unmitigated fiscal impact from Indian gaming on non-tribal municipal governments is 
rooted in the unique and complicated political environment that surrounds Indian 
communities.  Within the broader scope of United States Indian policy, we have 
communities with their own distinct characteristics operating adjacent to one another.  
Examining the fundamentals of these governance structures aids in understanding the 
impact these governments could potentially have on one another.  The dynamics of 
government finances and economic development in tribal and non-tribal communities has 
direct bearing on the evidence for or against un-mitigated impact from Indian gaming 
operations on non-tribal governments since both tribal and non-tribal governments are 
reliant on a tax base directly influenced by economic development.  Development in 
tribal communities historically has been driven by external forces, most often subsidized 
by the federal government.  In more recent times, this has changed as tribes have become 
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more self-sufficient.  Some argue that tribal development is influenced by cultural, 
political and historical elements and often enhanced by their deregulated status, but 
limited by their lack of market access and capital.  Governments in tribal communities 
are subsidized by both the federal government and tribal development activities.  A key 
difference is the ability tribes have to utilize their deregulated status. Given the focus on 
non-metropolitan communities in this dissertation, these factors are relatively similar for 
non-tribal governments.  Non-tribal municipal governments are reliant on property and 
sales tax revenue in combination with a decreasing amount of intergovernmental transfers 
from federal and state governments.  They too face path-dependent trajectories with a 
limited access to capital.  Both tribal and non-tribal governments face increasing resource 
demands and have deployed various tactics to try to improve community economic 
development.  The degree to which either community has an advantage in this effort is 
not clear.  What is clear is that the literature suggests cooperative “regional” efforts can 
be advantageous especially in the global perspective.  Chapter 3 explores in depth how 
tribal and local governments interact. 
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Chapter 3: Tribal/Local Government Interaction and Specific Examples of Asserted 
Impact and Mitigation 
I. Introduction 
Does the socioeconomic impact of Indian gaming extend beyond the reservation 
boundaries?  This chapter examines the manner in which tribes and local governments 
interact with one another, providing for mechanisms of mitigation and collaboration.  It 
explores specific examples of suggested impact and mitigation from a variety of sources.  
It looks at relations between tribes and local governments to outline the dynamics of their 
relationships and begin to search for concrete examples of impact and mitigation.  
Second, it examines the evidence for a socio-economic impact of Indian gaming on non-
tribal communities.  Third, it looks for evidence of a fiscal impact.  Finally, it examines 
any existing mitigation efforts.  This will answer the question of whether there is a need 
or justification for these revenue-sharing arrangements.   
II. Tribal and Non-Tribal Municipal Government Relations 
 Tribes are traditionally viewed as outside the scope of intergovernmental relations 
in the US.  But, in reality, tribes directly interact with all levels of government.  Although 
few examples of tribal intergovernmental relations exist in the literature, this literature 
still can provide the foundation for understanding intergovernmental relations in general.    
The literature highlights three models of intergovernmental relations: 
1. Coordinate-Authority Model--local authority nested within the state, 
national authority separate. 
2. Overlapping-Authority Model--National, state, and local authority overlap 
and intersect. 
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3. Inclusive-Authority--Local authority nested in state authority and state 
authority nested in national authority. 
(O’Toole, 2000, p. 75)   
It is not surprising that tribes are not included in the formal models.  Some authors have 
suggested that a more formal relationship be established. 
The formal status of American Indians in the U.S. federal system continues to be 
a social, political, and legal enigma; however, it is not our intention to enter into 
this fray (see, e.g., Emenhiser, 2002). Rather, we suggest that in attempting to 
incorporate this fourth type of government into the IGR framework some issues of 
“fit” arise, especially when judged against how other governments fit in the 
intergovernmental maze. The fact that tribal governments bring different 
considerations to our understanding of IGR is to be expected. Nevertheless, we 
would argue that much is to be gained by taking a broader perspective. The 
relations of Native American groups with other governments in the federal system 
are becoming increasingly noticeable and intertwined, especially as they pertain 
to the emergence of Indian gaming and the perceived economic stakes with which 
it is associated (e.g., Brosnan, 1996; Jorgensen, 1998; O’Brien, 2002). Although 
the role of American Indians in the American political system has been 
approached from a number of useful perspectives, including understanding their 
actions as organized interest groups (Mason, 2000), a vast majority are members, 
first and foremost, of tribal governments. It is these governments, propelled in 
large measure by the economics of gaming that are helping to usher in a new era 
in IGR, especially with respect to the American states.  
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(as cited in Mays & Taggart, 2005, p.75) 
The relations between tribes and local governments are explored here in order to 
understand how these relations affect fiscal impact and further how they provide for a 
venue for mitigation for any possible impact from tribal activities.   
Although there initially may appear to be a “dearth” of scholarly information on 
tribal-local relations (Collard, 2006, p. 4), there is actually a wealth of information 
contained within less conventional pieces of literature.  Information on tribal and non-
tribal relations is found most often through case studies, newspaper articles and internet 
accounts.  Outside of cases studies, there are very little actual textual accounts of tribal 
and non-tribal government relations unless it is deeply embedded in literature 
surrounding specific topic areas such as land management and gaming.  After an 
extensive review of journalistic sources, it becomes clear that there are a multitude of 
relations between tribes and local government spanning a diverse number of topics.  By 
using Lexis-Nexis to search newspaper accounts for the past five years, one can find 
numerous articles on tribal and non-tribal government relations.  Search terms included 
American Indian, tribe, local government, city and county in a variety of orders.  This 
search was then supplemented by internet searches which yielded several additional 
articles.  Altogether over 120 articles were collected and reviewed.  Most often the 
accounts involved issues of governance, politics, land, taxes, environment, infrastructure 
and gaming.  None of these topics should be considered to be mutually exclusive as 
almost all are tied to each other at some point.  But these categories seem to be helpful in 
distinguishing some of the more unique aspects of each type of interaction. Interactions 
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outside the gaming arena help to provide for context in which gaming operations occur.  
Overall the interactions tended to fall into three broad categories: 
• Initial Interactions-These were usually simply informative exchanges between the 
two groups. 
• Secondary Interactions-These included negotiations, agreements and disputes post 
some event or development. 
• Final Interactions-These include lawsuits and/or the exchange of goods in 
response to a secondary interaction.  
Many of the interactions crisscrossed these groups making it difficult to clearly pin them 
to one particular group, however this grouping does help organize our thoughts 
somewhat.  Further, the literature search provides a fairly comprehensive albeit 
incomplete list of types of interaction between tribes and local governments.  These 
interactions include interaction at cities, counties and districts and span no less than 11 
states (Kansas, Washington, New York, California, Iowa, Montana, Utah, Nebraska, 
Mississippi, Virgina and Texas).   
a. Governance 
 There is clear evidence for relations between tribes and local governments.  In 
2005, Laura Evans, from the University of Michigan, wrote Influencing Powerful 
Partners:  American Federalism and Strategies of Tribal Governments.  This dissertation 
looks at the relations between federal, state, local and tribal governments and concludes, 
“The broader implications here are that the cultivation of expertise and the use of 
institutional niches can allow marginalized interests to expand their political influence 
(Evans, 2005, p. 270).” The second dissertation in 2006 by James Collard, of the 
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University of Missouri-St. Louis, titled Tribal-Municipal Cooperation in Oklahoma takes 
a more applied approach.  Collard used a survey to examine tribal-local relations in 
Oklahoma and concluded that… 
… while there is general agreement that cooperation between tribal and municipal 
officials is important, there is very little regular contact between tribal and 
municipal officials in Oklahoma.  Next, racism is still a serious barrier to tribal-
municipal cooperation.  It is demonstrated by many municipal officials’ incorrect 
perceptions concerning the lower educational and income levels of Native 
Americans in the state, especially as they are compared with the study’s targeted 
cities.  Third, trust and respect are critical elements in the tribal – municipal 
relationship; however, the major determinant of how important municipal officials 
view cooperation with the tribes is the citizens’ views concerning the relationship.  
Fourth, there is no relationship between the socio-economic characteristics, such 
as median household income level and educational level and the importance 
municipal officials place on cooperation with the tribes.  Finally, there are 
significant differences between the tribal and municipal leaders concerning the 
salient issues.  The most important difference is that while the tribal leaders list 
sovereignty as the number one issue, the municipal leaders list it last. 
(Collard, 2006, 195) 
 
 Also, in “The Opinions of Cities and Counties on the Impact of Gambling Casinos 
on their Communities”, conducted by the state of Minnesota, we see evidence of 
cooperation.  This study assessed local opinions regarding Indian gaming facilities. Using 
a survey, it provided insight into the interactions between tribes and local governments.  
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The survey covered 137 cities within a 20 mile radius of an Indian casino, achieving an 
81 percent response (McCormack, 1997, p. 1).  Question Number 5 asked, "Does your 
unit of government have any signed agreements with nearby tribal governments, casino 
management, or other tribal government (McCormack, 1997)?”    The agreements or 
negotiations described by city governments include:  casino, fire protection, water, sewer, 
animal control, police, inspections, airport improvements and operations, and road 
improvement.  Four local governments responded that they had signed agreement with 
the tribes and eight had discussions with the tribes regarding mutual issues. 
Given the elements of self-governance tribal sovereignty provides, it is no 
surprise that tribes find themselves in relationships with other governments.  Some of 
these relationships are formally established between paired governments as is the 
relationship between the Swinomish27 tribe and Seattle, which have an official 
“government to government” agreement (Kamb, 2004, p. B1).  Others are a bit larger and 
may include a tribe and several local governments, such as the “Memorandum of 
Understanding” between the Seneca-Cayuga28 tribe, Cayuga County and Auburn City, 
New York (“Seneca-Cayuga’s Release…,” 2004).  Finally, there are a few examples of 
very large group agreements like that of the “Great Lakes Declaration” which engaged 
federal, state, local and tribal governments in a formal agreement (“Cabinet Members, 
Governors, Mayors…,” 2004).  However, many relationships between governments are 
less formal then these and relate directly to specific situations.  In some cases, local 
governments need authority from the state to enter into agreements with tribes (“A 
Fruitful Partnership…,” 2000, p. B08).   
 
27 Washington 
28 Oklahoma 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 65 
 
 
 
 Not only do tribes and local governments interact in the above fashion, but tribal 
members may engage in direct participation in local governments under their dual 
citizenship.  If this ability seems hindered, a tribe(s) can sue as the Omaha and 
Winnebago29 did with regards to employment with the Thurston County government 
(“Tribes Accuse County…,” 2004).    
 Tribes and local governments may also interact when one of the governments 
attempts to assert its authority over the others constituents.  For example, the Yakama30 
implemented an alcohol ban on their reservation, asserting that this ban also included 
non-Indian residents within reservation boundaries (Murphy, 2000, p. 02A).  This type of 
attempt is increasing given the “checker boarding” that occurred during the allotment 
period.  The battles between Thurston County residents and the Winnebago and Omaha 
tribes also present another interesting example of this issue and exemplify growing tribal 
self-governance.  The Winnebago have assumed EPA pesticide regulations within the 
reservation boundaries which has upset non-Indian residents, who would be subject to 
those regulations (Hammel, 2003, p. 1A).  These government-to-government conflicts 
can also occur with relation to the provision of services.  For example, Thurston County 
is required to provide fire services to the Omaha reservation, but does not have the 
authority to impose fines or sanctions (Hammel, 2003, p. 1B).   
Tribes and local governments interact politically with increasing frequency.  As 
both groups come to recognize the importance of the other in their community-related 
endeavors, it makes it natural to assume they will actively pursue their interests.  The 
only accounts found document tribal groups attempting to influence non-tribal elections.   
 
29 Nebraska 
30 Washington 
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For example, tribes may provide funds for candidates or agendas and bills in local 
political races (e.g. McGreevy, 2002, p. 3; Arner, 2004, p. B10).  Tribal issues may also 
play a role in a non-tribal election over the candidate’s stance on tribal related activities 
(e.g. Podger, 2004, p. B4).  Tribes may also become very vocal and active in questioning 
those elected (e.g. “Economic Boycott…”, 2004).   Finally, tribes may be actively 
engaged by the outside governments in things such as redistricting (e.g.. Humphrey, 
2001).  Finally, in a more extreme example it is possible for a tribe and local government 
to merge in times of hardships as several Alaskan communities are considering (Gay, 
2003, p. A1).   
b. Land Relations  
As we begin to see in the above discussion of interaction surrounding governance 
and politics, land is an important resource that drives tribal and non-tribal interaction.  
Tribal land is in most cases outside the jurisdiction of local governments, but land can 
still be given, argued over and negotiated for.  The city of Eureka, California returned 
land to the Wiyot31 tribe.  This land was returned as a form of restitution for a massacre 
of the tribe in 1860. (Barnard, 2004)   It is more common for tribes to buy back ancestral 
lands.  With increasing economic resources, tribes according to the Denver Post are 
buying significant portions of non-reservation land (Miniclier, 2000, p. B01).  Many local 
governments are concerned with issues of zoning, taxation and externalities of particular 
land use.  As touched upon briefly, once tribal land is taken into trust by the US federal 
government, local jurisdiction is removed at least for issues of land use.  This legal stance 
is exemplified in the case of Aquinnah-Gay Head Community Association which sued 
 
31 California 
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the Wampanoag32 tribe over a shed built on tribal land (Burge, 2004, p. B1).  The suit 
seeks issue not with the shed, but the fact that the tribe did not request a permit to build 
the shed, following a series of questionable negotiations between the tribe, state and 
township. The township claimed that the tribe gave up its zoning rights and agreed to 
subject itself to town zoning regulations and procedures.  The court’s response was, 
“However, absent clear consent by the Tribe to such judicial intervention, this Court is 
constrained to conclude that the Town received a right but no remedy (Burge, 2004, p. 
B1).”  Thus, the township has no power to enforce its regulations.  This case is a bit more 
complicated then most of the zoning issues encountered as there is a mitigating 
agreement to discuss.  More often it is a clear cut issue with the local government having 
no rights to zoning regulation on tribal land although the local governments tend to take 
these issues to commissions and courts frequently.   
 This leads to another frequently argued issue between tribes and local 
governments, land acquisition.  Once tribes acquire land, if it is placed into trust, it is not 
only removed from local jurisdictional control but also removed from local taxation. As 
discussed above jurisdictional issues are common, but two of the unique stories found 
involve individuals and companies requesting that tribes acquire land to put it in to trust 
which would allow private parties to do things with the land otherwise not allowed or 
condoned by the local government.  In one case, an individual land owner offered to sell 
his land to a tribe in order that a gas station could be built there, which the local 
government had denied zoning for twice (Heffter, 2004, p. H8).    A similar case involved 
a company wanting to open a landfill.  That company offered significant compensation to 
the tribe in exchange for its taking over the land and bringing it under trust status 
 
32 Massachusetts 
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(Davenport, 2004, p. B01).  Finally, land acquisition also poses a threat to local 
governments as the acquisition removes the land from tax rolls and according to some 
gives tribes an unfair advantage (Olson, 2000, p. 3B).  On the flip side, some 
governments may feel that by releasing land to tribal trust they will gain benefit from the 
endeavors the tribes uses that land for, as did Roseburg City Council when they 
supported the Cow Creek tribe decision to use land to build a convention center (Duncan, 
2004). 
 Not all land related issues between local and tribal governments are negative.  We 
see cases such as the city of Eureka giving land to the tribe and such good will stories as 
Snohomish County, Washington changing zoning regulations in areas surrounding tribes 
to be more conducive to tribal cultural values (Brooks, 1999, p. B1).  Land use issues can 
also be a catalyst for establishing government to government relationships between local 
and tribal governments, as seen in Snohomish County where there is now regular 
interaction between the groups (“Briefly…,” 2004, p. H4). 
c. Taxes 
 Taxes are certainly an issue that drives some tribal and non-tribal government 
interaction.  Since tribal lands are exempt from many forms of taxation how does this 
apply to lands tribes have more recently purchased?  For example in Nebraska in 1998, 
…such land can be taxed unless Congress specifically says otherwise.  The ruling 
is a victory for state and local governments seeking to protect their tax bases and a 
setback for tribes across the nation that have been using reservation-gambling 
revenues to rebuild their land base.  State and local governments generally cannot 
tax reservation land owned by a tribe, but the Supreme Court previously has 
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recognized an exception for on-reservation land not held in federal trust – land the 
tribe is free to sell without any restriction.  Monday’s decision fine-tuned that 
exception by narrowing it. (Blackwood, 1998, p. 5). 
There are specific interactions regarding restaurant (Morain, 2001, p. 6), cigarette (Wack, 
2003) and gas taxes (“Lawsuit Seeks Showdown…,” 2006).  In the case of cigarette 
taxes, these debates have become very heated.  These tax issues can also be legally 
complex.  For example in Wisconsin with regard to Oneida gas stations,  
Those gas stations and convenience stores outside the 32 acres had to pay 
property taxes. Yet, there is no mechanism for collecting those taxes from a 
sovereign nation, another court decreed.  
 The Indian nation subsequently paid about $5 million to the city of Oneida, the 
equivalent of the property taxes it owed from 1988 to 2005, after signing a 
compact with the city. The nation offered similar deals to other jurisdictions. But 
Madison County couldn't abide the conditions offered in a compact, such as 
allowing the nation to have its own building codes on non-nation land, 
DiVeronica says. The county voted not to sign a compact with the tribe and has 
not received any "tax" money. (Perlman, 2007) 
d. Environment and Infrastructure 
 Hand in hand with governance, interactions over land and taxes are interactions 
over the environment and infrastructure.  Most of the articles in this area relate to water 
in one way or another.  Most heated conflicts center on water rights claims.  These 
conflicts appear to engage numerous participants as demonstrated by the Snake Basin 
water issue in which, at least “...two dozen local governments including cities, counties 
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and highway and school districts..” question the water rights of the Nez Perce33 tribe 
(“Idaho Supremes Allow…”, 2004).  Not only do water rights issues address who holds 
the right, but how much may be charged for utilization of the resource.  In the Southwest 
many cities lease water rights from tribes.  A study discussed a situation with the 
Catawba34 tribe and Rock Hill, in which Rock Hill imposed an ‘impact fee’ after a water 
rate had been negotiated  causing difficulty for the tribe as it already had contracts on the 
land (“Catawbas Sue…,” 2004).  The second situation involved a tribe that was working 
towards building its own water treatment plant because it felt some tribal members would 
not be able to afford the city rates (“Brief News Stories…,” 2004).   
 Also, tied to water rights but in a bit of a different way are interactions over 
salmon.  Two articles were found that discuss cooperative efforts between tribes and local 
governments over water issues tied to salmon (Barnard, 2004; “Agreement Signed to 
Remove…,” 2004).  In the article regarding Port Angeles and the Lower Elwha 
Klallam35, although overall interaction seemed cooperative, there was some disagreement 
between the city council and mayor on the topic (“Agreement Signed to Remove…,” 
2004).   Similar is a conflict between the Miccosukee36 tribe and South Florida Water 
Management District.  The tribe has sued the District over water pollution that is 
impacting the Everglades (Carlson, 2004). 
 Another sub-area of interaction with regards to the environment and infrastructure 
is environmental impact statements (ex. Mueller, 2004).  Similar to this are articles on 
environmental issues (also see Brown, 2004, p. A14; Wetzel, 2004).  Finally, in an article 
 
33 Idaho 
34 South Carolina 
35 Washington 
36 Florida 
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on Ponca37 tribe and Kay County and Osage County, we see a tribal and local 
government working in cooperation for the benefit of the local community to build a 
bridge (“Tribe, Two Counties…,” 2004).  Another example that demonstrates this type of 
cooperation is “The Northwoods NiiJii Enterprise Community, inc. (NNEC, Inc.)” which 
consists of tribal and non-tribal communities in Wisconsin that have joined together for 
economic development purposes (Thompson, 2003).  Although examples of 
infrastructure related interactions were minimal, one might wonder if this is an example 
of:  “The fights often go unnoticed because they are important only to the Indians waging 
them or to their immediate neighbors (Kimberly, 2000, p. 1).”  This suggests that 
interactions with a limited number of actors may receive less attention than other 
interactions.  Maybe not only do the “fights” go unnoticed, but even less noticed are the 
cooperative engagements for infrastructure improvement that lack sensationalism.  Given 
the closing of the gap between tribal and non-tribal lands, these interactions may no 
longer continue to go unnoticed (Miller, 2004, p. A17). 
e. Cultural Resources 
 Another rich area of interaction often lost in larger struggles and negotiations over 
land use is that of cultural resources, often but not always embedded in land use issues.  
At the root of some of these interactions are required permits with reference to the 
archaeological significance of the land under development.  When these permits are not 
sought, struggles erupt such as the case in Cumberland, Rhode Island.  The council 
approved a walking trail without having the appropriate archaeological assessments and 
permits filed, upsetting the tribe because of the possible disturbance to tribal artifacts on 
the land (Lewis, 2004).  This threat to cultural artifact preservation is even greater at the 
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individual level, when counties often do not require individuals to seek such permits 
(Fausset, 2001, p. 4).  Tribes may fight back with lawsuits (Leventis, 2004, p. B01; 
Whitehead, 2003), but not all cases are conflictual.  The St. Charles Parish changed its 
development plan to protect possible cultural artifacts of the Chitimacha38 (Swerczek, 
2003, p. 1).  Another good example is found in Boulder, Colorado where the city has 
given tribes power over cultural artifacts when found on “city open space” (Good, 2002, 
p. 25A).  Although many of these issues are predominantly land related, other issues exist 
as well.  For example, there was a movement to rename “Andrew Jackson Highway” 
because it offended tribes (Griffin, 2001, p. A10).   
III. Tribal/Local Government Relations Survey 
 In an attempt to better illuminate the above relations a survey (Appendix A) was 
sent out to a sample of tribes and local governments from the literature fore-mentioned.   
The sample for this research was gathered through the above referenced review of the 
literature which included searches of Lexis-Nexis and Internet searches on key words 
such as American Indian, Tribal, City, County and Local Government spanning 
approximately the past 7 years altogether that eventually yielded the original sample for 
this work.  A supplemental sample was constructed using a similar search only on more 
recent dates, since the time since the research had originated spanned almost 2 years.  
Overall more than 120 cases of tribal local government interaction were uncovered. 
The initial goal for the sample was a total of 50 pairs of tribal-local governments 
interacting over a specific situation or issue were collected through a literature review 
from newspapers, journals and Internet news sources.  With duplicates removed this 
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endeavor actually resulted in 34 tribes and 46 local governments including counties, 
cities and towns in the original sample.  After duplicates were removed the secondary 
sample included an additional 20 tribes and 29 local governments. The disproportionate 
number of local government is a result of tribes interacting with more than one local 
government.  Methodologically this sample would be described as a non-probability 
purposive sample.  The goal here was to create an inclusive heterogeneity sample of the 
span of tribal-local government interaction and not to generate a random sample 
supportive of probability methodologies.  This sample was used to create an outline of 
tribal-local government interaction that summarized the situations and types of 
interactions that occur given the situation lending itself to identifying for future research 
a sub sample meeting a proportional quota of the original sample as identified in the 
above section. Given the methodology used there was an over sampling of gaming 
interactions, as gaming interactions are often more likely to find themselves 
sensationalized in the media. This is in contrast to interactions over social services or 
general community functions.   
Those cases identified in the above sample were approached with a survey 
(Appendix A)39 that addressed the questions to be answered in this dissertation and 
provided greater detail of the interaction(s) over the specified situation or issue suggested 
by the literature. 40 The first deployment of the survey was as follows: 
1) Initial contact with Tribal or Local Government’s most senior official (Chief, Mayor 
and/or Administrator) via email or phone requesting their participation in study.  
 
39 Note the survey directions varied slightly given the method of completion. 
40 Since contacts in this survey will be appointed or elected government officials it is therefore exempt from 
the human subjects review process.  Appropriate paperwork is on file with the Internal Review Board at 
UMSL.   
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2) Present three methods of survey completion: online, mail or via telephone. 
3) Given the preferred method of participation administer the survey.  
4) Make follow-up contact via email method if available at least once more over a 
period of 30 days and one phone attempt for those groups without email.   
Once a contact agreed to participate the survey was delivered according to the method 
requested: 
• Online/Email Survey 
o Email link to survey to appropriate individual as ascertained by initial 
contact. 
• Mail Survey  
o Use US mail to deliver the Survey and return envelopes. 
• Phone Survey 
o Mail or email survey for review then contact appropriate individual to 
complete survey over telephone. 
In the first survey effort only 1 person requested a mail survey and 1 person requested an 
emailed version of the survey.  Neither of these respondents returned a completed survey. 
Thus, in the second survey effort the process was simplified with a request to complete 
on online survey with the link directly to the survey embedded and simplified 
instructions.  Emails for tribes and local governments were found using telephone, 
internet and the BIA tribal leaders directory.  An option for alternative completion was 
given but again those requesting alternative options yielded limited results.  Two people 
requested phone interviews, of which one was completed.  One person requested an email 
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survey but did not return it.  Three email attempts were made. Respondents were given 
the option to indicate a desire for confidentiality.  
The Survey engine used to collect the online version of the survey was TestPilot.  
This software produces a CSV file, which was transferred to a Microsoft Excel/Access 
and Stata for initial analysis.  The limited phone interviews did not follow the survey 
questionnaire perfectly so was not included in these results.   
This data is examined using basic descriptive measures including textual 
description, summary counts, means, modes and medians.   Of the more than 129 surveys 
sent out via email, phone and mail there were only 15 responses directly to the survey.  
There was one phone interview and 2 generic responses.  Thus the survey resulted in a 
response rate of 14%.  One local government responded twice.  Of those that responded 
to the survey 9 were local governments and 5 were tribal governments.  Twelve of these 
responses stemmed from the first survey attempt and only 3 from the second.  These 
responses span the time frame of October 2004 to March of 2005.  Although the 
responses were limited, they bear noting given the consensus reached in some of the 
responses. 
Table 6: Government Type 
Please describe your governance structure 
  Total 
American Indian nation government 5
Non-American Indian government 9
 14
 
The interactions covered by those who responded to the survey included judicial 
authority, taxes, land, economic development, social services and joint infrastructure 
related activities.  More often these interactions were simply an information exchange.   
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Half or more involved negotiations, agreements and disputes.  Less than a quarter 
involved lawsuits or an exchange of goods.  More than half indicated these interactions 
were ongoing and of those almost half indicated they had been interacting for 6 or more 
years.  Half of the respondents indicated the interaction was cooperative and three 
quarters of the respondents indicated there was some level of conflict involved.  None of 
the respondents felt that the impact from the interaction was one sided.  All indicated 
either both benefited or neither benefited.  The question referencing negative 
consequences also followed this pattern. 
Table 7: Interaction as a Whole 
What type of interactions did this situation or issue involved? (Check all that apply)  
Information Exchange Total 
No 1 
Yes 13 
 14 
Negotiations Total 
No 5 
Yes 9 
 14 
Agreements Total 
No 5 
Yes 9 
 14 
Disputes Total 
No 7 
Yes 7 
 14 
Lawsuits Total 
No 11 
Yes 3 
 14 
Exchange of Goods Total 
No 12 
Yes 2 
 14 
Other Total 
No 10 
Yes 4 
 14 
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What was the approximate length of this situation or issue from start to finish. 
Meaning not just an independent phone call, but the overall process of interacting 
regarding the specific situation or issue? 
  Total. 
No Answer 1 
Less than 1 year 4 
1-3 years 0 
4-5 years 0 
6+ years 0 
ongoing 9 
 14 
If you describe the situation or issue as ongoing, please indicate for how long 
interactions regarding this have been occurring:  
  Total. 
No Answer 4 
Less than 1 year 0 
1-3 years 2 
4-5 years 2 
6+ years 6 
 14 
How often does your government interact with the corresponding government?  
  Total. 
No Answer 1 
Frequently 6 
Often, but would not say frequently. 5 
Not very often. 2 
Almost never 0 
 14 
How cooperative was the interaction(s) regarding the specific situation or issue?  
  Total 
No Answer 5 
Very Cooperative 4 
Somewhat Cooperative 4 
Not very Cooperative 1 
Not at all Cooperative 0 
 14 
Who benefited from the results of the interaction(s) over the specific situation or 
issue?  
  Total 
No Answer 2 
Local Non-American Indian Community Benefited 0 
American Indian Community Benefited 0 
Both Benefited 8 
Neither Benefited 4 
 14 
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How much conflict was there during the interactions over the specific situation or 
issue?  
  Total 
No Answer 2 
Quite a bit of Conflict 2 
Some Conflict 6 
Not very much Conflict 1 
No Conflict 3 
 14 
Where there negative affects of the interaction(s)?  
  Total 
No Answer 4 
Yes, negative effects on the Local Government's Non-tribal 
Community.  
Yes, negative effects on the Tribal Community.  
Yes, negative effects on both the Local Government's Non-
tribal Community and Tribal Community. 4 
No, no negative effects on either community. 6 
 14 
 
Of those who indicated they had experienced governmental changes in the past 5-
10 years all but one felt these changes were positive.  Four of the 7 those who responded 
to the question “Do you feel these changes have affected your government's interaction 
with the corresponding government?” felt that government changes did indeed impact 
their interactions. 
Table 8: Government Factors 
Has your government structure changed in the past 5-10 years?  
 Total 
No 7 
Yes 7 
 14 
How recently has it changed?  
 Total 
No Answer 6 
Within the past year. 1 
1-5 years ago. 6 
 5 or more years ago. 1 
 14 
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Would you define these changes as_____________ for the government as a 
whole?  
 Total 
No Answer 7 
Positive 5 
Negative 1 
Both 1 
 14 
Do you feel these changes have affected  your government's interaction with the 
corresponding government?   
 Total 
No Answer 7 
No 3 
Yes 4 
 14 
  
Most of the responding governments (8 out of 12) indicated the economic circumstances 
in their government were different from the government with which they had interaction.  
Of these 6 indicated they felt these differences impacted their interactions.  Ten of the 14 
governments indicated the economic circumstances in their government had changed in 
the past 5-10 years.  Seven of the 10 governments experiencing these changes felt they 
impacted their interactions. 
Table 9: Economic Factors 
Are the economic circumstances in your government similar or different to the 
economic circumstance in the corresponding government?  
 Total 
No Answer 2 
Similar 4 
Different 8 
 14 
Do you feel this similarity or difference has impacted your government’s specified 
interaction with the corresponding government? 
 Total 
No Answer 3 
No 5 
Yes 6 
 14 
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Does your government have more influence over economic resources, does the 
corresponding government have more influence over them, or do they each have 
about the same influence?  
 Total 
No Answer 3 
Corresponding government has more influence over 
economic resources. 4 
My government has more influence over economic 
resources. 5 
Each has about the same amount of influence. 2 
 14 
Has the economic circumstances of your government changed in the past 5-10 
years? Examples: Additional tax revenues assessed, decrease in tax base, 
isolation of other revenues, etc.  
 Total 
No 4 
Yes 10 
 14 
Do you think these changes have effected your government's interaction with the 
corresponding government?  
 Total 
No Answer 4 
No 3 
Yes 7 
 14 
Have you noted any changes in the corresponding government's economic 
circumstances in the past 5-10 years?  
 Total 
No Answer 2 
No 4 
Yes 8 
 14 
 
 For most of the respondents interaction with the corresponding government was 
not a new phenomenon (9 out of 13).  All but one of the 13 governments felt that past 
interactions influenced current interactions.  Almost half indicated the interaction 
referenced gaming. 
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Table 10: Historic Interaction 
Has your government interacted with the corresponding government prior to the 
specified interaction(s)? 
 Total 
No Answer 1 
No 4 
Yes 9 
 14 
Were these interactions regarding:  
Gaming Total 
No 8 
Yes 6 
 14 
  
Land Purchase/Development/Use Total 
No 4 
Yes 10 
 14 
  
Environment/Utilities Total 
No 8 
Yes 6 
 14 
  
Political/Jurisdictional Total 
No 8 
Yes 6 
 14 
  
Social Services Total 
No 9 
Yes 5 
 14 
  
Archaeology/Cultural Resources Total 
No 9 
Yes 5 
 14 
  
Other Total 
No 12 
Yes 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
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Do you believe your government’s past interactions with the corresponding 
government have influenced the corresponding government’s interaction over the 
specified situation or issue? 
 Total 
No Answer 3 
No 1 
Yes 10 
 14 
 
 When asking the question “Do you feel your community and the corresponding 
government's community share similar worldviews and values as they live their daily 
lives?” responses were fairly equally distributed across the spectrum.  The only response 
not noted was that they were “Very Different”, meaning that all of the governments felt 
there was some cultural similarity.  All of the governments felt that these similarities and 
differences had some impact on the interactions with more than half of those responding 
indicating these similarities and differences strongly impacted their interactions. 
Table 11: Culture 
Do you feel your community and the corresponding government's community share 
similar worldviews and values as they live their daily lives? 
 Total 
No Answer 4 
Very Similar 3 
Somewhat Similar 4 
Not Very Similar 3 
Very Different 0 
 14 
Do you feel these similarities (differences) have impacted the pairs interactions? 
 Total 
No Answer 4 
Strongly impacted interactions 6 
Moderate impact on interactions 2 
Minimal impact on interactions 2 
No impact on interactions 0 
 14 
 
 Given the limited response rate there were very few areas in which there were 
notable differences in the responses given government type.   One distinction, only half 
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of local governments indicated the interaction was ongoing, but all tribal governments 
indicated the interaction was ongoing.  Also, local government more often indicated 
changes in economic circumstances in the past 5-10 years when compared to tribes.  
Local governments more often indicated the interaction was “Very Cooperative” and also 
that there was “Quite a bit of Conflict”.  It is clear from the literature and survey that 
tribes and local governments do indeed interact and have the potential to impact each 
other’s community and that these interactions frequently reference gaming. 
IV. Evidence from Gaming Related Tribal-Local Government Relations 
 
Clearly, tribes and non-tribal communities interact as we have established so far 
in this chapter.  Next, we explore how they interact with regard to gaming.  Interactions 
between tribes and local governments with reference to gaming are most often found in 
newspapers and internet searches.  There were 52 articles about gaming related tribal-
local government interaction. Most of the articles discussing relations over gaming 
between tribal and non-tribal communities focus on casino development.  Of those 
articles, 20 reflected cooperation, 17 reflect conflict and 5 could be considered neutral.    
The articles discuss casino development in 10 states.  Most articles on tribal/non-tribal 
government cooperation center on approvals for gaming plans and financial arrangements 
between local governments and tribes.    These negotiations and arrangements find the 
root in the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act, which requires tribes to seek a state 
compact before proceeding with gaming ventures.  These compacts may require local 
level agreements or compensation.   
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Approvals for gaming plans can include formal agreements and negotiations as 
seen in the case of the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians41 and Palm Springs, where 
tribes received land use approval from the city’s planning commission (“Panel Approves 
Tribe’s…,” 2004).  These negotiated agreements can also include things such as 
blessings, informal approvals and, as one article calls it, a “memorandum of 
understanding” (“Park City Pursuing...,” 2004).  These are cases when the tribe received 
what appears to often be informal approval to go forward with approaching the state for a 
compact or general casino plans.  In cases such as Park City and Orangeburg, the local 
government perceived economic benefit for their community and thus supported the 
tribe’s pursuit (Dys, 2003, p. 1B).  In fact, City’s may actually compete over the location 
of a tribal casino as is the case in New Bedford and Middleboro42 (Maguire, 2007).  
These cases of cooperative effort not only occur under mandates such as those dictated by 
tribal-state compacts, but also through agreements as demonstrated by two of the other 
groups.  In the case of the Los Coyotes43 and Barstow, although the tribe faced no 
requirements for city approval, they worked together voluntarily (Donovan, 2003).  
Finally, the Viejas44 tribe and the city of Del Mar took cooperation to the full extent by 
forming a partnership to negotiate with a casino enterprise (Christine, 2004, p. 10).  It is 
important to note that these partnerships not only encompass tribes and the local 
governments, but may include the state (deFiebre, 2001, p. 5B).  Cooperative agreements 
between tribes and local governments may be focused primarily on financial 
compensation.  The tribe compensates the local government because of gaming 
 
41 California 
42 Massachusetts 
43 California 
44 California 
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operations.  For example, the Puyallup45 tribe agreed to contribute $ 1 million annually to 
the city of Fife (Tucker, 2004, p. B01).  Tribes may be strategic in pursuing cooperation, 
as well. Wisconsin tribes chose to pursue agreement with counties before, rather than 
going town to town (Jones, 2000, p. 01A). 
Conflict often stems from issues of tribal sovereign immunity, the exclusion of 
lands from local regulations, gaming externalities and finally conflict between different 
tribes.  Sovereign immunity is something that often poses an issue for local authorities as 
seen in the case of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma negotiations with the Oklahoma 
Horse Racing commission (Bellamy, 2004).  Before agreeing to approve the Cherokee 
license request, the commission asked them to forgo their sovereign immunity and face 
the same risks as a private business would in such an activity.  Tribal sovereign status is 
often at the source of conflict over land regulation in acquisition and land control.  Many 
tribes are located in relatively remote areas not suitable for gaming operations, so they 
seek land outside their reservation lands.  If the lands they acquire are placed into trust, 
they are removed from the authority of local governments.  Local governments may 
attempt to solidify these relations inside the state level gaming compact, allowing them to 
maintain some level of control.  In cases where this hasn’t been accomplished local 
governments have resorted to tactics such as blocking building permits or denying 
utilities.  San Diego took the approach of denying building permits.  Although the county 
could not control the tribe, they could control the non-tribal contractors building on the 
tribal lands and did just that preventing the contractors from receiving the needed permits 
to begin construction. (Barfield, 2000, p. A-1)  In Florence, Oregon they took the 
approach of denying utilities as a way of exerting some control (“City, Tribe Reopen 
 
45 Washington 
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Talks,” 2003).  The issue of off-reservation has become increasing salient.  Gaming on 
lands acquired after the passing of Title 25 are restricted from gaming use unless they 
meet “exceptions”.  These exceptions include: 
1. contiguous to or within reservation boundaries 
2. acquired after the SOI determines acquisition to be in the best interest of the tribe 
and not detrimental to the local community and the governor of the state concurs 
3. acquired for tribes that had no reservation on the date of enactment of IGRA 
4. acquired as part of a land claim settlement 
5. acquired as part of an initial reservation for a newly recognized tribe 
6. acquired as part of the restoration of lands for a tribe restored to federal 
recognition 
(Murphy, 2006) 
 
Efforts to restrict these exceptions met no success in the 109th Congress (“Interior 
Department Wary…,” 2007). 
Another potent area of conflict involves real or perceived gaming externalities.  
First, tied directly to the above discussion of land acquisition is the choice of location for 
a gaming operation.  Tribes and local governments do not always agree on where best to 
locate a gaming operation.  For example, the city of Buffalo, New York wanted to see the 
Senecas46 build a casino in the city where economic growth is needed, but the tribe 
intended to build its casino in a suburban area (Thompson, 2004).  Further, issues of 
infrastructure impacts, environmental impacts and crime bring about tension when the 
governments fail to see eye to eye (Green, 2001, p. B1; Kelley, 2001, p. 1).   
 
46 New York 
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Finally, if conflicts between tribes and local governments were not enough, tribes 
also face conflict from fellow tribes who sense unwanted competition (“Deck Stacked 
Against…,” 2004).  This would include a situation in which the Golden Hill 
Paugussetts47 and the Schaghiticokes48, both “courted” the city of Bridgeport in an effort 
to win support for casino developments (Cummings, 2004).   
Tribal/non-tribal government interaction over gaming can focus on management 
and impact of the casino operations.  Management issues can be jurisdictional, as, for 
example, in Inyo County which county overstepped its bounds by searching casino 
payroll records (Egelko, 2002, p. A18).  The higher court ruling supported the tribe’s 
right to self governance and restricted jurisdiction of counties on tribal lands.   
Positive impacts from gaming operations most often include financial 
contributions to local governments, socioeconomic impacts such as declining 
unemployment to sizeable renovations in struggling towns.  Direct contributions are 
usually large such as the Coushatta49 tribe “… is expected to contribute 7 million 
annually…(Maggi, 2001, p. 1).”  Not only do these revenues go directly to cities and 
counties, but in some cases find their way to schools and community groups (“Tulalip 
Tribes Give…,” 2000, p. B3; “American Indian Tribe Pays…,” 2003).  Finally, cities like 
Crescent City, California experienced overwhelming renovation and economic 
restoration as the result of tribal gaming revenues (Gelfand, 2003, p. 24).   
There are plenty of conflicts over gaming impacts.  These may be over 
infrastructure needs that are lacking such as road changes or from overall environmental 
 
47 Connecticut, note this Tribe was denied federal recognition and denied it’s land claims in December 
2006 (Toensing, 2006). 
48 The Schaghticokes received federal recognition then had it repealed upon an appeal from the State 
(“Schaghticokes Deserve Recognition”, 2005) 
49 Texas 
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impacts such as traffic or noise (DeArmond & Gaudette, 2003, p. A01).   Not only are 
there direct conflicts regarding those types of impacts with local communities, but both 
tribes and local communities appear to walk a think line legally and politically.  Changes 
in administrations can alter the climate for these arrangements (Precious, 2001, p. A1).  
V. Socio-Economic Impact 
 
Many studies of casino gaming suggest that gaming operations do indeed have a 
fiscal and economic impact in non-Indian communities (Eadington, 1998: 187).  Some 
would even argue that it is a negative economic impact (Gazel, 1998: 83).  The social 
impacts however, are often a bit less clear.  Amidst the numerous socioeconomic studies 
related to Indian gaming there are three predominant literature sources on the 
socioeconomic impact of Indian gaming on non-Indian communities. 
First, in “The Social and Economic Impact of Native American Casinos”, Julie H. 
Topoleski found that there were negative and positive effects on counties with and near 
(within a 50 mile radius) Indian gaming operations.  Positive effects included increased 
job growth and decreased mortality.  Job growth in counties with gaming was influenced 
by time, “...the fourth year, we estimate a statistically significant increase in the 
jobs/adult ratio of 0.021, which is about 3.8 percent of the median value…” and 
geographic distance to the casino played a roles as well “...is a smaller increase in 
employment of three percent for counties within 50 miles of casinos (Topoleski, 2003, p. 
88).”  Mortality rates fell 2.3 percent 4 years after the casino opening (Topoleski, 2003, p. 
90). 
Negative effects included an increase in bankruptcy and crime.  Topoleski found, 
“Four years after a casino opens, bankruptcy rates are up 10 percent in counties with a 
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casino and seven percent in counties within 50 miles of a casino (Topoleski, 2003, p. 
89).”  The impact on crime appears relatively complex and is affected by both time since 
opening and geography: 
Looking separately at the eight broad categories of crime in the UCR, we find 
that there are no significant changes in murders, assaults, or arsons per 100,000 
people for either casino counties or counties within 50 miles of a casino. Casino 
counties saw a 12 percent increase in motor vehicle theft by four or more years 
after a casino opens, and counties within 20 miles saw a smaller, 6 percent 
increase, but this increase is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Larceny per 100,000 people increased by 7 percent four or more years after 
opening in casino counties, but for counties within 50 miles of an Indian casino, 
there is no significant change in the larceny rate. Rapes per 100,000 increased by 
a statistically significant 15 percent in casino counties, but there is no increase for 
counties within 50 miles. Interestingly, the burglary rate decreases for both 
counties with and within 50 miles of a casino. The decrease is 4 percent for casino 
counties, but this decrease is not statistically significant. For counties within 50 
miles, there is a statistically significant 6 percent decrease. These decreases may 
suggest that 92 people are turning to crime less as their employment prospects 
improve. The change in robberies per 100,000 is not statistically significant for 
casino counties four or more after opening, but earlier years show significant 
increases. For counties within 50 miles of a casino, robberies increased by 24 
percent, but this is significant at only the 10 percent level. (Topoleski, 2003, pp. 
91-92) 
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Second, in “The National Evidence on the Socioeconomic Impacts of American 
Indian gaming on Non-Indian communities”, J.B. Taylor, M.B. Krepps and P. Wang 
found an increased positive impact (including an increase in local government earnings) 
in areas with Indian casinos as compared to those with non-Indian casinos. The authors 
argue that this can be attributed to the existing environment where Indian gaming 
operations are located.  “Further analysis reveals that this effect is driven by the fact that 
Indian casinos are more likely to be located in relatively economically depressed areas 
displaying lower average incomes prior to casino introduction (Taylor et al., 2000, p. 2).”  
This study used a “…dataset constructed by the National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) at the University of Chicago on behalf of the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission (NGISC) (Gerstein, Volberg, Harwood, and Christansen, 1999) (as cited in 
Taylor et al., 2000, p. 6).” 
Gerstein et al., were commissioned by the NGISC to undertake an analysis of 
100 communities across the country over the period 1980-1997 to uncover any 
systematic relationships between the introduction of a nearby casino and various 
social and economic indicators (NGISC, 1997). They gathered a random sample 
of 100 communities, of which 40 saw a casino introduced within 50 miles by the 
end of the period,10 and then tested the association of a casino introduction with 
the movement of 32 measures of social and economic status. (Taylor et al., 2000, 
p. 13) 
One interesting finding from the Gerstein et al. study, relative to this thesis, is that there 
is a slight decline in local government employment in these communities (Taylor et al., 
2000, pp. 14-15).  Taylor et al. found that, “On the other hand, local government earnings 
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decline by 4% for casinos generally; however, they rise by 6% in communities where 
proximate Indian casinos are introduced (Taylor et al., 2000, p. 27).” 
Third, in “Opinions of Cities and Counties on the Impact of Gambling Casinos on 
Their Communities”, McCormack, P & Reed, G. found that respondents to their survey 
felt that the casinos had a positive effect on the community in the areas of jobs and 
tourism.  On the flip side, respondents also felt that there were negative effects such as 
increases in crime and traffic (McCormack et al., 1997, p. 3). 
From these three studies, it is clear there is some perceived impact in the non-
Indian community. All of these show positive impacts and two of these studies suggest 
evidence of a negative impact.   
VI. Fiscal Impact 
The studies examining the socio-economic impact of Indian gaming may or may 
not support revenue sharing agreements. To date the literature on the fiscal impacts of 
Indian gaming operations on non-Indian governments has been relatively limited.50  
Arguments for public sector impacts from private sector activities though, are not new.  
Like the studies focused on other developments one could debate that Indian gaming has 
the potential to impact its host community and adjacent community by spurring job 
growth as well as detract from these communities by drawing resources from other areas 
(zero sum arguments).  Numerous studies have been done examining everything from the 
impact of stadium developments to that of high-rise apartment complexes.   Whether or 
not these types of developments bring benefit to the host community or communities 
adjacent to them can be debated according to which research one subscribes.  For 
 
50 One specific argument made by Anders in 1998 is that, “For example, since Indian Casinos do not pay 
taxes, lost tax revenue may have stimulated some state legislatures to legalize riverboats that can be taxed 
(Anders, 1998: 105)”.  
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example, a study of the Brooklyn Arena/High Rise development project suggested that 
although initial claims indicated a gain of $812.7 million to the state and local 
governments, the authors thought that this would actually be a loss of $506 million (Kim 
& Peebles, 2004, pp. iii-iv). 
In addition to the findings of Gerstein et al. (1999) and Taylor et al. (2000), one of 
the few scholarly references found regarding the fiscal impact of gaming, focused on 
non-Indian gaming in Mississippi.  In Resorting to Casinos, Edward J. Clynch et al. 
examines the impact of casinos on local expenditures in, “The Impact of Casino 
Gambling on Municipal Revenue, Expenditures and Fiscal Health”.  These authors 
theorize that casino revenues stabilize or decline and the size of casino industry matters; 
that there are positive impacts on public works, capital expenditures, public safety 
expenditures, reserve funds and non-essential services; and negative effects on millage 
rates and long term debt (Herrmann, 2006, pp. 86-89).  Their theory on the 
stabilization/decline of casino revenues is based on the similar pattern with regard to 
lottery revenues (Herrmann, 2006, p. 83).  They theorize an impact on public works, 
capital expenditures, reserve funds and non-essential services under the premise that 
given the unpredictability of casino revenues local governments will be hesitant to use 
these resources for reoccurring budget items (Herrmann, 2006, p. 84).  They find 
evidence in their data to support all of these theories except that regarding long term debt 
(91-97).  They also found that the stabilization/decline of revenues argument did not fare 
as well in areas with a larger casino market, where revenues continue to grow (Herrmann, 
2006, p. 91).  In addition these authors suggest that those poorer communities may be 
willing to take more of a gamble in their reliance on casino revenues (Herrmann, 2006, p. 
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82) and that “...over-saturation of casinos in a market can lead to decreasing revenues for 
municipalities in which the original, sometimes larger casinos were built (Herrmann, 
2006, p. 83).”  It’s notable that in Mississippi revenues are distributed in accordance to 
the Mississippi Gaming Control Act (Herrmann, 2006, p. 85) and that the Choctaw 
gaming operations were excluded from this study since they are not under these 
regulations (Herrmann, 2006, p. 99).  The authors do reference the New York Empire 
Opportunity Fund,  “In the state of New York taxes on Indian casinos support at least 50 
percent of the Empire Opportunity Fund that supports project grants to municipalities and 
non profit agencies to spur economic development (Odato 2002) (as cited in Herrmann, 
2006, p. 84).” 
Beyond this, the impact may very well vary given how reliant a local government 
is on particular revenues streams.  For example in Oklahoma where communities are very 
reliant on sales taxes, when tribes pursue activities such as gaming that distract from 
other taxable activities there may be a stronger impact (Collard, 2006b). 
Sources of information on the fiscal impact of Indian gaming are most often 
found in broader economic impact studies and newspaper articles.  These broader 
economic impact studies exist on two levels: national reports and tribe specific reports.  
The first of these broader, national-level reports is the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission Report produced in 1999.  Chapter 6 of this report is specifically dedicated 
to Indian gaming and has a section on Local Community Impacts.  Here, the authors 
discuss the various Indian gaming related issues with regard to local communities.  These 
include resource sharing, social and economic impacts.  The report briefly touches on the 
potential fiscal impact with a reference from Supervisor Dianne Jacob of San Diego, 
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California regarding the government’s law enforcement costs (National Gambling 
Impact, 1999, pp. 6-13 to 6-14).  The second report of this nature is the National Indian 
Gaming Association’s annual (biennial 1998-2000) report, the most recent being, “An 
Analysis of the Economic Impact of Indian Gaming in 2004”.  This report is more 
specific and indicates that Indian gaming generated “...an additional $100 million in local 
taxes and revenue through increased sales and other taxes and governmental services 
agreements (National Indian Gaming Association, 2004, p. 11)”.51   In addition, this 
report indicates that 553,000 jobs have been created that could have some impact on local 
government finances, especially considering the rural nature of most Indian gaming 
operations (National Indian Gaming Association, 2004, p. 10).  Finally, the Analysis 
Group’s semi-annual report titled, “Casino City’s52 Indian Gaming Industry Report”, 
details many of the economic and fiscal aspects of Indian gaming. It also indicates, 
“…report estimates Indian gambling directly and indirectly contributed $19.4 billion in 
wages nationally, 539,000 jobs, $6.2 billion in tax revenue and additional revenue sharing 
with governments of $900 million. He estimates total economic output from the industry 
at $52.3 billion (Stearns, 2005).”  
 In addition to these broader, national level reports there are numerous economic 
impact analyses done for specific tribes and local communities.  These reports use a 
variety of models to measure and look at impact from the following perspectives: 
1. Predictive vs. post development  
2. Longevity of impact (impact from operation development and impact from 
continuing operations) 
 
51 Taxation of Indian gaming directly varies depending on whether or not the tribe is “incorporated” and 
what type of “incorporation has occurred (Internal Revenue Service).   
52 Casino City is not a place. 
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3. Level of impact (Federal, State and Local) 
4. Magnitude of impact 
5. Direction of impact (positive/negative)53 
6. Impact area 
These reports as a whole most often attributed fiscal impact to three sources: increased 
tax revenue, decreased social service needs and direct contribution from the tribes.  
1. In Arizona, economic impact analysis of Indian gaming suggests, “state and local 
governments reap $40 million in tax collections” (Cornell & Taylor, 2001, p. 8). 
2. A study examining the economic impact of the Grande Casinos at Mille Lacs54 and 
Grand Casino Hinckley found that in the counties near the casino (Reeves, 1996):  
• No major cost increases for counties (Reeves, 1996, p. 7) 
• Net tax capacity increased at a greater rate than the state as a whole (Reeves, 
1996, p. 7) 
• Property tax capacity has increased (Reeves, 1996, p. 10-11) 
• Did not financially impacted police services, since the casino offsets additional 
burden (Reeves, 1996, p. 19-20) 
3. A study looking at the economic impact of Indian gaming on metropolitan Green Bay 
found (Alesch, 1997): 
 
53 No negative impacts have been found in these reports.  One interesting study reviewed, however, that 
demonstrated a negative impact was The Economic and Social Impacts of NIMBYs (Rephann, 1996).  He 
found that casinos were “deadbeats” (9) which is “Deadbeats don't pay the full cost of their infrastructure 
and public service needs. They leave others in the area footing part of the bill. This situation may arise 
when NIMBYs receive substantial relocation subsidies or do not compensate the community for facility 
externalities that increase public service expenditures (3).” 
54 Minnesota 
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• No local government burden from Tribal land acquisition efforts, although 
continued land acquisition poses concern for local communities(Alesch, 1997, p. 
21) 
• Evidence of tribal services, contracts for services and direct contributions to local 
government offsetting externality costs (Alesch, 1997, p. 21-22) 
4. In Oregon an economic impact study looking at the impact of the “...Chinook Winds 
Casino and Convention Center on Lincoln City” found (Econorthwest, 1999): 
• “ECONorthwest concludes that because of Chinook Winds, the Government of 
Lincoln City received $675,055 in additional revenues and spent an additional 
$318,233 in fiscal year 1998/99. The fiscal impact on the City Government was a 
net benefit of $356,822 in fiscal 1998/99 (Econorthwest, 1999, p. 38).” 
5. In Texas a ‘prospective’ study of the impact of Indian gaming found an expected 
yearly increase of local revenues of at least $9.6 million (Perryman Group, 2003, p. 18). 
In a study examining the impact in New Mexico, the findings suggest that people’s 
spending habits change incrementally with the number of Indian casinos, having the 
ability to impact sales taxes (Popp & Stehwien, 2002, pp. 320-330).  This study also 
establishes the effect of Indian casinos on neighboring counties: 
Besides the effects on the host county, the presence of casinos can have an affect on 
neighboring counties. This is particularly true because most of the casinos are located 
on the border of the home county and the most populated neighboring county. The 
casinos will draw individuals from the neighboring county as the individuals 
substitute away from goods and services generating taxable gross receipts in the 
residence county toward gaming in the non residence county. The value of the 
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coefficient associated with the first casino opening in a neighboring county,Dnc1, is 
negative, indicating a 1.3% decrease in the generation of taxable gross receipts. The 
sign of the coefficient associated with the second casino opening in a neighboring 
county, Dnc2, is positive, indicating a 3.5% increase in the generation of taxable 
gross receipts. This could be explained by the fact that individuals visit the more 
populated county to visit and spend time in multiple casinos and also spend on other 
goods and services that are taxable. (Popp & Stehwien, 2002, p.  328) 
Beyond these more formal studies the literature review on tribal-local government 
relations yielded additional examples of both potential and actual fiscal impact.  For 
example, a casino in Lenwood, CA was estimated to possibly generate $1 million a year 
in bed taxes (Donovan, 2003)”.  Another study of the potential impact from the 
Catawba’s operation estimated “..$5 million in new individual income and sales tax 
revenues… (Hendren, n.d.).”   A deal with the Chippewa tribe was argued to add “..at 
least $70 million to local tax rolls…(Lisheron, 1999, p. 1).   
All the literature reviewed gives some indication of fiscal impact. What remains in 
question is the magnitude of impact and to what degree any negative impacts are 
mitigated by the positive effect of Indian gaming. 
VII. Impact Mitigation 
 
The literature on impact mitigation for fiscal impacts from Indian gaming 
operations is relatively limited.  This is most likely due to the relative newness of this 
phenomenon.  IGRA stipulates that: 
(4) Except for any assessments that may be agreed to under paragraph (3)(C)(iii) 
of this subsection, nothing in this section shall be interpreted as conferring upon a 
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State or any of its political subdivisions authority to impose any tax, fee, charge, 
or other assessment upon an Indian tribe or upon any other person or entity 
authorized by an Indian tribe to engage in a class III activity. No State may refuse 
to enter into the negotiations described in paragraph (3)(A) based upon the lack of 
authority in such State, or its political subdivisions, to impose such a tax, fee, 
charge, or other assessment. (Title 25, Chapter 29, Section 2710) 
 
Until the Seminole Tribe vs. the State of Florida (1996) case few revenue sharing 
agreements were included in state-tribal compacts.  However, with this case, tribe’s lost 
their ability to sue states for failing to negotiate in good faith (Lent, 2003, p. 1).  Since 
this time states have gained more latitude in negotiating revenue sharing agreements as a 
part of the state-tribal compact process.  The Interior Department has approved these 
compacts under the premise that states give tribes “exclusivity” in their gaming rights in 
exchange for revenue sharing (Lent, 2003, p. 1).  According to Eric Lent in “Are states 
beating the house? The validity of tribal-state revenue sharing under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act”: 
While IGRA prohibits states from levying taxes or fees on tribal gaming, the 
Department of the Interior has nonetheless approved some gaming compacts that 
contain revenue sharing provisions. The Department stresses, however, that it will 
only approve revenue sharing compacts that provide substantial exclusivity for 
Indian gaming in the state. This seemingly contradictory policy is justified on the 
ground that tribal payments for exclusivity rights are a function of the tribes' 
sovereign authority as governments. Tribes have the sovereign authority to make 
business decisions to pay for something of value, and the Department views the 
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right to exclusive gaming as an asset for which tribes may agree to pay with 
revenue sharing. IGRA, it is argued, does not strip tribes of their right as 
sovereigns to make business decisions, and paying for exclusivity is one such 
decision. (Lent, 2003, p. 9) 
 
As can be interpreted from this, this is an area ripe with potential debate as to the validity 
of these arrangements.  Another author, Richard L. Skeen, elaborates on this debate in 
Tribal-State Gaming Compacts and Revenue Sharing Provisions:  Are States Upping the 
Ante? (Skeen, 2006).  Regardless of this debate, we can examine examples of formal 
revenue sharing such as those embedded in tribal-state compacts and those directly 
developed between tribes and municipal governments such as ‘Memoranda of 
Understanding’.  Then there are less formal revenue sharing agreements as well including 
voluntary contributions/support from tribes to local governments. 
Official government to government revenue sharing occurs or has occurred at all 
levels of government in the U.S.  Revenue sharing at the federal level emerged from 1972 
to 1987 under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (North Dakota 
Legislative Council, 2003) and continues in block grants today.  Revenue sharing 
continues to prevail between federal/state and local governments with a significant 
portion of most local government revenue coming from state and federal aid (Table 12).  
And now a third source of revenue has come to the scene, tribal revenue sharing. 
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Table 12: Percent of Revenues and Expenditures by Category 
 1982 2002 
  Non-Gaming Gaming Non-Gaming Gaming
Sales Tax 1.77% 1.38% 3.51% 2.67%
State IGR 29.18% 34.28% 35.08% 37.64%
Property Tax 30.30% 27.16% 24.45% 23.76%
Capital Outlays 14.59% 13.36% 12.24% 12.76%
Construction Exp. 10.82% 9.41% 7.05% 7.76%
Highway Exp. 10.44% 11.09% 7.51% 9.42%
Welfare Exp. 1.96% 3.43% 2.09% 2.99%
Police Exp. 2.94% 2.90% 3.43% 3.41%
 
Formalized revenue sharing agreements between local governments and tribes 
appear to be relatively new, also, according to Meister’s report, with most agreements 
appearing post 2000 (Meister, 2006,  pp. 28-33).  Revenue sharing or intergovernmental 
transfer agreements found in compacts may or may not include revenue sharing with 
local communities.  Two examples of those that do include local communities are 
Arizona (12% of total revenue collected by the state from revenue sharing agreement) 
(Meister, 2006, p. 28) and Michigan (“Tribes share 2 percent of gaming revenue from 
Class III machines with local municipalities (Meister, 2006,  p. 29)“).  In addition to 
revenue sharing agreements formalized in state-tribal compacts, there are revenue sharing 
agreements found in “memorandums of understanding” (Indian Gaming MOU, n.d.) and 
more informal agreements directly negotiated between tribes and municipal governments.   
 The following outlines examples of revenue sharing or intergovernmental 
transfers between tribes, states and municipal governments as found in a review of two 
state-tribal compacts in each of the listed states:    
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California 
The facilities pay into a revenue sharing fund.  California mandates revenue sharing with 
non-gaming tribes (1.1 million) and contribution to the Special Distribution Fund.  The 
Special Distribution Fund is used to: 
Sec. 5.2 Use of Funds.  The State’s share of the gaming device revenue shall be 
placed in the Special Distribution Fund, available for appropriation from the 
legislature for the following purposes: (a) grants, including any administrative 
costs, for programs designed to address gambling addiction; (b) grants, including 
any administrative costs, for the support of state and local government agencies 
impacted by tribal government gaming; (c) compensation for regulatory costs 
incurred by the State Gaming Agency and the State Department of Justice in 
connection with the implantation and administration of the Compact; (d) payment 
of shortfalls that may occur in the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund; and (e) any other 
purposes specified by the legislature.  It is the intent of the  parties that Compact 
Tribes will be consulted in the process of identifying purposes for grants made to 
local governments.  (Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and 
the Augustine Band of Mission Indians, 2000, pp. 9-10) 
 
 A recent audit of these funds found that these resources where not always dedicated to 
mitigating impacts from tribal gaming (California State Auditor, 2007).    
Colorado 
The Southern Ute compact indicates there is/was an assessment of impact on non-AI 
communities within 18 months of the start of tribal gaming and that remedies would be 
negotiated on the basis of this assessment (The Southern Ute Tribe  - State of Colorado 
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Gaming Compact, 1992, p. 30).  Ute Mountain agrees to do a study of impact with 
Montezuma County using data from the "Fox Study of 1994"  as a baseline and the tribe 
agrees to “assist in correcting” any impact (The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of 
Colorado Gaming Compact, 1995, pp. 39-41). 
Idaho 
The Kootenai may voluntarily contribute 2 & 1/2 % of profits “...for financial support of 
local government programs, hospitals, education or other purposes as directed by the 
Council (1993 Class III Gaming Compact By and Between the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho 
and the State of Idaho, p. 22)”.   
Kansas 
The tribes agree to:  
The Tribe shall consult with the appropriate State and county officials concerning 
maintenance and safety of roads, bridges and other infrastructure made necessary 
by the implementation of this compact. 
Upon mutual consultation and agreement between the Tribe and the state 
and local governments, the Tribe agrees that certain related costs of the operation 
of the Class III gaming facility may be paid for from the operating revenues of the 
tribal facility.  Such costs shall be limited to the cost of increased police patrol 
and necessary road improvements, if any. 
(Tribal State Gaming Compact Between the Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of the 
Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas and the State of Kansas, 1995, p. 39) 
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Michigan  
There is a 2% payment to local governments. (A Compact Between the Pokagon Band of 
Potawatomi Indians and the State of Michigan Providing for the Conduct of Tribal Class 
III Gaming By the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, 1998, pp. 18-19) 
New Mexico 
There is a $250,000 a year payment to the state with a 5% annual increase and 16% of net 
wins (Indian Gaming Compact Between the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the State of New 
Mexico, 1997, p. 58; Indian Gaming Compact Between the Pueblo of Acoma and the 
State of New Mexico, 1997, p. 58). 
New York 
The revenue sharing agreements vary by tribe in New York.  The Mohawk have an 
agreement the basis of net revenue use (Amendment to the Tribal State Compact between 
the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and the State of New York, 1999, pp. 6-8) described as, 
"offsetting expenses associated with gaming facility in Clinton, Franklin and St. 
Lawrence counties (9)." The Seneca also have an agreement for revenue sharing with the 
state that increases as the time with a gaming operation increases from 18 to 25% (Nation 
State Gaming Compact Between the Seneca Nation of Indians and the State of New 
York, 2002, p. 15). 
North Carolina 
The resources from gaming in North Carolina are distributed by the Cherokee 
Preservation Foundation and provide vague language implying responsibility for areas 
‘near’ Cherokee tribal lands. 
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A non-profit foundation shall be established which shall be funded and endowed 
by the tribe and shall operate under the name CHEROKEE PRESERVATION 
FOUNDATION, whose purpose shall be to protect, preserve and enhance the 
natural resources, aesthetic appearance of the Cherokee tribal lands against long 
term degradation resulting from increased traffic and growth in connection with 
gaming activities, assist in the economic development for public services, 
recreation, entertainment and community economic development and foster 
employment opportunities on or near Cherokee tribal lands, provide funding for 
the purpose of preservation, research, study, restoration and development of the 
history, tradition, culture, language, arts, crafts and heritage of the Cherokee 
people (Second Amendment to the Tribal-State Compact Between the Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians and the State of North Caroline, 2000, pp. 7-8). 
 
Washington  
Washington State contributes: 
Up to one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the net win derived from Tribal Lottery 
System activities, determined on an annual basis, shall be added to any amounts 
payable and distributable from other class III activities under the Compact in 
order to meet community impacts, to the extent such Compact amounts are 
insufficient to meet actual and demonstrated impact costs (Appendix X State of 
Washington Class III Gaming Compact, p. 44)) 
 
These compacts demonstrate formal revenue sharing at both the state and local level.  On 
some level this mandates relationships, however not without caveats.  For example, in 
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Arizona tribes were allowed to choose which cities with which they wanted to share $5.1 
million in revenue sharing (“Additional $5.1 Million,” 2004). 
Outside of this more formal evidence of revenue sharing in the same literature 
that we found evidence of tribal relations, we find evidence of gaming related impact 
mitigation.  In a proposed deal with the Menominee55 tribe over a casino development, 
the tribe suggested paying “...the city and county $168 million over a 10-year period in 
exchange for local support… (Cole, 1999, p. 3)”.  In Hesperia, CA “..city officials 
reached an agreement with the tribe that would generate about $6.5 million a year in 
revenue for the city…(Ascenszi, 2003, p. 2)”.  In Louisianna the Coushatta tribe, 
“..contributed $26 million directly to local governments from 1995 until 2000 and is 
expected to contribute at least $7 million for the next seven years (Maggi, 2001, p. 1)”.  
In Michigan in 2001 Tribe’s contributed over $8 million to local governments (“Receipts 
and Distribution,” 2001, p. 1).  Very recently the town of Middleborough, MA decreed 
they are ready to accept $7 million dollars annually for their support of an Indian casino 
(Goodwin, 2007).  And in Niagra Falls, NY: “The mayor and City Council last week 
agreed to transfer $500,000 of the casino money from the Urban Renewal Agency to 
rebuild streets, reconstruct sidewalks and tear down dilapidated buildings throughout the 
city (Jewell, 2007).”  
VIII. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have continued to examine the specific contexts in which 
Indian gaming occurs.  It is obvious from the literature and survey that tribes and local 
governments find themselves in both cooperative and conflictual situations that may or 
may not result in unmitigated impacts on the non-tribal community.  There is clear 
 
55 Wisconsin 
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evidence from tribal-state compacts and other sources that tribes do often provide 
mitigation to the non-tribal communities.  Given that formal Indian policy only dictates a 
federal-tribal relationship, many of the activities between tribes and local governments 
happen in an informal manner.  Also, given their long history of deprivation and 
disadvantage, the tribes may justifiably question mitigating conditions on non-Indian 
communities.  This chapter shows however that although there are conflictual interactions 
and times when tribes resist mitigation, tribes often engage in cooperative ventures with 
local governments and as part of this may very well mitigate the externalities (actual or 
perceived) that local governments encounter as a result of tribal activities.  Finally, it’s 
clear that tribes do provide direct mitigation for impacts on the non-Indian community 
from Indian gaming operations. 
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Chapter 4: Data & Methods 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Having established that there is indeed the potential for tribal and non-tribal 
communities to impact each other, now we can examine the potential fiscal impact from 
Indian gaming on non-Indian governments using several relevant data sets.  These 
include the Census of Governments, Decennial Census, County Business Patterns, Urban 
Influence Codes and The Taylor Policy Group’s Indian gaming data.  This data must then 
be stratified into a treatment and a comparison group during a time frame relevant to the 
period in which Indian gaming began.  The stratification into a treatment and comparison 
group requires the use of GIS to join Indian gaming operations to their county locations.   
Finally, after intensive data work a difference in difference model can be applied to 
attempt to dissect the impacts from the opening of an Indian gaming operation and other 
influential elements. 
II. Research Questions 
 
This research intends to look at the formal relationship between the opening of an 
Indian gaming operation and revenues/expenditures in adjacent local governments.  This 
research will utilize the 50 mile radius impact area used in Julie Topoleski’s work.  
Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1:  There is an impact on fiscal conditions from American Indian 
Class III gaming operations on non-Indian county expenditures and revenues 
within a 50 mile radius. 
 
What drives this hypothesis?  First, the literature presented provides evidence of 
both a socioeconomic impact on the non-Indian community and a fiscal impact on the 
non-Indian community.  If there is a socio-economic impact on the non-Indian 
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community (e.g. Eadington (1998), Gazel (1998), Topoleski (2003), Taylor (2000), 
McCormack (1997)), there is potential for this impact to translate to the governments that 
serve these populations.  Following this reasoning one could assume that an impact on 
the non-Indian government would impact that government’s expenditures and revenues.  
This is supported by the literature suggesting a fiscal impact on non-Indian governments 
(e.g. National Gambling Impact Study (1999), National Indian Gaming Association’s 
Annual Report (2004), Casino City’s Indian Gaming Report (2005), Popp and Stehwien 
(2002), Cornell & Taylor (2001), Reeves (1996), Alesch (1997), Econorthwest (1999), 
The Perryman Group (2003), Donovan (2003), Hendren (n.d.) and Lisheron (1999).  
First, positive economic impacts from the gaming operation have the potential to 
reduce local government expenditures and increase tax revenues.  If there is an increase 
in jobs in the non-Indian community (McCormack, 1997; Topoleski, 2003), this may 
result in a lowering of social welfare spending and an increase in community member’s 
capacity for spending.  This could increase the revenues from sales taxes.  Negative 
impacts from gaming operations have the potential to increase social welfare needs and 
decrease potential tax revenues. The increase in bankruptcies Topoleski found could very 
well cause social welfare expenditures to rise and sales tax revenues to decline.  The 
suggested increase in traffic (McCormack, 1997) could increase road related 
expenditures.  A crime increase (Topoleski, 2003) could cause an increase in police, 
imprisonment and court costs (although Taylor et al. found no evidence of this).   
Hypothesis 2:  There are both positive and negative effects on specific county 
area expenditures and revenues that are correlated to the opening of an Indian 
gaming operation.     
 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 109 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Increases in county revenues from income and state IGR post the 
opening of an Indian gaming operation offset any additional associated 
expenditure.  
  
In addition to these indirect effects there are the more direct contributions such as 
revenue sharing funds and compact mandated contributions to state, local and tribal 
governments.   
In addition to these suggested relationships, it is important to consider potential 
factors that could influence them.  First, the number of years a gaming operation is open 
could affect both the strength and direction of the relationship between the operation and 
county finances.  For example, a gaming operation opening might initially create new 
demands on infrastructure. It may take many years for the operation to become 
established and generate economic consequences significant enough to offset local costs.  
Although competition could increase with additional years, given the rural nature of 
Indian gaming operations it seems more likely that with passing time the operation would 
have more potential to take root as well as the potential for adding other tourist drawing 
features such as convention centers.  This makes it necessary to include a measure for the 
number of years a casino has been operating.   
Hypothesis 4: Time plays a role in the fiscal effects of Indian gaming.  The length 
of time a gaming operation has been in business affects the impact it has on 
expenditures or revenues.  The longer the business has been operating the more 
positive the impact on local government revenues and expenditures. 
 
Second, other economic factors may have a greater influence on county finances.  
For example, the closing of a manufacturing plant may offset any positive influences 
from the opening of a gaming operation and vice versa; the attraction of additional 
business ventures may offset any negative influences from the gaming operation.  To 
attempt to control for this issue, this model will use employment and population measures 
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as independent variables for the macro level demographic and socio-economic changes.  
Finally, this model will take into consideration the unique circumstances that a non-
metropolitan geography presents.  Given the vast difference between non-metropolitan 
and metropolitan communities, this model will only examine non-metropolitan 
communities.  Not only are metropolitan/non-metropolitan communities different from 
one another, in metropolitan communities the impact of casino operations may be 
overshadowed or confused with other economic development factors, requiring additional 
control measures.  There also may be increased competition in metropolitan areas. These 
non-metropolitan communities will then be stratified by the Urban Influence Codes 
(Urban Influence Codes 3 and higher).   
Hypothesis 5: The more non-metropolitan a community the more likely they are to 
benefit from the opening of an Indian gaming operation.   
 
II. Data  
  
Five data sources are used in this analysis: Census of Governments, Decennial 
Census, County Business Patterns, Urban Influence Codes and The Taylor Policy 
Group’s Indian gaming data.  Each of these sources has its own unique formatting and 
issues.  The discussion which follows details the source of each set of data, collection 
time periods, sampling methods, geographic level and any limitations posed by the data. 
a. Census of Governments  
The Census of Governments will provide the revenues and expenditures data for 
county governments at two points, one prior to and one post the opening of the Indian 
gaming operations.   These data were obtained from the Census Bureau56,57  and have 
 
56 Craig A. Langley, Public Accounting Specialist, Bureau of the Census 
57 “The annual survey of State and Local Government Finances contains current estimates of government 
financial activity. Data include estimates of revenue by type, expenditure by purpose and function, debt, 
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been collected every 5 years since 1957.  The time periods used for this analysis are 1982 
and 2002.  Additional time periods could be added, but this would increase the risk for 
unrecognized data definition changes over the course of the survey.  This dataset is not a 
“sample”.  The survey is sent to all governments that meet a set of criteria that defines 
them as an ‘independent government’.  The Census Bureau takes numerous steps to limit 
any non-sampling errors, such as non-response or mis-coding (U.S. Census Bureau, April 
20, 2007).  This analysis uses an aggregate of all local government level finances in the 
‘county area’ level, thus diminishing the need to differentiate between the way powers 
vary across governments and states: 
It (the data) includes ALL local governments within a county area. The only thing 
it excludes is state government amounts. Note that some governments (especially 
special districts) have Boundaries that cross county lines. We make no effort to 
pro-rate them among the counties they serve. Rather, we allocate all their finances 
to the county where they are headquartered. (John Curry, personal 
communication, October 10, 2006) 
b. Decennial Census 
Data from the Decennial Census, from 1980 and 2000 are used to provide for 
demographic and socio-economic variables for each community.  This dataset was 
acquired through the Missouri Census Data Center (sf3200x and stf803x2) and provides 
the number employed out of the working age population, percent American Indian and 
                                                                                                                                                 
and financial assets by type - all in detail similar to that found in the Census of Governments. Estimates are 
shown for state and local governments combined, as well as for local governments. (State government data 
are not estimates, but rather actual measures from the surveys on state government finances mentioned 
previously.) Geographic coverage includes estimates for all governments nationwide, as well as estimates 
by state area. Reports consist of viewable tables and data files that users can download from the Internet 
(U.S. Census Bureau, July 9, 2007).“ 
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per capita income (Missouri Census Data Center, 2007).  These are used in a multivariate 
model and numerous other elements for more descriptive analysis.  This dataset is subject 
to both sampling and non-sampling errors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). 
c. County Business Patterns 
County Business Patterns (CBP) data provides for a measure of broader economic 
activity at the county level.  The variables used are the total payroll and number of 
establishments in the county as a percent of the total in the state.  This dataset was 
obtained from the University of Virginia Library’s Geospatial and Statistical Data Center 
(Geospatial & Statistical Data Center, 2005).  The data series originates from the Census 
Bureau.  Collection for this data series began in 1946 and has been collected annually 
since 1964 (U.S. Census Bureau: County Business Patterns, n.d.). This research will 
utilize data from 1982 and 2001.  This dataset can be subject to non-sampling errors and 
requires some degree of imputation for missing data (Coverage and Methodology, n.d.).  
d. Urban Influence Codes 
Urban Influence Codes will be used to isolate potential effects from the 
geographic location of the community.  There are two predominant sets of codes used to 
analyze geographic indicators, the Urban Influence Codes and the Rural-Urban 
Continuum Codes.  At the advice of an expert58 in the utilization of these codes, this 
research will use the Urban Influence Codes.  The Urban Influence codes were updated in 
2003 (previous designation 1993).  This research will use the 1993 designation.  This 
research will focus on those communities with a “non-metropolitan” status.  Aside from 
inferring incorrectly the potential consequences of a specific geographic codification, 
 
58 Conversation with Timothy D. McBride, PhD, Professor, Division of Health Management and Policy, 
School of Public Health, Saint Louis University and member of the Rural Policy Research Institute. 
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there are no errors referenced with regard to this data.  This research is limited to non-
metropolitan communities both to control for the differences in the treatment and 
comparison group and to standardize the impact from the gaming venture.  For example, 
in a 2004 Federal Reserve Bank study, it was found that the employment impact of 
casinos is stronger in rural areas (Garrett, 2004, p. 21), but that the direct effect of a 
casino on employment can be altered by the composition of the workforce found in the 
area.  Garrett found that “…if a casino is planning to move to a rural area that has a 
relatively less-skilled workforce, the casino will probably draw skilled labor from outside 
the area. If this labor remains outside of the local area and workers commute to the 
casinos, then unemployment will not change (Henderson, 2003)”.  This, as well as other 
components of rural economic growth such as specific population size, education and age 
(Aldrich & Kusmin, 1997) is important to this analysis, because these factors are likely to 
impact fiscal conditions.   
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Table 13: Urban Influence Codes 
UIC 
Code Description 
Number 
of 
counties
2000 
Population 
Square 
miles 
Population 
per sq. 
mile 
1 
Metropolitan 
adjacent to large 
metro 92 5,147,233 94,178 54.7
2 
Noncore adjacent to 
large metro 123 2,364,159 88,229 26.8
3 
Metropolitan 
adjacent to small 
metro 301 14,668,144 285,527 51.4
4 
Noncore adjacent to 
small metro with 
own town 358 7,855,590 334,361 23.5
5 
Noncore adjacent to 
small metro no own 
town 185 1,879,264 336,499 5.6
6 
Metropolitan not 
adjacent to a metro 
area 282 9,139,821 338,256 27
7 
Noncore adjacent to 
micro with own 
town 201 3,227,833 193,200 16.7
8 
Noncore adjacent to 
micro with no own 
town 198 1,313,175 196,269 6.7
9 
Noncore not 
adjacent to metro or 
micro with own 
town 138 2,247,189 488,521 4.6
10 
Noncore not 
adjacent to metro or 
micro with no own 
town 174 999,558 285,304 3.5
  Total 3,141 281,421,906 3,537,438 79.6
 
(Measuring Rurality: Urban Influence Codes, n.d.) 
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e. The Taylor Policy Group’s Gaming Data 
The Taylor Policy Group data is used to isolate when the Indian gaming operation 
began as well as its actual zip code.  The dataset from The Taylor Policy Group was 
collected from the Casino City Press database, National Indian Gaming Commission, 
state regulatory agencies, existing monographs, websites, telephone interviews, the NIGA 
survey and newspaper articles and obtained via a reciprocal contract.  It was noted that 
there are some questions regarding the addresses of casinos in this file.  Web based 
research revealed that in some cases there is disagreement regarding the physical location 
of the facility (Appendix B).  In most cases the disagreement is minimal and places the 
facility in an adjacent zip code.  Given the broad circumference being used it this analysis 
this approximation seems acceptable.    
II. Model 
 
This research will examine changes in long-term county-level expenditures and 
revenues from before and after the start of a class II or class III Indian gaming operation.  
Communities considered to be within the impact area are those within a 50 mile radius59 
of the outer boundary of the zip code of an Indian gaming operation.   
a. Difference in Difference 
A longitudinal “difference in difference” model with panel data is used to examine the 
fiscal impact of the gaming operation.  The model examines a variable of interest before 
and after some intervening factor (Angrist & Krueger, 1999, p. 21-23, Wooldridge 2000).  
This model is similar to that used by Topoleski (2003).  This work differs from 
Topoleski’s socio-economic outcomes, in that the outcomes are revenues and 
 
59 Parameter established through work by Topoleski & Evans. 
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expenditures in counties prior to and after the opening of an Indian gaming operation60.  
The form of the regression equation is: 
Yct=Bo +  δ0post + β1gaming +  δ1post*gaming + β2population + β3uicode93 +  
β4pay_pct + β5est_pct + β6pctIndian + β7empwrkag + β8pci + β9maxlocalst  + 
β10welfare_co  + u 
Where: 
• Y=per capita revenues, per capita expenditures (total revenues, sales tax, state 
IGR, property tax, total expenditures, construction expenditures, highway 
expenditures, welfare expenditures and police expenditures) and the ratio of per 
capita total expenditures to per capita total revenues. 
• βo=intercept constant (average expenditure or revenue of non-gaming 
community). 
• δ0Post=dummy variable representing pre (0) or post (1) period. (change in 
revenue or expenditure overall from pre to post period). 
• β1gaming=dummy variable representing non-gaming(0) and gaming(1) counties. 
(measure of difference in revenues or expenditures between non-gaming and 
gaming communities irrelevant of pre/post period). 
• δ1post*gaming=interaction effect (measure of change in revenues or 
expenditures specifically related to the opening of the gaming operation). 
• β2uicode93=dummy variable indicating rural non-adjacent or rural adjacent from 
the Urban Influence Codes. 
• β3pay_pct=percent of total payroll in the state. 
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• β4est_pct=percent of total establishments in the state. 
• β5pctIndian=percent American Indian in the county. 
• β6empwrkag=ratio of employed to working age. 
• β7pci=per capita income. 
• β8maxlocalst=dummy variable for low/high local sales tax rate61. 
• β9welfare_co=dummy variable indicating AFDC and child welfare at the county 
level62. 
This model is replicated for revenues, expenditures and the ratio of expenditures to 
revenues.  Only the total expenditures and welfare expenditures models use the 
AFDC/child welfare variable.  Likewise, only the total revenues and sales tax revenues 
use the sales tax dummy variable. This model is employed as a fixed effects model 
controlling for the fixed effects from the ‘state’.  In lieu of using a software package with 
a specialized program for fixed or random effects, this analysis simply includes a dummy 
variable for each state in the data. 
In addition, there are potential biases in this data with regard to the location of the 
casino.  First, tribes choosing to open a casino may be non-random.  They may be 
motivated by culture, economic or geographic factors.  Julie Topoleski explored this in 
depth.  She found that prior tribal economic conditions and economic growth did not 
influence a tribe’s decision to open a casino (Topoleski, 2003, pp. 54-55).  She did find 
that the population within a fifty mile radius of tribal headquarters positively influenced 
 
61 This indicator was derived from Washington Department of Revenue “Comparison of State and Local 
Retail Sales Taxes” http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sl_sales.html, considering high sales taxes those in 
top two quartiles and those with low sales taxes the bottom two quartiles.. 
62 This indicator was derived from “Table 1 Administrative Authority for AFDC and Child Welfare 
Services, Historically by State” and “Table 2 States Know to Have Enacted or Proposed Changes in State-
Local Responsibilities for Social Services, Public Assistance, and Workforce Development, 1995-1996” 
(Watson and Gold, 1997).  
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this decision (Topoleski, 2003, p. 55).  Topoleski also examined the role of ‘economic 
shocks’ in influencing the interpretation of results.  She found,  
If, for example, tribes that elect to open a casino are ones which experience a 
negative transitory shock that triggers it to open a casino, we would have a 
problem analogous to “Ashenfelter’s Dip.” Specifically, if tribes were opening 
casinos in response to negative transitory shocks and after some period of time 
returning to pre-shock levels of employment and poverty, what we would be 
interpreting as a positive treatment effect would actually be a return to prior 
levels. The fact that we cannot reject the hypothesis that pre-treatment trends are 
not significantly different than zero supports the idea that we are not erroneously 
interpreting the reversal of a negative transitory shock as a treatment effect. 
(Topoleski, 2003, p. 55) 
Given Topoleski’s work this model will operate under these assumptions. 
 In addition a tribe may choose to open a casino due to the influences of nearby 
tribes.  A measure of this effect was found to be significant when examining bingo 
operations. 
On the one hand, a tribe may be discouraged from opening its own bingo hall if 
there is another Indian bingo facility within its 100-mile “watershed.”  But on the 
other hand, close proximity may lead to a demonstration or diffusion effect, such 
that the nearer another Indian bingo hall, the more likely the non-gaming tribe is 
to learn by example and enter the gaming industry itself. 
(Jorgensen, 2000, p. 14) 
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b. Sampling Design 
The sample for this analysis will include class II and class III Indian gaming 
operations which began in the U.S. between 1983 and 1997, except for Alaska.  This 
analysis includes both class II and class III gaming for several reasons.  First, in many 
cases it is becoming difficult to distinguish between class II and class III gaming 
machines.  Second, class II games represent a small but significant portion of the Indian 
gaming industry with 156 facilities and $2.6 billion in revenue (2005) (Meister, 2006, p. 
4). 
The pre-gaming period will be the 1982 Census of Governments (COG) the post-
gaming period will be the 2002 COG.   Approximately half of the current 354 Indian 
gaming operations began during this time.  The comparison group consists of 
observations from counties in the same time period within the same state that did not 
have Indian gaming.    The sample is further limited to non-metropolitan counties 
according to the Urban Influence Codes (UIC).  The degree of non-metropolitan is further 
specified using the distinct codes provided by the UIC.  Given variability in the gaming 
data with regard to Oklahoma and the general differences in the structure of Oklahoma 
and Alaska tribes this data will exclude both.  This analysis will look at 19 states (Table 
15) excluding:  
? Arizona all counties within a 50 mile radius of an Indian gaming 
operation. 
? Missouri since its actual Indian gaming operation is in Oklahoma 
which has been removed.   
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? California has only one county without Indian gaming within a 50 
mile radius.   
? Nevada has only has 2 Indian gaming communities and there are 
issues with comparability given the non-Indian gaming in the state. 
? Oregon only has one county without Indian gaming within a 50 
mile radius . 
? Washington only has 2 counties without Indian gaming within a 50 
mile radius. 
? Wisconsin only has 1 county without Indian gaming within a 50 
mile radius. 
 
This results in the following sample: 
 
Table 14: Sample Size 
 Sample 
Percent 
of Total 
Sample 
Gaming County Areas  370  39.52 
Non-Gaming County 
Areas  566 60.47
 
Twelve out of the 19 the states used in this analysis have some form of non-Indian 
gaming.  Table 15 describes the total number of gaming facilities (all types) by state.  
This analysis does not control for any competition between non-Indian and Indian 
gaming.   
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Table 15: Gaming by State 
State Details 
AL Total of 7 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian.   
CO Total of 49 gaming operations. 
FL Total of 146 gaming operations. 
IA Total of 19 gaming operations. 
ID Total of 14 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian. 
KS Total of 9 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian. 
LA Total of 25 gaming operations. 
MI Total of 25 gaming operations.   
MN Total of 35 gaming operations. 
MS Total of 29 gaming operations. 
MT Total of 136 gaming operations. 
NC Total of 2 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian. 
ND Total of 38 gaming operations. 
NE Total of 11 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian. 
NM Total of 26 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian. 
NY Total of 21 gaming operations.   
SC Total of 2 gaming operations.  
SD Total of 56 gaming operations. 
WY Total of 3 gaming operations.  All casinos are American Indian. 
  
Source: Casino City http://us.casinocity.com/ 
 
c.  Matching 
 Given the potential for differences between gaming and non-gaming communities 
pre-gaming, propensity score based matching is used for a comparative sample.  This 
program will simply isolate communities in both groups in pre-period that have a similar 
propensity to be an Indian gaming community.  In this case this will be all government 
finance indicators and per capita income as a measure of current economic conditions in 
the community.   This method is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 and Appendix G. 
d. GIS Work 
For the purposes of this thesis, the gaming data required cleaning.  There were 22 
zip codes with two casinos.  Of these zip codes, 12 had different opening dates.  In these 
cases, the first opening date was selected.  This does not mitigate potential multiplier 
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effects on those casinos opened within 1-2 years of each other.  In 10 cases, the casinos 
had the same opening date so the information was aggregated and one casino address was 
selected.  
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Map 1: Geocoded Addresses of Gaming Operations 
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Map 2: Centroids Based on Zip Codes from Indian Gaming Operations  
Not limited to thesis specific sample. 
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Map 3: Counties Within 50 Mile Radius of Indian Gaming Operation Zip Code Centroid 
Not limited to thesis specific sample. 
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Map 4: A Comparison of Zip Code Centroids to Geocoded Address of Indian Gaming Operations 
Not limited to thesis specific sample. 
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In order to determine communities within the 50 mile radius of the Indian gaming 
operation (treatment group), the zip code of each casino was converted to a centroid 
(Map 2) and merged to counties (The Zip Code, n.d.) within a 50 mile radius using the 
Union feature of ArcGIS (see Map 3)63.  Geocoded addresses were not used given the 
poor match rate (Map1).  Map 4 demonstrates that in cases were an address was found 
the boundaries of the 50 mile radius surrounding this address are very similar to the 50 
mile radius from the zip code centroid in Map 2.  These data were then exported from 
ArcGIS.  The resulting file contains gaming counties with indication of the zip code of 
the gaming operation that is within a 50 mile radius of these specific zip codes.  The zip 
code indicator in the file is used to merge the data from Step Two back to the gaming 
data.  This creates a file of counties with gaming data for any Indian gaming operations 
within a 50 mile radius of that county.   
The next step was to limit to the data to only one representation of the county.  
The data were summarized to represent one county with an indicator of the number of 
gaming operations within this county and an aggregation of gaming relevant variables.  
Then, the expenditure and revenue data from the Census of Governments and Urban 
Influence Codes are merged with the aforementioned file with the fips indicator.  
Metropolitan, as well as any counties with missing revenue and expenditure data were 
removed.  Expenditure and revenue data are adjusted for inflation to 2002 dollars using 
the State and Local price index from the 2007 Economic Report of the President 
(Economic Report of the President, 2007, p. 239). 
 
63 From this point forward referred to as “gaming communities”. 
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Data for counties without an Indian gaming operation (comparison group) are 
selected within the states that experienced the opening of an Indian gaming operation.  
The data are limited to the period of interest at this point and only to states where an 
Indian gaming operation opened between 1983 and 1997.  All of the proceeding work 
results in the panel data set structure as seen in Appendix C. 
e. Ethical Considerations & Limitations 
Given that the data for this research are all public use files, the ethical 
considerations are limited.     
This research has limitations with regard to both the data sources and model.  The 
data being used, although compiled by reputable sources, does have the potential for 
errors. Details on the potential issues in the source data are provided within the 
description of each data source.  There also is the potential for errors in the complex 
process used to merge and compile these data sources into one data table.  The gaming 
data lack a clear variable of magnitude such as revenues.  This is due to the fact that 
revenues from Indian gaming operations are not required to be publicly disclosed.  The 
model is not immune to inferential criticisms.   
V.  Conclusion 
 
  This research uses a complex modeling process in combination with well 
respected data sources to produce an extremely robust model of the impact of Indian 
gaming operations and non-Indian gaming county areas.  This difference in difference 
model isolates the specific effects of having a gaming operation open in or near a non-
tribal community (within a 50 mile radius of the zip code of the operation) between 1983 
and 1997 through the use of a panel dataset constructed from Census of Governments, 
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Decennial Census, County Business Patterns, Urban Influence Codes and The Taylor 
Policy Group’s Indian gaming data. However, robust this model, it still might be subject 
to numerous potential data and model related errors, such as those related to sampling 
design and/or misspecification of the model.   
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
 
I. Introduction 
 At this point we have established a brief history of American Indian policy and 
laid the foundation for the analysis set forth in Chapter 5 from the anecdotal evidence that 
has been discussed.  It is clear at this point that there is a potential for tribal activities to 
impact non-tribal communities in both positive and negative ways.  We have established 
that tribes work with non-tribal communities both collaborating on development and 
providing revenues to offset potential impact costs in these communities.  We have also 
witnessed the arguments regarding uncompensated impacts including such things as 
infrastructure costs.  In this chapter we look at the quantitative evidence to support these 
assertions.  First, we start by looking descriptively at these communities in the pre-
gaming period.  Then we examine the changes in both communities from 1982 to 2002.  
We also look briefly at the difference between communities that house the actual 
operation versus those that are adjacent to it. 
II. Sample Analysis 
One of the first steps in examining the quantifiable data behind this hypothesis is 
to examine the similarities and/or differences between the two groups being compared. 
This data yielded 566 non-gaming counties and 370 gaming counties (counties within a 
50 mile radius of the gaming operation zip code centroid).  Of the 370 gaming counties 
61 actually had gaming operations within their boundaries.   
a. Aggregate 
 Overall, there are some differences between the treatment and comparison group, 
but as whole they appear to be relatively comparable.  The mean population in gaming 
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communities is very similar to that in non-gaming counties 20,204 vs. 18,242.  Mean 
revenues are lower per capita in all categories in gaming communities, except for State 
intergovernmental revenue which is $944.34 per capita in gaming communities, vs. 
$837.36 in non-gaming communities.  Mean total expenditures are nearly identical in the 
two communities.  Welfare expenditures in gaming communities are nearly double those 
of the non-gaming communities $93.24 vs. $54.72 per capita (Table 16).   
Table 16: Descriptive Characteristics 1982 
 Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Game (1,0) 566 0.00 0.00 0.00 370 1.00 1.00 1.00
Population 566 516 157770 18242 370 440 112660 20204
Urban 
Influence Code 566 3 9 7 370 3 9 7
Total Revenue 566 $817.40 $30,436.33 $2,869.84 370 $341.88 $9,377.65 $2,754.37
Sales Tax 566 $0.00 $1,425.71 $50.74 370 $0.00 $1,196.83 $38.01
State IGR 566 $226.15 $3,886.89 $837.36 370 $66.86 $2,388.86 $944.34
Property Tax 566 $70.30 $3,867.16 $869.43 370 $34.23 $4,290.49 $748.03
Total 
Expenditures 566 $806.25 $34,729.47 $2,796.09 370 $301.51 $12,025.84 $2,719.10
Capital Outlays 566 $5.77 $7,970.54 $407.98 370 $0.00 $8,975.13 $363.24
Construction 
Exp. 566 $0.00 $7,852.17 $302.49 370 $0.00 $8,923.87 $255.80
Highway Exp. 566 $0.00 $3,000.16 $291.80 370 $0.39 $1,961.44 $301.45
Welfare Exp. 566 $0.00 $747.94 $54.72 370 $0.00 $728.39 $93.24
Police Exp. 566 $12.85 $421.67 $82.24 370 $0.00 $333.35 $78.89
Percent of 
Total Payroll in 
State 566 0.00% 11.63% 0.54% 370 0.00% 12.13% 0.70%
Percent of 
Total 
Establishments 
in State 566 0.01% 7.08% 0.73% 370 0.02% 9.83% 0.91%
Percent 
American 
Indian 566 0.00 58.10 0.63 370 0.00 93.40 3.67
Ratio 
Employed to 
Working Age 566 33.70% 89.95% 71.85% 370 32.89% 88.61% 70.21%
Per Capita 
Income 566 $5,196.00 $20,588.00 $9,840.94 370 $4,504.00 $13,650.00 $9,520.62
 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 132 
 
 
 
As would be expected gaming communities have a higher percentage of American 
Indians (expected as they most likely include or are adjacent to an American Indian 
reservation).  Although, this model does not rely solely on the similarity of the two 
groups for comparison it is still beneficial to examine the degree to which these two 
groups diverge.   For closer examination of this an independent samples t-test was 
performed to determine if there were significant differences in key variables between the 
comparison (non-gaming) and treatment group (gaming). Prior to this examination it is 
first necessary to determine if the distribution of the key variable is normal (Appendix 
D).   
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Table 17:  Independent Samples T-Test of the Explanatory Variables 1982 
Group Statistics 
Gaming 
(0,1) N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
              Lower Upper 
Population 0.00 566.00 18241.71 17801.46 748.25 0.11 
-
4339.18 414.19
 1.00 370.00 20204.20 18584.09 966.14    
Urban Influence 
Code 0.00 566.00 7.45 1.44 0.06 0.47 -0.12 0.27
 1.00 370.00 7.38 1.53 0.08    
Total Revenues 0.00 566.00 2869.84 1658.97 69.73 0.23 -72.91 303.86
 1.00 370.00 2754.37 1002.12 52.10    
Sales Tax 0.00 566.00 50.74 111.55 4.69 0.08 -1.58 27.05
 1.00 370.00 38.01 105.27 5.47    
State IGR 0.00 566.00 837.36 361.14 15.18 0.00 -157.70 -56.24
 1.00 370.00 944.34 422.76 21.98    
Property Tax 0.00 566.00 869.43 659.56 27.72 0.00 44.27 198.54
 1.00 370.00 748.03 456.89 23.75    
Total 
Expenditures 0.00 566.00 2796.09 1732.76 72.83 0.45 -124.45 278.43
 1.00 370.00 2719.10 1170.17 60.83    
Capital Outlays 0.00 566.00 407.98 554.84 23.32 0.23 -28.98 118.45
 1.00 370.00 363.24 572.41 29.76    
Construction 
Exp. 0.00 566.00 302.49 515.62 21.67 0.19 -23.47 116.85
 1.00 370.00 255.80 562.76 29.26    
Highway Exp. 0.00 566.00 291.80 226.75 9.53 0.50 -37.87 18.57
 1.00 370.00 301.45 195.92 10.19    
Welfare Exp. 0.00 566.00 54.72 94.64 3.98 0.00 -53.65 -23.39
 1.00 370.00 93.24 141.29 7.35    
Police Exp. 0.00 566.00 82.24 43.09 1.81 0.22 -2.03 8.73
 1.00 370.00 78.89 37.60 1.95    
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 0.00 566.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
 1.00 370.00 0.01 0.01 0.00    
Percent of Total 
Establishments 
in State 0.00 566.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
 1.00 370.00 0.01 0.01 0.00    
Percent 
American Indian 0.00 566.00 0.63 3.25 0.14 0.00 -4.03 -2.06
 1.00 370.00 3.67 11.21 0.58    
Ratio Employed 
to Working Age 0.00 566.00 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
 1.00 370.00 0.70 0.09 0.00    
Per Capita 
Income 0.00 566.00 9840.94 1851.33 77.82 0.01 91.86 548.77
 1.00 370.00 9520.62 1557.79 80.99    
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Here we see there is significant difference in the means of the two groups on the 
following characteristics:  property tax, state IGR, welfare expenditures, percent of total 
payroll in the state, percent of total establishments in the state, percent American Indian, 
and ratio of employed to working age and per capita income.  Some of these differences 
are to be expected such as those with regard to percent American Indian and welfare 
expenditures.  The differences in the percent of total payroll in the state and percent of 
total establishments in the state, although significant indicate that all of the rural 
communities in this sample on average represent less than 1% of payroll and 
establishments in the state.  The correlations between these independent variables runs 
the risk of providing large standard errors in the model, the size of the sample however, 
can counteract this issue64. 
b. State by State Comparison 
 A state by state comparison yields greater difference between gaming and non-
gaming communities.  The number of counties within a state within a 50 mile radius of 
the zip code of a gaming operation ranges from 4 to 63 (Table 18). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 See Richard Williams’s notes for a good explanation of the effects of multicollinearity 
http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l11.pdf. 
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Table 18: Rural Counties Within Range of Indian Gaming Operation by State 
State 
Non-
Gaming 
Counties 
Gaming 
Counties 
Total 
Counties
AL 24 6 30
CO 42 8 50
FL 23 4 27
IA 63 24 87
ID 21 21 42
KS 76 12 88
LA 22 18 40
MI 12 36 48
MN 5 63 68
MS 57 18 75
MT 30 13 43
NC 45 13 58
ND 19 30 49
NE 58 25 83
NM 12 8 20
NY 8 8 16
SC 21 9 30
SD 12 50 62
WY 16 4 20
Total 566 370 936
 
The greatest number of counties within range of an Indian gaming operation is in 
Minnesota where 63 out of 68 counties are within range.  Appendix E outlines the 
descriptive characteristics by state.   
III. Comparative Analysis 1982-2002 
Between 1982 and 2002 some the differences between gaming and non-gaming 
communities appear to lessen, with the communities being relatively similar in most 
areas (Table 19). 
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Table 19:  Descriptive Characteristics 2002 
 1982 2002 % Change 1982-2002   
 
Non-
Gaming Gaming 
Non-
Gaming Gaming 
Non-
Gaming Gaming Difference 
Mean 
Population 18242 20204 19826 22042 8.69% 9.09% 0.41%
Urban Influence Code 7 7 7 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Total Revenue $2,869.84 $2,754.37 $4,151.11 $3,933.25 44.65% 42.80% -1.85%
Sales Tax $50.74 $38.01 $145.64 $104.95 187.02% 176.15% -10.87%
State IGR $837.36 $944.34 $1,456.14 $1,480.50 73.90% 56.78% -17.12%
Property Tax $869.43 $748.03 $1,014.89 $934.37 16.73% 24.91% 8.18%
Total Expenditures $2,796.09 $2,719.10 $4,085.76 $3,917.30 46.12% 44.07% -2.06%
Capital Outlays $407.98 $363.24 $499.97 $499.66 22.55% 37.56% 15.01%
Construction Exp. $302.49 $255.80 $288.24 $303.95 -4.71% 18.82% 23.53%
Highway Exp. $291.80 $301.45 $306.84 $368.91 5.16% 22.38% 17.22%
Welfare Exp. $54.72 $93.24 $85.19 $117.21 55.69% 25.71% -29.97%
Police Exp. $82.24 $78.89 $140.33 $133.76 70.64% 69.56% -1.08%
Percent of Total Payroll in 
State 0.54% 0.70% 0.49% 0.64% -8.95% -7.90% 1.05%
Percent of Total 
Establishments in State 0.73% 0.91% 0.68% 0.86% -7.01% -6.01% 1.00%
Percent American Indian 0.63 3.67 0.91 4.85 45.29% 32.28% -13.00%
Ratio Employed to Working 
Age 71.85% 70.21% 76.92% 78.05% 7.05% 11.16% 4.11%
Per Capita Income $9,840.94 $9,520.62 $16,295.52 $16,334.77 65.59% 71.57% 5.98%
Median 
Population 12719 14204 13279 14319 4.40% 0.81% -3.59%
Urban Influence Code 8 8 8 8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Total Revenue $2,595.59 $2,547.76 $3,767.12 $3,568.69 45.14% 40.07% -5.06%
Sales Tax $6.86 $0.21 $92.55 $28.24 1248.21% 13062.45% 11814.24%
State IGR $786.90 $850.16 $1,360.90 $1,335.23 72.94% 57.06% -15.89%
Property Tax $822.12 $722.47 $924.18 $890.35 12.42% 23.24% 10.82%
Total Expenditures $2,512.14 $2,470.85 $3,773.55 $3,568.39 50.21% 44.42% -5.79%
Capital Outlays $270.02 $261.07 $365.28 $407.79 35.28% 56.20% 20.92%
Construction Exp. $181.24 $165.18 $177.29 $212.89 -2.18% 28.89% 31.07%
Highway Exp. $266.49 $280.42 $269.07 $333.55 0.97% 18.95% 17.98%
Welfare Exp. $19.35 $37.77 $12.11 $22.49 -37.42% -40.44% -3.03%
Police Exp. $73.55 $73.13 $126.39 $121.35 71.84% 65.93% -5.90%
Percent of Total Payroll in 
State 0.23% 0.26% 0.19% 0.24% -18.30% -9.69% 8.61%
Percent of Total 
Establishments in State 0.43% 0.55% 0.38% 0.49% -12.89% -11.04% 1.85%
Percent American Indian 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.70 100.00% 75.00% -25.00%
Ratio Employed to Working 
Age 72.81% 72.33% 78.69% 79.68% 8.09% 10.17% 2.09%
Per Capita Income $9,763.00 $9,608.50 $16,238.00 $16,354.50 66.32% 70.21% 3.89%
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Comparing means, in general in 2002 revenues per-capita in gaming communities appear 
to be slightly lower than there non-gaming counterparts.  Total revenues, sales taxes and 
State IGR appear to be increasing at a slower pace in non-gaming communities; whereas 
property taxes are increasing at a faster pace in gaming communities.  Total expenditures 
are relatively comparable in gaming versus non-gaming communities with a slightly 
slower increase in total expenditures in gaming communities.  Construction expenditures 
in non-gaming communities decreased, but increased by 19% in gaming communities.  
Highway expenditures in gaming communities increased at a faster pace in gaming 
communities (22%), versus 5% in non-gaming communities.  While welfare expenditures 
remain higher in gaming areas, they increased at a far lesser percent than that seen in 
non-gaming communities.  In gaming communities welfare expenditures increased 25% 
where as in non-gaming communities they increased 56%.  Now similar to that of non-
gaming communities, per capita income in gaming communities increased at a slightly 
greater pace.  When examining the median change: 
• state IGR grew more in non-gaming counties 
• sales and property tax grew more in gaming counties 
• capital outlays, construction expenditures and highway expenditures grew more in 
gaming counties 
• the percent of state payroll declined less in gaming counties. 
So although the numbers may look rather different, some of the similar messages prevail. 
Given this analysis is only descriptive at this point it does not indicate a 
correlation or cause.  Thus, one cannot conclude that gaming is the root source of any of 
these changes only that there is difference in these changes between the two 
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communities.  For example, this analysis cannot indicate that gaming was the cause for a 
slower rate of increase in revenues in gaming communities.  It may very well be that 
these communities were at a disadvantage prior to gaming and simply have not overcome 
these hurdles. On the flip side, as another example, this analysis cannot suggest that 
gaming slowed the rate of welfare increase in gaming communities.  It could very well be 
that there were a greater number of long term welfare recipients in these communities 
which have been removed from welfare benefits not by choice.   
One final element left to examine descriptively is whether or not directly 
containing versus being adjacent to an Indian gaming operation has an impact on these 
factors. 
Table 20:  County Level Descriptive Characteristics of Counties that Contain an 
Indian Gaming Operation within their Boundaries  
 
 1982 2002 
  N Mean Mean 
% 
Change 
from 
1982 
Population 61 22,126.98 24,985.28 12.92%
Urban Influence Code 61 7.41 7.41 0.00%
Total Revenue 61 $2,735.52 $3,968.04 45.06%
Sales Tax 61 $49.11 $95.73 94.93%
State IGR 61 $1,029.00 $1,604.12 55.89%
Property Tax 61 $658.38 $810.98 23.18%
Total Expenditures 61 $2,706.80 $3,908.10 44.38%
Capital Outlays 61 $326.14 $455.91 39.79%
Construction Exp. 61 $220.33 $283.00 28.44%
Highway Exp. 61 $272.30 $355.30 30.48%
Welfare Exp. 61 $125.60 $144.67 15.19%
Police Exp. 61 $78.48 $137.42 75.11%
Percent of Total Payroll in 
State 61 0.84% 0.80% -5.84%
Percent of Total 
Establishments in State 61 1.16% 1.12% -3.30%
Percent American Indian 61 10.76 14.37 33.46%
Ratio Employed to Working 
Age 61 67.85% 74.74% 10.15%
Per Capita Income 61 $9,365.26 $15,789.28 68.59%
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By isolating the changes in counties with a gaming operation within their border we see 
some evidence towards the argument that the effects may vary with the exact location of 
the gaming operation.  Sales taxes increased at a slower pace in communities with a 
gaming operation, when compared to those within a 50 mile radius and those outside a 50 
mile radius.  There is a far greater increase in sales tax when comparing gaming counties 
as whole versus those counties with a gaming operation within their border (Table 21).  
Construction and highway expenditures increased at a faster pace in communities with a 
gaming operation within their border.  Welfare expenditures only increased 15% in these 
communities versus 26% in communities within a 50 mile radius Indian gaming 
operation and 56% in those not within a 50 mile radius.  The remaining characteristics in 
communities that directly house gaming operations are similar to those immediately 
adjacent to these operations. 
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Table 21: Differences in Change Given Distance to Gaming Operation 
 
Non-
Gaming 
Gaming (Within 
50 Mile Radius) 
Gaming (Within 
County) 
Population 8.69% 9.09% 12.92% 
Urban Influence Code 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total Revenue 44.65% 42.80% 45.06% 
Sales Tax 187.02% 176.15% 94.93% 
State IGR 73.90% 56.78% 55.89% 
Property Tax 16.73% 24.91% 23.18% 
Total Expenditures 46.12% 44.07% 44.38% 
Capital Outlays 22.55% 37.56% 39.79% 
Construction Exp. -4.71% 18.82% 28.44% 
Highway Exp. 5.16% 22.38% 30.48% 
Welfare Exp. 55.69% 25.71% 15.19% 
Police Exp. 70.64% 69.56% 75.11% 
Percent of Total Payroll in 
State -8.95% -7.90% -5.84% 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in State -7.01% -6.01% -3.30% 
Percent American Indian 45.29% 32.28% 33.46% 
Ratio Employed to Working 
Age 7.05% 11.16% 10.15% 
Per Capita Income 65.59% 71.57% 68.59% 
 
IV. Propensity Score Matching 
 As referenced in Chapter 4, a propensity score sample can be used for 
comparative purposes by generating a more ‘comparable’ comparison group.  One of the 
assumptions of a difference in difference model is that without intervention the treatment 
and comparison group experiences similar changes.  This necessitates the treatment and 
comparison group be similar in nature in the pre-period.  In order to explore the degree to 
which the full sample varies from a more precisely matched sample the gaming and non-
gaming communities is matched using propensity score matching.65  This matching 
 
65 SPSS Propensity Match, “Core elements of these programs were created by Raynald Levesque 
(http://pages.infinit.net/rlevesqu/). Levesque’s program was adapted for use with propensity 
matching by John Painter (www.unc.edu/~painter).”, Notes on SPSS Propensity Matching.  
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technique uses probabilities from a logistic regression on the treatment indicator, looking 
for communities that have a similar probability of being in the treatment group.  The 
characteristics used in this model including aggregate and specific revenues and 
expenditures.  After performing this matching function we have a gaming community 
sample of 370 compared to a non-gaming sample of 196 (Table 22 and 23).  This would 
suggest that the program could not isolate a one-to-one match for each gaming 
community from the total sample of non-gaming communities.  Overall, the averages of 
characteristics in the gaming versus non-gaming communities are relatively different 
even after propensity score matching.  This could be due to the non-matched gaming 
communities or this may indicate that matching on probabilities based on government 
fiscal characteristics may not have been the best approach.  The results of the multivariate 
models using this sample are provided in Appendix G. 
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Table 22: Descriptive Characteristics 1982 Post Matching 
 Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Game (1,0) 196 0.00 0.00 0.00 370 1.00 1.00 1.00
Population 196 813 71141 16268 370 440 112660 20204
Urban Influence 
Code 196 4 9 8 370 3 9 7
Total Revenue 196 $1,395.69 $30,436.33 $3,251.64 370 $341.88 $9,377.65 $2,754.37
Sales Tax 196 $0.00 $1,425.71 $63.61 370 $0.00 $1,196.83 $38.01
State IGR 196 $226.15 $2,191.81 $739.74 370 $66.86 $2,388.86 $944.34
Property Tax 196 $70.30 $3,867.16 $1,060.39 370 $34.23 $4,290.49 $748.03
Total 
Expenditures 196 $1,290.07 $34,729.47 $3,134.20 370 $301.51 $12,025.84 $2,719.10
Capital Outlays 196 $34.36 $7,970.54 $527.51 370 $0.00 $8,975.13 $363.24
Construction 
Exp. 196 $0.00 $7,852.17 $414.77 370 $0.00 $8,923.87 $255.80
Highway Exp. 196 $1.34 $1,031.55 $281.79 370 $0.39 $1,961.44 $301.45
Welfare Exp. 196 $0.00 $221.00 $29.55 370 $0.00 $728.39 $93.24
Police Exp. 196 $12.85 $421.67 $88.36 370 $0.00 $333.35 $78.89
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 196 0.00% 11.63% 0.64% 370 0.00% 12.13% 0.70%
Percent of Total 
Establishments 
in State 196 0.02% 6.99% 0.81% 370 0.02% 9.83% 0.91%
Percent 
American 
Indian 196 0.00 3.40 0.42 370 0.00 93.40 3.67
Ratio Employed 
to Working Age 196 47.40% 89.95% 73.60% 370 32.89% 88.61% 70.21%
Per Capita 
Income 196 6,033.00 20,588.00 10,451.95 370 4,504.00 13,650.00 9,520.62
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Table 23:  Descriptive Characteristics 2002 Post Matching 
 Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Mean 
% Change 
from 1982 N Mean 
% 
Change 
from 
1982 
Game (1,0) 196 0.00  370 1.00  
Population 196 17,447.22 7.25% 370 22,041.54 9.09% 
Urban Influence 
Code 196 7.53 0.00% 370 7.38 0.00% 
Total Revenue 196 $4,457.71 37.09% 370 $3,933.25 42.80% 
Sales Tax 196 $177.78 179.48% 370 $104.95 176.15% 
State IGR 196 $1,444.68 95.30% 370 $1,480.50 56.78% 
Property Tax 196 $1,108.38 4.53% 370 $934.37 24.91% 
Total 
Expenditures 196 $4,370.50 39.45% 370 $3,917.30 44.07% 
Capital Outlays 196 $556.51 5.50% 370 $499.66 37.56% 
Construction 
Exp. 196 $328.40 -20.82% 370 $303.95 18.82% 
Highway Exp. 196 $313.00 11.08% 370 $368.91 22.38% 
Welfare Exp. 196 $53.99 82.68% 370 $117.21 25.71% 
Police Exp. 196 $145.20 64.34% 370 $133.76 69.56% 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 196 0.57% -11.15% 370 0.64% -7.90% 
Percent of Total 
Establishments 
in State 196 0.75% -7.56% 370 0.86% -6.01% 
Percent 
American Indian 196 0.68 61.88% 370 4.85 32.28% 
Ratio Employed 
to Working Age 196 79.73% 8.33% 370 78.05% 11.16% 
Per Capita 
Income 196 $16,894.57 61.64% 370 $16,334.77 71.57% 
 
So far we have begun to describe the differences between non-gaming and 
gaming county areas.   The analysis at the point begins to lend evidence to some of the 
anecdotal and evidence based arguments examined in prior chapters.  On the positive side 
we begin to see evidence for increased job growth as found by Topoleski given the 
slightly greater increase in the ratio of employed to working age population in gaming 
communities.  We do not see support for the suggestion that the increase in crime 
Topoleski found has a cost factor for these governments.  In addition a slightly lower 
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increase in total revenue is in support of authors such as Anders, Siegel, Yacoub, 
Madhusudhan, Mason and Stranahan who argue that Indian gaming operations decrease 
revenues to state and local governments (Popp & Stehwien, 2002, p 321).  Contrary, 
though, to some of these arguments, sales tax revenues actually increased in gaming 
communities.  In this next section we explore these arguments as well as the argument 
that Popp and Stehwien (2002) make regarding the increase of a negative impact given 
the existence of multiple casinos more closely and further illuminate the specific 
questions of this thesis. 
V. Multivariate Analysis 
 After descriptively examining the characteristics of these communities each of the 
hypotheses was examined using an OLS regression model.  Note, the fixed effects 
coefficients are found in Appendix F. 
Hypothesis 1:  There is an impact on fiscal conditions from American Indian 
Class II and III gaming operations on non-Indian county expenditures and 
revenues within a 50 mile radius. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4 there is evidence of a direct impact on county area 
revenues.  Tribes such as the Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria and the Puyallup 
tribe have given substantial contributions to local government with regard to casino 
development and operations.   
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Table 24: Total Revenues 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate  
0.616163898 0.379657949 0.3695 1398.9725  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 891.4778 431.7846 2.0646 0.0391
Gaming (1, 0) -75.0977 133.6071 -0.5621 0.5741
Post Period 277.4763 144.8300 1.9159 0.0555
DID Estimator -379.1620 258.9272 -1.4644 0.1433
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -325.6061 77.5284 -4.1998 0.0000
Total Slots in County Area -0.1071 0.0503 -2.1312 0.0332
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 33.6857 18.9054 1.7818 0.0749
Number AI Gam. Ops. 15.7413 48.0836 0.3274 0.7434
Pct. State Payroll 33966.1019 7774.1005 4.3691 0.0000
Pct. State Establishments -46395.9262 8731.8136 -5.3134 0.0000
Percent Indian 6.2571 4.5792 1.3664 0.1720
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 1410.8619 548.0177 2.5745 0.0101
Per Capita Income 0.1430 0.0193 7.4258 0.0000
 
Looking at total revenues we see that the model accounts for 38% of the variation in 
revenues and that the DID Estimator66 is insignificant.   We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis.  Total slots in the county area had a significant (p < .05), if not very small 
(β=-0.1071) inverse relationship with total revenues.  The number of years a county area 
had a gaming operation had an ‘almost’ significant positive relationship with total 
revenues ( β=33.6857, p=.0749).  Other factors that showed a significant relationship to 
county area total revenues included:  percent of state payroll, percent of establishments in 
the state, rural adjacent/rural non-adjacent, ratio of employed to working age and per 
capital income.  Note that the percent of payroll in the state demonstrated a positive 
significant relationship with total revenues, while the percent of establishments in the 
 
66 The DID estimator refers to the difference in difference estimator which is a dummy variable constructed 
by multiplying the dummy variable for gaming by the dummy variable indicating pre/post period. 
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state had an inverse significant relationship.  This would imply that having  a greater 
number of smaller employers has an inverse impact on total county area total revenues. 
We also note in chapter 4 several arguments for potential increases in 
expenditures in county areas with regard to the operation of an Indian casino.  These 
examples are most often tied to the more specific areas discussed later in this chapter. 
Table 25: Total Expenditures 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate  
0.6079704 0.369628008 0.359355786 1411.6793  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 700.5193 435.7065 1.6078 0.1081
Gaming (1, 0) -76.3941 134.8206 -0.5666 0.5710
Post Period 309.7740 146.1455 2.1196 0.0342
DID Estimator -395.5966 261.2790 -1.5141 0.1302
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -329.4603 78.2326 -4.2113 0.0000
Total Slots in County Area -0.1067 0.0507 -2.1039 0.0355
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 35.7440 19.0771 1.8737 0.0611
Number AI Gam. Ops. 19.6732 48.5204 0.4055 0.6852
Pct. State Payroll 34679.1799 7844.7122 4.4207 0.0000
Pct. State Establishments -44500.5482 8811.1241 -5.0505 0.0000
Percent Indian 9.7600 4.6208 2.1122 0.0348
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 1518.1992 552.9953 2.7454 0.0061
Per Capita Income 0.1385 0.0194 7.1277 0.0000
AFDC/Child Welf. at County Level 881.8672 182.9561 4.8201 0.0000
 
Again, looking at total expenditures we see the DID estimator is insignificant indicating 
suggesting again, that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  The model accounts for 37% 
of the variation in expenditures.  We see results similar to those for revenues, most likely 
due to the correlation between revenues and expenditures.  In addition to this we see that 
the percent of the population that is Indian has a significant positive relationship with 
expenditures (β=9.76, p < .01)  this would indicate that for a one unit increase in the 
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percent of the population that is Indian there is a $9.76 dollar increase in expenditures per 
capita.  This model also demonstrates that there is a significant relationship between 
having AFDC/Child Welfare provided at the county level and expenditures. 
Neither the model of revenues nor of expenditures supports hypothesis 1.  We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is not a significant impact from the opening of 
a gaming operation on local government revenues and expenditures.  In addition to this, 
this research examined whether or not the DID estimator had a significant effect on the 
ratio of expenditures to revenues.  Both samples yielded no significant impact from the 
DID estimator. 
VI. Specific Impacts 
 The anecdotal evidence points to the potential impact (from Indian gaming) on 
sales taxes, property taxes, construction expenditures, highway expenditures, welfare 
expenditures and police expenditures.  This evidence drives the next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: There are both positive and negative effects on specific county area 
expenditures and revenues that are correlated to the opening of an Indian gaming 
operation.     
 
The operation of an Indian gaming facility has the potential to impact sales taxes by 
diverting spending from items taxable at the local level.  The study by Popp and Stehwien 
(2002) suggest this relationship may be altered by the number of casinos and the 
dynamics of the surrounding community (Popp & Stehwien, 2002, pp. 328-330).  The 
flip side of this argument is that by creating a destination spot these casinos attract 
patrons who otherwise might not spend their resources in these areas. 
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Table 26:  Sales Tax  
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7620 0.5806 0.573798107 110.9306  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -195.8344 34.2381 -5.7198 0.0000
Gaming (1, 0) 7.8746 10.5943 0.7433 0.4574
Post Period -110.8220 11.4842 -9.6500 0.0000
DID Estimator 42.0960 20.5315 2.0503 0.0405
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -21.3920 6.1476 -3.4797 0.0005
Total Slots in County Area -0.0153 0.0040 -3.8409 0.0001
Number of Yrs AI Gam. -4.8558 1.4991 -3.2392 0.0012
Number AI Gam. Ops. 4.9062 3.8128 1.2868 0.1983
Pct. State Payroll 1058.3900 616.4424 1.7169 0.0862
Pct. State Establishments -1140.6585 692.3837 -1.6474 0.0996
Percent Indian 1.2187 0.3631 3.3563 0.0008
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -158.1370 43.4547 -3.6391 0.0003
Per Capita Income 0.0330 0.0015 21.6394 0.0000
 
This model accounted for 58% of the variation in sales tax revenues.  This model 
supports the latter argument.  The DID is significant at the p < .05 level.  The β=42.0960 
indicates that the opening of a gaming operation is positively correlated with an increase 
in sales tax revenues of $42 per capita, which helps to offset a loss of $110 in sales taxes 
in the post period..  In contrast, however, there is a significant inverse relationship 
between total slots in the county area and the number of years the county has had a 
gaming operation and sales tax revenues.  This would suggest that there might be a point 
at which the returns from the opening gaming operation begin to retract be it from the 
opening of additional casino’s or continued operation.  This lends support to Popp and 
Stehwien’s (2002) argument.   
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The opening of the first casino in a county imparts a negative, if small, effect on 
the total taxable gross receipts generated in that county. At the same time, it 
affects the neighboring counties by lowering the total taxable gross receipts 
generated in that county by 1.3%. The second casino opening in a county 
significantly impacts taxable gross receipts, decreasing them by 6.2%. The second 
casino opening affects the neighboring county, but in a positive way. Because 
most casinos are located close to the county line with a county of higher 
population, this may suggest that individuals spend more time and money in the 
higher population county while spending some time at 
the casinos. 
(Popp & Stehwien, 2002, p. 329) 
There is also a small, but significant increase in sales taxes in relation to the percent 
Indian.  Other significant factors included: rural adjacent/non-adjacent, ratio of employed 
to working age and per capita income. 
The arguments surrounding an inverse impact of Indian gaming on property taxes 
are rooted in the argument that as tribes buy land they remove it from the tax base.  We 
could also argue that there is the potential for an increase in property taxes if the casino 
provides for growth in the non-tribal area. 
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Table 27:  Property Tax 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7492 0.5613 0.5542 407.1203  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 483.8396 125.6553 3.8505 0.0001
Gaming (1, 0) -9.7496 38.8815 -0.2508 0.8020
Post Period -322.3612 42.1475 -7.6484 0.0000
DID Estimator 93.4672 75.3514 1.2404 0.2150
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -108.0436 22.5618 -4.7888 0.0000
Total Slots in County Area -0.0182 0.0146 -1.2471 0.2125
Number of Yrs AI Gam. -4.6464 5.5017 -0.8445 0.3985
Number AI Gam. Ops. -0.1709 13.9930 -0.0122 0.9903
Pct. State Payroll 16114.6195 2262.3705 7.1229 0.0000
Pct. State Establishments -26076.9591 2541.0782 -10.2622 0.0000
Percent Indian -4.6109 1.3326 -3.4601 0.0006
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 296.1378 159.4807 1.8569 0.0635
Per Capita Income 0.0695 0.0056 12.3975 0.0000
 
This model accounts for 56% of the variation in property taxes.   The DID estimator is 
insignificant indicating that there was not a significant correlation between property taxes 
and the opening of a gaming operation.  Significant factors included whether or not the 
community was rural adjacent or non-adjacent, percent of total payroll in the state, 
percent of total establishments in the state, percent Indian and per capita income.  It is not 
surprising that there is an inverse relationship between the percent Indian and property 
taxes given that a portion of this population would live on reservation and not be paying 
local property taxes. 
The arguments in support of an impact on construction expenditures are more 
limited.  The literature suggests that the opening of an Indian casino may spawn the need 
for enhancement of other services and infrastructure in a county area.   
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Table 28:  Construction Expenditures 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.324140563 0.105067104 0.090483733 441.5569  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -258.7781 136.2839 -1.8988 0.0577
Gaming (1, 0) -44.5541 42.1703 -1.0565 0.2909
Post Period -308.3608 45.7126 -6.7456 0.0000
DID Estimator 6.9118 81.7251 0.0846 0.9326
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -29.1029 24.4702 -1.1893 0.2345
Total Slots in County Area -0.0046 0.0159 -0.2895 0.7722
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 3.8808 5.9671 0.6504 0.5155
Number AI Gam. Ops. -0.9163 15.1766 -0.0604 0.9519
Pct. State Payroll 8040.6494 2453.7350 3.2769 0.0011
Pct. State Establishments -8818.6567 2756.0174 -3.1998 0.0014
Percent Indian 5.2244 1.4453 3.6147 0.0003
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 26.4611 172.9705 0.1530 0.8784
Per Capita Income 0.0450 0.0061 7.4073 0.0000
 
This model accounts for very little of the variation in construction expenditures, 10.5% 
and DID estimator was insignificant.   Significant factors included the percent of total 
payroll in the state, percent of total establishments in the state, the percent Indian and per 
capita income. 
 In contrast, the arguments suggesting an impact on highway expenditures are 
much more common.  Since many of these casinos are in rural areas these communities 
complain that the roads can’t meet the demands of the increased utilization caused by the 
casino. 
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Table 29:  Highway Expenditures 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.6799 0.4623 0.4535 167.4990  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -2.9988 51.6976 -0.0580 0.9537
Gaming (1, 0) -18.5526 15.9968 -1.1598 0.2463
Post Period -105.0154 17.3405 -6.0561 0.0000
DID Estimator 30.4313 31.0014 0.9816 0.3264
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -49.3961 9.2825 -5.3214 0.0000
Total Slots in County Area -0.0207 0.0060 -3.4314 0.0006
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 4.0964 2.2635 1.8097 0.0705
Number AI Gam. Ops. 2.6792 5.7571 0.4654 0.6417
Pct. State Payroll 5306.0736 930.7931 5.7006 0.0000
Pct. State Establishments -10812.9380 1045.4601 -10.3428 0.0000
Percent Indian -1.2577 0.5483 -2.2940 0.0219
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 302.4539 65.6142 4.6096 0.0000
Per Capita Income 0.0158 0.0023 6.8600 0.0000
 
The model accounts for 46% of highway expenditures.  The DID estimator is not 
significant, however total slots is.  This might suggest that the relationship between 
gaming and highway expenditures is more complex with reference to size of the 
operation.  There is an inverse significant correlation between total slots and highway 
expenditures (β=-0.0207, p < .001).  This would suggest that the greater the number of 
slots, the lower the highway expenditures.  Additional significant factors include rural 
adjacent/non-adjacent, percent of total payroll in the state, percent of total establishments 
in the state, percent Indian, ratio of employed to working age and per capita income. 
There are arguments that support both a negative and a positive impact with 
relation to fiscal spending on welfare expenditures.  For example Topoleski (2003) found 
both evidence for increased bankruptcy and at the same time evidence of increased job 
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growth.  Topoleski also found evidence for an impact on police related expenditures.  
Since the passage of the Citizenship Act in 1934 tribal members have also been eligible 
for welfare benefits as citizens of the US and the state.  As tribal individuals obtain 
employment it is more likely that they will be removed from the welfare rolls, lessening 
the burden of the state.   According to Anders, this has been the case in Michigan where 
between 1987 and 1991 welfare payments in counties with gaming decreased by 14 
percent.  In Wisconsin under the same circumstances welfare payments dropped 26 
percent (Anders 1998: 559).    “In Minnesota, roughly 37% of the tribal gaming 
employees had received state or federal welfare assistance prior to their employment and 
another 31% were drawing unemployment compensation. (Lawrence, 1995).”  How does 
the reduction in social welfare use impact local government welfare expenditures? 
Table 30:  Welfare Expenditures 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7091 0.5029 0.4948 112.6506  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 60.0522 34.7689 1.7272 0.0843
Gaming (1, 0) -26.5671 10.7585 -2.4694 0.0136
Post Period 45.3418 11.6623 3.8879 0.0001
DID Estimator -61.1770 20.8498 -2.9342 0.0034
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj 1.7612 6.2429 0.2821 0.7779
Total Slots in County Area 0.0018 0.0040 0.4366 0.6625
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 4.9820 1.5223 3.2726 0.0011
Number AI Gam. Ops. 11.7767 3.8719 3.0416 0.0024
Pct. State Payroll 375.0544 626.0001 0.5991 0.5492
Pct. State Establishments -605.3006 703.1188 -0.8609 0.3894
Percent Indian -0.3795 0.3687 -1.0291 0.3036
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -40.8002 44.1285 -0.9246 0.3553
Per Capita Income -0.0020 0.0016 -1.2814 0.2002
AFDC/Child Welf. at County Level 305.1638 14.5997 20.9020 0.0000
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This model accounts for 50% of welfare expenditures.  The DID estimator is significant 
(β=-61.1770, p <.01).  This suggests that the opening of the gaming operation is 
correlated decreased welfare expenditures per capita.  Although total slots are 
insignificant, the number of years with a gaming operation and the number of gaming 
operations share a significant positive correlation with welfare expenditures.   It is 
surprising the ratio of employed to working age does not share a significant correlation 
with welfare expenditures; one would expect that the more employed the population the 
lower the welfare expenditures in the community.  One additional significant factor is 
AFDC/Child Welfare at the county level, which suggests costs increase when 
AFDC/Child Welfare is provided for at the county level. 
 Finally, given Topoleski’s finding regarding an increase in crime we look at 
police expenditures. 
Table 31:  Police Expenditures 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.6908 0.4772 0.468661909 51.7380  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -2.1004 15.9686 -0.1315 0.8954
Gaming (1, 0) 5.5434 4.9412 1.1219 0.2621
Post Period -18.8619 5.3562 -3.5215 0.0004
DID Estimator -3.9094 9.5759 -0.4083 0.6831
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -10.8171 2.8672 -3.7727 0.0002
Total Slots in County Area -0.0026 0.0019 -1.3971 0.1625
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 0.1921 0.6992 0.2748 0.7835
Number AI Gam. Ops. 0.1789 1.7783 0.1006 0.9199
Pct. State Payroll 641.0030 287.5084 2.2295 0.0259
Pct. State Establishments -912.5695 322.9273 -2.8259 0.0048
Percent Indian 0.1935 0.1694 1.1428 0.2533
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -55.9623 20.2673 -2.7612 0.0058
Per Capita Income 0.0123 0.0007 17.3083 0.0000
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This model accounts for 48% of the variation in police expenditures.  Neither the DID 
estimator nor any of the other gaming related variables have a significant relationship 
with police expenditures.  Significant factors included rural adjacent/non-adjacent, 
percent of total payroll in the state, percent of total establishments in the state, ratio of 
employed to working age and per capita income. 
 The above models support hypothesis 2 that the opening of an Indian gaming 
operation affects specific revenues and expenditures.  Revenue streams affected include 
sales taxes, property taxes and State intergovernmental revenues (when looking at both 
the full sample and the propensity score sample).  The only expenditure clearly affected 
was welfare. 
VII. Impact on State IGR 
 Is there evidence here to support a ‘trickle down’ effect from state-tribal 
compacts?  That is do states pass on the revenues collected per these contracts to local 
governments? 
Hypothesis 3: Increases in county revenues from income and state IGR post the 
opening of an Indian gaming operation offset any additional associated 
expenditure.  
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Table 32: State IGR 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7529 0.5668 0.5598 388.1680  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 758.4764 119.8058 6.3309 0.0000
Gaming (1, 0) 16.1163 37.0715 0.4347 0.6638
Post Period 870.7671 40.1855 21.6687 0.0000
DID Estimator -226.0017 71.8436 -3.1457 0.0017
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -20.3152 21.5115 -0.9444 0.3451
Total Slots in County Area 0.0081 0.0139 0.5806 0.5616
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 12.1647 5.2456 2.3190 0.0205
Number AI Gam. Ops. 12.8532 13.3416 0.9634 0.3355
Pct. State Payroll 4558.4790 2157.0527 2.1133 0.0347
Pct. State Establishments -10429.4349 2422.7860 -4.3047 0.0000
Percent Indian -1.0946 1.2706 -0.8615 0.3891
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 531.0757 152.0566 3.4926 0.0005
Per Capita Income -0.0436 0.0053 -8.1679 0.0000
 
This model accounts for 57% of the variation in State intergovernmental revenue (IGR).  
The DID estimator shares a significant inverse correlation with State IGR (β=-226.0017, 
p < .01).  This indicates that the opening of a gaming operation is correlated with a 
decrease of $226 in State IGR per capita.  There is also a significant positive relationship 
between the number of years with a gaming operation and State IGR (β=12.1647, p < 
.05).  This suggests that the longer a gaming operation has been in place, the greater the 
State IGR.  Additional significant factors include percent of total payroll in the state, 
percent of total establishments in the state, ratio of employed to working age and per 
capita income.   This model does not support hypothesis 3 that there is a ‘trickle’ down 
affect in State IGR that offsets any additional expenditures. 
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VIII. Role of Specific Independent Factors 
 Finally, what role does time and geographic location play in the fiscal impact of 
Indian gaming operations? 
Hypothesis 4: Time plays a role in the fiscal effects of Indian gaming.  The longer 
a gaming operation been in business affects the impact it has on expenditures or 
revenues.  The longer the business has been operating the more positive the 
impact on the county. 
 
The table below details the coefficients and significance of the time with gaming 
operation by model.  It’s notable that although only significant in 3 models (Sales Tax, 
Welfare Expenditures and State IGR), it is ‘almost’ significant in 3 additional models 
(Total Revenues, Total Expenditures and Highway Expenditures) 
Table 33: Time with Gaming Operation 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Std. 
Error t Sig. 
Total Revenues 33.6857 18.9054 1.7818 0.0749 
Total Expenditures 35.744 19.0771 1.8737 0.0611 
Sales Tax -4.8558 1.4991 -3.2392 0.0012 
Property Tax -4.6464 5.5017 -0.8445 0.3985 
Construction 
Expenditures 3.8808 5.9671 0.6504 0.5155 
Highway Expenditures 4.0964 2.2635 1.8097 0.0705 
Welfare Expenditures 4.982 1.5223 3.2726 0.0011 
Police Expenditures 0.1921 0.6992 0.2748 0.7835 
State IGR 12.1647 5.2456 2.319 0.0205 
 
Hypothesis 5: The more non-metropolitan a community the more likely they are to 
benefit from the opening of an Indian gaming operation.   
 
 The role of metropolitan status and the opening of a gaming operation appear to 
be insignificant in both rural adjacent and non-adjacent communities.  The factor is 
insignificant in all models.   
 With regard to hypothesis 4 and 5, preliminary examination of the role of time 
with a gaming operation lends evidence that time plays a role, however models with 
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varying metropolitan status did not show any significant variation with regard to the DID 
estimator. 
IX. Conclusion 
 This chapter clearly demonstrates that although relatively limited there are 
potentially both positive and negative impacts from the opening of an Indian gaming 
operation on non-Indian local governments.   There was not a significant correlation 
between the DID estimator and aggregate revenues and expenditures from the opening of 
an Indian gaming operation.  There were however, depending on the sample impacts on 
sales taxes, property taxes, welfare expenditures and State intergovernmental revenues.  
The result of the full sample model (versus the propensity score model) indicated the 
opening of an Indian gaming operation had a positive effect on sales taxes suggesting that 
the opening of an Indian gaming operation may indeed generate additional revenues in 
these communities.  The result of the propensity score model in Appendix G indicated 
that the opening of an Indian gaming operation results in increased property taxes 
suggesting that the opening of a gaming operation is correlated with an increase the 
property value of off reservation taxable property.  This is validated by the inverse 
relationship between the percent of the population which is American Indian and property 
taxes.  Both samples demonstrated the opening of a gaming operation is inversely 
correlated with welfare expenditures at the local government level.  Finally, both models 
suggest that the opening of a gaming operation is inversely correlated with State IGR.  
The full sample model where State IGR shares a positive relationship with the years the 
community has a gaming operation and the propensity score model where State IGR 
shares a positive relationship with the total number of gaming operations suggests that 
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this relationship may be more complex.  It may be the ‘trickle’ down effect takes longer 
to show up in the data or that it is reliant on number of operations.  Further, it may be that 
these models are simply missing a key factor which is established tribal/local government 
revenue sharing that impacts the state’s decision regarding intergovernmental revenues 
sharing with local governments.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
I. Introduction 
 Through this research we have woven a complicated tale of governance and 
economic development.  We establish the basis for current tribal-local relations by 
looking at both the history of American Indian policy and current tribal-local government 
relations.  We see a series of conflictual national policies that make it hard for tribes to 
establish culturally appropriate institutions capable of sustained economic development 
and in this make it challenging for local governments to understand and see validity in 
these policies and institutions.  Given the limited policies directed at the relations 
between state/local governments and tribes we see a blossoming of informal relations 
sometimes solidified in forms such as “memoranda of understanding”.   The Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act provides little if no direction for the relations between tribes and 
local governments regarding gaming. 
 Given the close ties between governance and economic development it becomes 
clear that governments are susceptible to the influence of local economic endeavors, 
including those outside their immediate jurisdiction.  Clearly tribes have faced a greater 
responsibility for the care of their populace, given their “semi-sovereign” status, although 
with recent devolution movements local governments are continuing to face increasing 
demands as well.  Given the challenges of economic development in tribal communities 
as well as rural communities, gaming is a very lucrative endeavor.  Not only does it 
provide for jobs for the community members, it can be a destination point and potential 
stimulus for tourism.   
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 We begin to see how these foundations have laid the ground for tribal-local 
relations.  Tribes are generally considered outside the scope of intergovernmental 
relations in the United States.  However, as resources enable them greater participation 
there are recommendations that this change (as cited in Mays & Taggart, 2005, p. 75).  
Demonstrated here are complex relations that span a variety of topics.  These relations 
most often appear to center around land and gaming related issues.  Relations over 
gaming appear to be almost equally cooperative and conflictual.  In these relations we see 
clear evidence of impact mitigation through negotiated payments from tribes either 
directly to local governments or awarded to the state that then disperses these revenues to 
local governments.  These relationships are illuminated by a limited survey (14 
responses) of tribal and local governments.  Most of these respondents indicated the 
relations were information exchanges and not an exchange of goods.  Most relations were 
cooperative and both groups benefited, although most of the governments indicated their 
economic circumstances were different from the government with which they were 
interacting.  A majority indicated that their government’s economic circumstances had 
changed within the past 5-10 years.  History clearly influenced these interactions. 
 Although there is debate about the degree and direction of socio-economic impact 
from Indian gaming, there appears to be consensus that their most likely is some impact 
on communities surrounding Indian gaming operations.  Employment and crime related 
impacts seem to be popular.  Although studies of non-Indian gaming operations have 
shown negative impacts, some would argue this relationship is not transferable to Indian 
gaming communities since the dynamics of these communities are so different from the 
communities where gaming operations are traditionally found.  Given the ties established 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 162 
 
 
 
between the socio-economic conditions of the community and governance, once can 
assume that this would imply a fiscal impact.  The literature however documenting a 
fiscal impact is limited.  The National Indian Gaming association reports an additional 
$100 million in local revenue as a result of Indian gaming (National Indian Gaming 
Association, 2004, p. 11).  Smaller economic impact studies demonstrate primarily 
positive fiscal impacts on local governments as well, suggesting that negative impacts are 
mitigated by the tribes.  There is some suggestion in the literature that the number of 
Indian gaming operations plays a role in how the operation(s) impact their surrounding 
communities.  These economic impact studies as well as tribal-state compacts give 
evidence to mitigation for any real or perceived impacts in local communities.  The 
specificity and breath of this mitigation varies greatly between communities and states.   
II. Revisiting the Primary Research Questions: Assumptions and Findings 
 The primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine evidence for or against a 
fiscal impact on non-Indian governments from the opening of an Indian gaming 
operation.  To enhance the validity of these results two samples were used.  The first was 
a sample of gaming communities in 19 states.  The second was a sample using propensity 
score matching to isolate communities that had a similar probability of being a gaming 
community. Given the limited match in the propensity score sample, this research places 
the emphasis on the results of the full sample, while still sharing the results of the 
propensity score sample.  The first question explored was: 
What is the effect of American Indian Class II and III gaming operations on non-
Indian local government expenditures and revenues within a 50 mile radius of 
these operations? 
 
This question led to the hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1:  There is an impact on fiscal conditions from American Indian 
Class III gaming operations on non-Indian county expenditures and revenues 
within a 50 mile radius. 
 
 
The quantitative models employed here would suggest that at an aggregate level there is 
not a significant correlation between non-Indian government expenditures and revenues 
within a 50 mile radius and the opening of an Indian gaming operation.  This includes no 
significant correlation with the ratio of expenditures to revenues.  Thus we cannot 
answer: 
To what degree do increases in local government revenues that can be attributed 
to the opening of an Indian gaming operation potentially offset any additional 
associated expenditure?  
 
Given the limited evidence for impact on aggregate revenues and expenditures, one might 
infer that the system is working fine as is.  Maybe there is no need for additional policy 
interventions or mandated impact mitigation.  Does this mean there is no need for impact 
mitigation?  Not necessarily.  These models may very well be failing to pick up the 
significance of existing impact mitigation effects.  Looking at the next question and 
hypothesis: 
Is there any evidence that the local government  fiscal effects of the opening of an 
Indian gaming operation are directly tied to specific expenditures (crime, social 
welfare and/or infrastructure) or revenue sources (taxes: incomes, sales, 
property) 
 
Hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There are both positive and negative effects on specific county 
area expenditures and revenues that are correlated to the opening of an Indian 
gaming operation.     
 
The model(s) used here do appear to indicate that there is indeed correlation between 
specific revenues and expenditures.  Using the full sample the model indicated that the 
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opening of an Indian gaming operation is positively correlated with sales taxes.  This 
relationship did not maintain significance when looking at the propensity score sample. 
In reverse the full sample does not show a significant correlation between property taxes 
and the opening of an Indian gaming operation, but the propensity score shows a positive 
correlation between the two.  Both samples suggest that there is an inverse correlation 
between the opening of an Indian gaming operation and welfare expenditures.  That is, 
the opening of an Indian gaming operation is correlated with a decrease in local welfare 
expenditures.   
What role do state-local intergovernmental revenue exchanges have on the fiscal 
effect of gaming?  Are tribal-state revenue sharing agreements reflected in the 
data such that there is a trickle down effect from the state to the local area or do 
all fiscal affects stem from changes in the local economy?   
 
Both samples show a significant relationship between the opening of an Indian gaming 
operation and State intergovernmental transfers.  Both models indicate that with the 
opening of the gaming operation there is a decrease in State intergovernmental transfers.  
This is directly opposite the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Increases in county revenues from income and state IGR post the 
opening of an Indian gaming operation offset any additional associated 
expenditures.  
 
The logic or reason for this is room for future research.  Descriptively, out of 79 county 
areas that had a decrease in state intergovernmental revenues, they were almost evenly 
split between gaming and non-gaming communities.  The average decrease in non-
gaming communities was 14% versus a 12% decrease in gaming communities.  State IGR 
increased almost 2 percentage points more in non-gaming communities (in communities 
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with an increase in state IGR) and in non-gaming communities the maximum increase 
was considerably higher 18% versus 6% in gaming communities.  
The next question and hypothesis surrounded the role of time in these models. 
What role does time play in the fiscal effects of Indian gaming?  Example: Does 
the longer a gaming operation has been open affect the impact it has on local 
government expenditures or revenues? 
 
Hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Time plays a role the fiscal effects of Indian gaming?  The longer a 
gaming operation been in business affects the impact it has on expenditures or 
revenues.  The longer the business has been operating the more positive the 
impact on local government revenues and expenditures. 
 
In a number of these models the time a gaming operation has been in effect is significant 
or near significant.  This indicates that the longevity of the operation may very well be a 
significant factor in the impact of the operation.  There appears to be both negative and 
positive impacts in the long run.   
Is there a geographic component to this effect?  Does the degree of rurality(as 
indicated by the scalar Urban Influence Codes (UIC)) of a community impact the 
effect? 
 
Although the degree of rurality clearly impacts expenditures and revenues, when running 
separate models to explore the changes in the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, when looking at either rural adjacent or rural nonadjacent, there 
does not appear to be any great difference in these relationships.  Thus, this research did 
not support the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The more non-metropolitan a community the more likely they are to 
benefit from the opening of an Indian gaming operation.   
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III. Limitations 
 There were several limitations to this research.  First, the data is limited by the 
errors and biases found in the original data sources.   These include both sampling and 
non-sampling errors and imputation of missing data.  One of the greatest limitations is the 
lack of revenues for gaming operations.  The size of the gaming operation can only be 
inferred from the number of slots.  This may or may not be the best proxy, given that this 
work looks at both Class II and Class III gaming.  In addition given the r-squared results 
in the models it is clear that there are many additional factors that would need to be 
included to account for a large portion of revenues and expenditures.  Finally, this 
research was unable to account for potential competition between Indian and non-Indian 
gaming.   
IV. Future Research 
 There is great potential for future research on this topic.  At on the outset of this 
research these issues were just beginning to surface in the literature.  Since that time 
though, the number of articles discussing these issues has grown dramatically.  Most 
recently in the August 2007 issue of Governing Magazine an article titled, Tribes and 
Tribulations: Localities are struggling to deal with the issues that arise from being 
adjacent to Indian lands, by Ellen Perlman examined the impacts of Indian gaming on 
local areas finding very similar situation as those presented here from early in the decade 
(Perlman, 2007).  Perlman stresses the importance of the uniqueness of these 
relationships given varying circumstances under which tribes and local governments 
interact.  Future research could benefit from better exploration of ways to control for or 
represent these differences in the models. 
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  The models presented here move us towards a more objective account of these 
issues.  It’s near certain that with the 2007 release of the Census of Governments; these 
models may very well provide different findings given the increase in impact mitigation 
post the mid-1990’s.  These models could be greatly enhanced by more deeply exploring 
the concepts of proxies for revenues as well as attempting to isolate whether or not there 
are existing mitigation agreements within these communities.  These models may also 
dilute a more dramatic impact on a given government type, for example cities vs. 
counties given the use of aggregate ‘county area’ revenues and expenditures.  These 
governments vary in both their responsibilities and resources.  This model could also be 
enhanced by looking at differences in these relationships given the varying distances 
from the actual gaming operation.  Finally, future research could include examining the 
areas excluded from this research and including urban areas. 
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Appendix A: Surveys and Survey Letter 
 
Survey Letter 
 
I’m contacting you to request your participation in a survey designed to examine Tribal-
Local government interaction.  A literary source indicated your government has had 
interaction with ………….. government regarding ………………….  I’m hoping you 
might be willing to answer some questions regarding the interaction(s) involved in this 
situation or issue? 
This survey is part of a dissertation titled: The New Paradigm of United States American 
Indian Policy:  Tribal-Local Government Interaction.  This dissertation is aimed at further 
illustrating the interactions that occur between Tribal and non-tribal governments in an 
effort to better understand what elements play a role in these interactions.  The goal is to 
provide American Indian Nations, Local governments and policy-makers information for 
the purpose of creating effective and amicable policies.     
Upon completion of the survey I will be asking selective governments to provide 
additional details as necessary.   
There are three options for completing the survey. 
1. Completed online.   
2. Completed via mail. 
3. Completed via the telephone. 
 
The online survey is presented in 6 group’s demographics, interaction details, 
government, culture, policies and economics.  It shouldn’t take more than 10-15 minutes 
to complete.  If there are certain questions you feel more comfortable discussing over the 
phone please contact me at the number below. 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you may stop participating at any point.  
Only myself and the ITS staff at Saint Louis University have access to the information 
you submit, however unless you indicate so I will not maintain these responses as 
confidential.  This research has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at the 
University of Missouri-St. Louis. 
If you’re willing to participate please let me know which method works best for you.  
You may respond to this email or contact me at 1-888-502-1749. 
 
Sincerely, 
Courtney Andrews 
PhD Candidate, Political Science, University of Missouri St. Louis 
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Survey Instrument (Mail Version) 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to understand how American Indian Governments 
and local governments including City governments, Mayors offices, County governments, 
Municipal boards interact over issues or situations of mutual concern, such as land use, 
utilities, economic development etc. The term interaction is used in this case to reference 
all interactions (phone conversations, meetings, paper correspondence, etc) regarding 
the specific topic, issue or situation we discussed in our phone or email conversation. For 
example the issue or situation may be composed of a set of interactions regarding a 
negotiation over an economic development project. The "Economic Development Project 
Situation" would include all interactions (phone call, correspondence, meetings) 
pertaining to that situation. The results of this survey will provide a clearer picture to 
policymakers of how to promote cooperative interactions between American Indian and 
local governments. As opportunities for American Indian governments and local 
governments continue to increase it is critical that policymakers develop of full 
understanding of the dynamics of these interactions so as to best promote appropriate 
policies, which do not threaten American Indian sovereignty.  
Please take 10-15 minutes to complete this brief survey with regards to the specific topic, 
issue or situation referenced in our initial phone or email conversation. If you would like 
to take the survey online you can do so at:  
http://fxap2.slu.edu/servlet/TestPilot3/surveys/019/FinalV_All.tp3. You may choose to 
withdraw from the survey at anytime and the results will not be used. If you would like to 
remain confidential please check the box at the end indicating so. Also, please indicate if 
you would like to receive a copy of the survey results. I can also provide more details of 
my findings if requested, for use by your government. 
Thanks in advance for your participation! 
Courtney Andrews, PhD candidate UM-St. Louis, andrewsc@studentmail.umsl.edu,  
1-888-502-1749  
Directions: Please answer each question to the best of your ability. There 
are several different question types.  
 
The "Corresponding Government" refers to the government you are 
interacting with over this specific issue or situation.  
 
On the essay questions if you need additional space feel free to use 
additional paper.  On the Yes or No questions I've provided a place for 
comments and explanation if you are willing to provide additional 
information.  
 
You do not have to answer all questions, only those you feel comfortable 
responding to. 
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If you have any questions or need clarification please do not hesitate to 
ask.  When completed return the survey in the stamped/addressed 
envelope which was included with the survey. 
 1. Name: _________________________________________________ 
2. Title: 
____________________________________________________________ 
3. Government Name/Phone Contact Number 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
4. Email Address: ______________________________________ 
5. Please describe your governance structure: Circle your answer(s). 
a. American Indian nation government 
b. Non-American Indian government 
Other:  
6. Please indicate who the corresponding government is that you have 
been interacting with over the specific situation or issue and briefly 
describe in your own words the interaction you had with the 
corresponding government local regarding the specific situation or issue 
referenced in our prior phone conversation. This could be as simple as a 
single letter or phone conversation, or could be comprised of years of 
interactions over the specific situation.  
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
7. What type of interactions did this situation or issue involved? Circle all 
that apply. 
Circle your answer(s). 
a. Information Exchange 
b. Negotiations 
c. Agreements 
d. Disputes 
e. Lawsuits 
f. Exchange of Goods 
g. Other 
 
8. What was the approximate length of this situation or issue from start to 
finish. Meaning not just an independent phone call, but the overall process 
of interacting regarding the specific situation or issue? Circle your 
answer(s). 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1-3 years 
c. 4-5 years 
d. 6+ years 
e. ongoing 
 
9. If you describe the situation or issue as ongoing, please indicate for how 
long interactions regarding this have been occurring: Circle your 
answer(s). 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1-3 years 
c. 4-5 years 
d. 6+ years 
 
10. How cooperative was the interaction(s) regarding the specific situation 
or issue? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Very Cooperative 
b. Somewhat Cooperative 
c. Not very Cooperative 
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d. Not at all Cooperative 
Other:  
11. Who benefited from the results of the interaction(s) over the specific 
situation or issue? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Local Non-American Indian Community Benefited 
b. American Indian Community Benefited 
c. Both Benefited 
d. Neither Benefited 
Other:  
12. How much conflict was there during the interactions over the specific 
situation or issue? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Quite a bit of Conflict 
b. Some Conflict 
c. Not very much Conflict 
d. No Conflict 
 
13. Where there negative affects of the interaction(s)? Circle your 
answer(s). 
a. Yes, negative effects on the Local Government's Non-
tribal Community. 
b. Yes, negative effects on the Tribal Community. 
c. Yes, negative effects on both the Local Government's 
Non-tribal Community and Tribal Community. 
d. No, no negative effects on either community. 
Other:  
14. How often does your government interact with the corresponding 
government? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Frequently 
b. Often, but would not say Frequently. 
c. Not very often. 
d. Almost never. 
 
15. Has your government interacted with the corresponding government 
prior to the specified interaction(s)? Circle your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
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How often has this interaction occurred 
previously?: 
 
16. Were these interactions regarding: Circle all that apply. 
a. Gaming 
b. Land Purchase/Development/Use 
c. Environment/Utilities 
d. Political/Jurisdictional 
e. Social Services 
f. Archaeology/Cultural Resources 
e. Other 
 
17. Do you believe your government’s past interactions with the 
corresponding government have influenced the corresponding 
government’s interaction over the specified situation or issue? Circle your 
answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Comments: 
 
18. Were there any other events that occurred prior to the more recent 
interactions that you feel influenced the specified interaction your 
government had with the corresponding government? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
19. What do you believe most strongly impacted your interactions and 
relations with the corresponding government? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
20. Please describe what you feel the community impact was from these 
interactions or the specific situation or issue on the surrounding 
community? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
21. In your municipal elections who do voters have the opportunity to vote 
for? Circle all that apply. 
a. Chief/Mayor 
b. Council Members 
c. Other Elected Officials 
d. Board of Commissioners 
 
22. Optional: What is your government's annual revenues and 
expenditures? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
________________________________ 
23. What is the primary source(s) of your government's revenues? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
24. Has your government structure changed in the past 5-10 years? Circle 
your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Comments: 
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25. How recently has it changed? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Within the past year. 
b. 1-5 years ago. 
c. 5 or more years ago. 
 
26. Would you define these changes as_____________ for the government 
as a whole? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Positive 
b. Negative 
c. Both 
Other:  
27. Do you feel these changes have affected the your government's 
interaction with the corresponding government?  Circle your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Did they make it easier or more difficult?: 
 
 
28. Please describe in your own words how these changes effected the 
interaction with the corresponding government. 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
29. Do you feel your community and the corresponding government's 
community share similar worldviews and values as they live their daily 
lives? Circle your answer(s). 
Very Similar 
Somewhat Similar 
Not Very Similar 
Very Different 
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30. Do you feel these similarities (differences) have impacted the pairs 
interactions? Circle your answer(s). 
Strongly impacted interactions 
Moderate impact on interactions 
Minimal impact on interactions 
No impact on interactions 
 
31. Please describe specifically how these similarities or differences have 
effected the interaction: 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
32. Are the economic circumstances in your government similar or 
different to the economic circumstance in the corresponding government? 
Circle your answer(s). 
a. Similar 
b. Different 
Other:  
33. Do you feel this similarity or difference has impacted the your 
government’s specified interaction with the corresponding government? 
Circle your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Comments: 
 
34. Does your government have more influence over economic resources, 
does the corresponding government have more influence over them, or do 
they each have about the same influence? Circle your answer(s). 
a. Corresponding government has more influence over 
economic resources. 
b. My government has more influence over economic 
resources. 
Each has about the same amount of influence. 
Other:  
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 177 
 
 
 
35. Has the economic circumstances of your government changed in the 
past 5-10 years? Examples: Additional tax revenues assessed, decrease in 
tax base, isolation of other revenues, etc. Circle your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Comments: 
 
 
36. Do you think these changes have effected your government's 
interaction with the corresponding government? Circle your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Comments: 
 
 
37. Have you noted any changes in the corresponding government's 
economic circumstances in the past 5-10 years? Circle your answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Do you feel these changes impacted the 
interaction(s)?: 
 
 
38. Would you like the results of this survey to be sent to you? Circle your 
answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Should the results be sent via email or US 
mail? If US mail please indicate mailing 
address.: 
 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 178 
 
 
 
39. Would you like your answers to remain confidential? Circle your 
answer(s). 
Yes 
No 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 179 
 
 
 
 Appendix B:  Examination of Discrepancies in Facility Locations 
 
Poarch Creek (first zip 36504 second zip 36502) 
Reservation appears to be in 36504 
http://www.eda.gov/ImageCache/EDAPublic/documents/pdfdocs/02alabama_2epdf/v1/0
2alabama.pdf 
This site also lists the casino as in 36504. 
http://www.merchantcircle.com/business/Creek.Bingo.Palace.251-368-8007 
http://500nations.com/casinos/alCreek.asp (Good website for tribal casinos). 
 
Oneida (first zip 51455 second zip 54313) 
http://www.oneidabingoandcasino.net/?page_id=56&parent_page_id=13 has mailing 
address 51455 and shipping address 54313) 
 
Creek Nation Casino Tulsa (first zip 74170 second zip 74137) 
Site has casino in 74137 http://www.500nations.com/casinos/okCreekTulsaCasino.asp 
 
Ute Mountain Casino (first zip 81321 second zip 81334) 
Site has casino in 81331 and reservation in 81334. 
http://www.500nations.com/casinos/coUteMountain.asp 
Site has casino mailing address in 81334. 
http://www.utemountaincasino.com/map.html 
 
Bannock Peak (first zip  83203 second zip 83204) 
Site has casino in 83203 
http://www.500nations.com/bingo/idShoshoneBannockBingo.asp 
Site has casino in 83204. 
http://www.casinocity.com/us/id/forthall/bannock/ 
 
Gila River (first zip 85246 second zip 85226) 
Site has casino in 85226 
http://www.500nations.com/casinos/azGilaRiverCasinoWildhorse.asp 
Site has casino in 85226 
http://www.casinocity.com/us/az/chandler/gilarive/ 
 
Pechanga (first zip 92589 second zip 92592) 
Site has casino in 92592  http://www.500nations.com/casinos/caPechanga.asp 
Site has casino in 92592 http://pechanga.casinocity.com/ 
 
Spirit Mountain (first zip 97347 second zip 97396) 
Site has casino in 97347 http://www.500nations.com/casinos/orSpriritMountain.asp 
Site has casino in 97396 http://www.casinocity.com/us/or/willamina/spirmoun/. 
 
Border Town (first zip in MO second in OK) 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 180 
 
 
 
Casino City does show this as an OK gaming facility 
http://www.casinocity.com/us/or/willamina/spirmoun/ 
But this shows it in MO 
http://www.500nations.com/casinos/moBorderTown.asp 
 
 
 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 181 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Data Example 
 
FIPS 
COG 
Year State County 
Urban 
Influence 
Code Population Post 
Gaming 
(0, 1) 
Opening 
Year Total Slots 
Total 
Tablegames 
Total Poker 
Seats 
Total Bingo
Seats 
1019 1982 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 19525 0 0
1019 2002 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 23988 1 0
8033 1982 CO Dolores County 10 1669 0 1
8033 2002 CO Dolores County 10 1844 1 1
46063 1982 SD Harding County 12 1670 0 0
46063 2002 SD Harding County 12 1353 1 0
56029 1982 WY Park County 11 23263 0 1
56029 2002 WY Park County 11 25786 1 1
56045 1982 WY Weston County 9 7789 0 0
56045 2002 WY Weston County 9 6644 1 0
             
FIPS 
COG 
Year State County 
Urban 
Influence 
Code Population Post 
Gaming 
(0, 1) 
Years 
Gaming 
Number of 
Operations 
Total 
Revenue Sales Tax State IGR
1019 1982 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 19525 0 0 1406.730751 78.35343131 596.919372
1019 2002 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 23988 1 0 1713.189928 149.1579123 926.421544
8033 1982 CO Dolores County 10 1669 0 1 3153.421031 61.48109065 1771.77324
8033 2002 CO Dolores County 10 1844 1 1 4202.277657 85.68329718 2182.21258
46063 1982 SD Harding County 12 1670 0 0 2834.256859 0 799.892751
46063 2002 SD Harding County 12 1353 1 0 3437.546194 126.3858093 932.742054
56029 1982 WY Park County 11 23263 0 1 4528.602527 4.491149548 883.473275
56029 2002 WY Park County 11 25786 1 1 5881.09827 14.73667882 1674.3969
56045 1982 WY Weston County 9 7789 0 0 3703.558214 197.6093343 924.572157
56045 2002 WY Weston County 9 6644 1 0 7389.072848 155.3281156 4430.46357
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 182 
 
 
 
             
FIPS 
COG 
Year State County 
Urban 
Influence 
Code Population Post 
Gaming 
(0, 1) 
Total 
Expenditures Capital Outlays
Construction 
Expenditures
Highway 
Expenditures
Welfare 
Expenditure
1019 1982 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 19525 0 0 1344.81243 58.66952052 32.67911403 111.0325453 4.0132245
1019 2002 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 23988 1 0 1634.859096 49.39969985 30.26513257 182.8414207 2.75137568
8033 1982 CO Dolores County 10 1669 0 1 3190.309686 371.1222199 150.9081316 903.2131136 274.988150
8033 2002 CO Dolores County 10 1844 1 1 5446.854664 2533.08026 2391.54013 551.5184382 155.639913
46063 1982 SD Harding County 12 1670 0 0 2630.932166 237.956922 233.4882474 731.7454643 6.70301188
46063 2002 SD Harding County 12 1353 1 0 3499.630451 182.5572801 153.7324464 888.3961567 1.478196
56029 1982 WY Park County 11 23263 0 1 3861.185625 805.1989547 451.6011269 192.8788333 8.26050720
56029 2002 WY Park County 11 25786 1 1 5316.567129 735.7868611 449.2748003 187.4272861 2.71465136
56045 1982 WY Weston County 9 7789 0 0 3267.140993 464.92087 190.4235403 389.9490863 2.39526465
56045 2002 WY Weston County 9 6644 1 0 7125.075256 2801.02348 2378.236002 221.5532812 24.8344370
             
FIPS 
COG 
Year State County 
Urban 
Influence 
Code Population Post 
Gaming 
(0, 1) 
Percent of 
Total Payroll 
in State 
Percent of 
Total 
Establishments 
in State 
Percent 
American 
Indian 
Ratio 
Employed to 
Working Age 
Per Capita
Income 
1019 1982 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 19525 0 0 0.002110319 0.003564289 0.1 0.67117567 928
1019 2002 AL 
Cherokee 
County 6 23988 1 0 0.001494368 0.003566355 0.4 0.685198896 1554
8033 1982 CO Dolores County 10 1669 0 1 0.000123764 0.000377837 3.6 0.678018576 919
8033 2002 CO Dolores County 10 1844 1 1 4.76584E-05 0.000337583 3.4 0.729055258 1710
46063 1982 SD Harding County 12 1670 0 0 0.000739741 0.001890705 0.6 0.784067086 876
46063 2002 SD Harding County 12 1353 1 0 0.000355168 0.001539614 1.5 0.934156379 1279
56029 1982 WY Park County 11 23263 0 1 0.040816241 0.058455422 0.5 0.780877111 1232
56029 2002 WY Park County 11 25786 1 1 0.041768128 0.062970791 0.4 0.783296285 1802
56045 1982 WY Weston County 9 7789 0 0 0.01297105 0.015460502 0.6 0.743333333 1256
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 183 
 
 
 
56045 2002 WY Weston County 9 6644 1 0 0.007191543 0.011976372 1.8 0.748255234 1736
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Appendix D: Distribution of Key Variables 
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Appendix E:  1982 Descriptive Characteristics by State 
 
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
AL Game (1,0) 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 24 11,007.00 67,978.00 29,497.46 6 15,054.00 37,474.00 22,699.33
 
Urban Influence 
Code 24 4.00 9.00 6.42 6 6.00 9.00 7.50 
 Total Revenue 24 1,408.14 3,836.11 2,010.09 6 1,446.90 2,837.51 1,978.49 
 Sales Tax 24 29.72 264.77 121.27 6 33.15 115.85 78.90 
 State IGR 24 601.30 1,257.42 755.99 6 684.84 966.55 820.59 
 Property Tax 24 70.30 141.44 103.00 6 65.38 285.31 130.65 
 Total Expenditures 24 1,290.07 3,669.88 1,929.67 6 1,372.97 10,714.21 3,355.46 
 Capital Outlays 24 38.30 622.05 178.46 6 103.45 8,975.13 1,615.87 
 Construction Exp. 24 23.28 452.10 139.88 6 46.14 8,923.87 1,556.85 
 Highway Exp. 24 101.67 256.10 155.88 6 123.18 209.61 156.44 
 Welfare Exp. 24 0.00 6.03 2.13 6 0.00 5.96 1.94 
 Police Exp. 24 34.05 76.09 55.62 6 45.33 75.08 57.34 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 24 0.00 0.02 0.01 6 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 24 0.00 0.02 0.01 6 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 24 0.00 0.50 0.12 6 0.00 4.60 1.35 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 24 0.57 0.72 0.66 6 0.54 0.66 0.62 
 Per Capita Income 24 6,033.00 9,760.00 8,441.92 6 6,190.00 8,610.00 7,883.50 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
CO Game (1,0) 42 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 42 1,629.00 94,152.00 12,333.17 8 440.00 29,346.00 7,319.63 
 
Urban Influence 
Code 42 4.00 9.00 7.48 8 7.00 9.00 8.63 
 Total Revenue 42 2,223.80 7,049.38 3,765.23 8 2,583.89 4,860.12 3,577.61 
 Sales Tax 42 5.15 1,425.71 231.06 8 70.05 391.32 233.33 
 State IGR 42 296.86 1,659.67 993.33 8 695.82 2,018.71 1,212.08 
 Property Tax 42 468.42 2,870.86 1,207.44 8 528.38 1,890.07 1,159.41 
 Total Expenditures 42 2,177.76 7,372.96 3,862.53 8 2,897.00 5,087.19 3,723.85 
 Capital Outlays 42 134.23 2,701.39 781.11 8 373.48 859.76 549.81 
 Construction Exp. 42 38.59 2,375.82 538.22 8 0.00 767.24 282.82 
 Highway Exp. 42 137.75 1,031.55 434.87 8 176.09 1,961.44 785.92 
 Welfare Exp. 42 38.48 489.25 186.06 8 0.00 313.31 155.69 
 Police Exp. 42 38.61 421.67 139.80 8 89.56 333.35 170.16 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 42 0.00 0.02 0.00 8 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 42 0.00 0.03 0.00 8 0.00 0.01 0.00 
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Percent American 
Indian 42 0.00 1.70 0.54 8 0.00 9.60 2.59 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 42 0.61 0.88 0.74 8 0.68 0.89 0.73 
 Per Capita Income 42 7,693.00 20,588.00 11,558.38 8 9,191.00 13,333.00 10,875.50
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
FL Game (1,0) 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 23 4,126.00 53,613.00 17,047.48 4 6,261.00 66,797.00 36,461.75
 
Urban Influence 
Code 23 5.00 9.00 6.74 4 3.00 6.00 5.25 
 Total Revenue 23 1,092.23 3,619.82 2,301.38 4 2,098.38 3,647.27 2,924.81 
 Sales Tax 23 4.31 55.36 29.34 4 0.00 37.24 19.89 
 State IGR 23 710.57 1,682.73 1,186.43 4 527.15 1,114.74 831.02 
 Property Tax 23 142.54 632.19 321.21 4 552.75 855.75 734.34 
 Total Expenditures 23 1,178.72 3,441.74 2,292.74 4 1,999.67 3,919.10 3,004.64 
 Capital Outlays 23 113.04 963.42 315.51 4 190.47 943.67 476.60 
 Construction Exp. 23 6.95 844.92 157.26 4 18.67 758.19 347.35 
 Highway Exp. 23 81.65 721.03 225.27 4 69.41 229.17 162.59 
 Welfare Exp. 23 0.00 79.89 9.39 4 9.85 41.43 21.08 
 Police Exp. 23 61.28 149.69 92.16 4 128.10 175.76 156.01 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent American 
Indian 23 0.00 1.30 0.37 4 0.40 5.50 1.83 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 23 0.34 0.72 0.63 4 0.61 0.71 0.65 
 Per Capita Income 23 6,325.00 9,766.00 8,253.52 4 7,882.00 13,246.00 10,279.00
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
IA Game (1,0) 63 0.00 0.00 0.00 24 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 63 5,556.00 56,359.00 17,777.92 24 8,744.00 72,292.00 22,721.75
 
Urban Influence 
Code 63 5.00 9.00 7.41 24 5.00 9.00 6.54 
 Total Revenue 63 1,878.18 4,637.63 2,943.77 24 1,997.41 3,474.18 2,631.42 
 Sales Tax 63 0.00 4.57 0.25 24 0.00 1.47 0.09 
 State IGR 63 621.91 1,414.87 886.71 24 608.32 1,082.98 861.94 
 Property Tax 63 662.24 1,345.12 952.53 24 720.08 1,163.06 911.35 
 Total Expenditures 63 1,839.75 8,658.46 2,853.80 24 1,840.58 3,616.71 2,487.99 
 Capital Outlays 63 101.22 4,687.08 430.49 24 169.51 662.59 331.60 
 Construction Exp. 63 56.51 4,612.58 342.59 24 74.46 528.69 244.42 
 Highway Exp. 63 155.66 626.38 345.19 24 179.22 503.74 314.68 
 Welfare Exp. 63 6.61 619.63 63.76 24 4.39 140.49 43.66 
 Police Exp. 63 38.16 109.39 75.68 24 47.32 94.84 67.14 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 197 
 
 
 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 63 0.00 0.02 0.00 24 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 63 0.00 0.02 0.01 24 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 63 0.00 0.50 0.11 24 0.00 3.80 0.27 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 63 0.67 0.84 0.76 24 0.67 0.87 0.76 
 Per Capita Income 63 8,552.00 12,807.00 11,083.35 24 10,229.00 12,967.00 11,352.08
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
ID Game (1,0) 21 0.00 0.00 0.00 21 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 21 804.00 53,958.00 11,563.81 21 3,279.00 67,081.00 22,136.24
 
Urban Influence 
Code 21 6.00 9.00 7.86 21 5.00 9.00 7.62 
 Total Revenue 21 1,345.39 4,062.11 2,219.88 21 1,421.59 4,073.01 2,214.15 
 Sales Tax 21 0.00 11.41 2.57 21 0.00 168.45 11.41 
 State IGR 21 566.49 1,867.34 913.39 21 345.22 1,269.34 790.61 
 Property Tax 21 248.87 946.46 466.94 21 242.53 1,131.97 550.20 
 Total Expenditures 21 1,292.11 3,947.35 2,215.68 21 1,411.64 3,699.97 2,183.92 
 Capital Outlays 21 57.53 1,451.50 362.95 21 44.46 515.26 223.30 
 Construction Exp. 21 11.00 1,393.34 276.11 21 14.01 476.94 149.88 
 Highway Exp. 21 89.95 1,051.34 250.13 21 86.44 550.20 230.15 
 Welfare Exp. 21 0.00 23.32 9.44 21 2.59 185.26 21.57 
 Police Exp. 21 33.97 168.83 87.94 21 51.38 178.39 91.48 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 21 0.00 0.05 0.01 21 0.00 0.12 0.02 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 21 0.00 0.07 0.01 21 0.00 0.07 0.02 
 
Percent American 
Indian 21 0.00 3.10 0.69 21 0.10 6.00 1.43 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 21 0.45 0.78 0.69 21 0.57 0.78 0.69 
 Per Capita Income 21 6,999.00 11,298.00 9,102.48 21 7,435.00 13,650.00 10,080.29
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
KS Game (1,0) 76 0.00 0.00 0.00 12 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 76 1,792.00 64,352.00 9,590.88 12 6,653.00 37,792.00 16,363.00
 
Urban Influence 
Code 76 4.00 9.00 8.16 12 3.00 9.00 6.25 
 Total Revenue 76 1,755.62 7,869.12 3,405.01 12 1,972.14 4,561.54 2,577.95 
 Sales Tax 76 1.07 192.60 18.89 12 4.32 61.86 22.92 
 State IGR 76 226.15 785.51 477.83 12 509.18 953.52 703.52 
 Property Tax 76 336.36 3,549.05 1,538.03 12 507.44 1,436.07 837.21 
 Total Expenditures 76 1,781.05 5,268.32 3,225.18 12 1,961.85 3,977.05 2,448.41 
 Capital Outlays 76 146.85 1,631.39 410.14 12 139.31 532.40 279.05 
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 Construction Exp. 76 31.65 1,381.69 290.64 12 49.31 426.04 197.28 
 Highway Exp. 76 110.59 793.28 384.26 12 143.84 412.91 233.11 
 Welfare Exp. 76 0.00 440.25 15.84 12 0.00 107.39 15.24 
 Police Exp. 76 38.35 199.20 89.43 12 39.06 93.72 63.96 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 76 0.00 0.03 0.00 12 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 76 0.00 0.03 0.00 12 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 76 0.00 2.50 0.37 12 0.10 5.00 1.42 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 76 0.48 0.90 0.79 12 0.70 0.82 0.76 
 Per Capita Income 76 9,133.00 13,329.00 10,981.14 12 9,517.00 11,333.00 10,308.00
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
LA Game (1,0) 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 18 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 22 8,191.00 84,663.00 24,158.86 18 9,896.00 68,801.00 32,248.50
 
Urban Influence 
Code 22 3.00 9.00 6.32 18 5.00 8.00 6.28 
 Total Revenue 22 1,449.30 2,870.45 2,063.61 18 1,109.42 5,339.81 2,746.00 
 Sales Tax 22 83.25 322.58 185.46 18 3.01 1,196.83 328.15 
 State IGR 22 709.69 1,361.42 1,067.85 18 724.72 1,896.93 1,043.60 
 Property Tax 22 74.42 401.60 206.99 18 87.77 1,243.29 299.46 
 Total Expenditures 22 1,332.59 2,736.33 2,007.45 18 1,106.00 5,122.86 2,535.58 
 Capital Outlays 22 27.32 544.62 170.87 18 36.63 1,287.32 359.81 
 Construction Exp. 22 1.86 482.22 117.83 18 16.75 1,176.70 293.96 
 Highway Exp. 22 84.47 230.06 137.38 18 69.74 1,112.47 223.77 
 Welfare Exp. 22 0.00 23.36 5.26 18 0.00 133.19 12.28 
 Police Exp. 22 38.25 108.82 81.65 18 58.62 329.51 119.05 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 22 0.00 0.01 0.00 18 0.00 0.03 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 22 0.00 0.02 0.00 18 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 22 0.00 2.90 0.21 18 0.00 1.30 0.26 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 22 0.53 0.68 0.60 18 0.33 0.71 0.59 
 Per Capita Income 22 6,851.00 9,546.00 8,282.14 18 6,702.00 12,240.00 9,314.94 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
MI Game (1,0) 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 12 9,802.00 57,492.00 37,800.17 36 2,015.00 73,719.00 24,807.00
 
Urban Influence 
Code 12 4.00 9.00 6.33 36 5.00 9.00 7.78 
 Total Revenue 12 1,514.57 3,721.93 2,211.25 36 1,740.89 4,142.53 2,508.72 
 Sales Tax 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 State IGR 12 453.68 803.44 601.22 36 350.39 1,334.66 700.89 
 Property Tax 12 590.69 1,147.53 880.31 36 447.29 1,508.45 948.39 
 Total Expenditures 12 1,524.99 4,174.88 2,354.50 36 1,700.65 4,369.80 2,502.50 
 Capital Outlays 12 13.93 1,927.06 295.47 36 55.68 875.21 215.70 
 Construction Exp. 12 0.51 1,885.32 239.34 36 1.32 792.43 130.40 
 Highway Exp. 12 87.35 350.47 205.91 36 124.32 865.05 299.87 
 Welfare Exp. 12 7.14 126.11 54.97 36 4.44 111.93 47.11 
 Police Exp. 12 39.46 96.01 70.80 36 51.97 148.45 79.26 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 12 0.00 0.01 0.00 36 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 12 0.00 0.01 0.00 36 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent American 
Indian 12 0.20 0.80 0.43 36 0.10 9.00 1.20 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 12 0.44 0.72 0.63 36 0.46 0.73 0.60 
 Per Capita Income 12 8,730.00 11,896.00 10,324.42 36 7,925.00 11,867.00 9,666.42 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
MN Game (1,0) 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 63 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 5 13,485.00 35,555.00 24,278.20 63 3,720.00 52,755.00 20,094.49
 
Urban Influence 
Code 5 7.00 8.00 7.60 63 3.00 9.00 6.98 
 Total Revenue 5 2,735.70 4,558.94 3,618.08 63 2,038.10 9,377.65 3,699.06 
 Sales Tax 5 0.00 40.42 8.13 63 0.00 7.35 0.33 
 State IGR 5 1,041.99 1,976.74 1,418.57 63 716.33 2,388.86 1,499.70 
 Property Tax 5 501.84 823.80 673.44 63 346.28 1,171.38 625.05 
 Total Expenditures 5 2,536.13 4,562.89 3,507.98 63 1,986.22 12,025.84 3,738.26 
 Capital Outlays 5 329.12 488.51 415.58 63 110.53 3,489.47 478.51 
 Construction Exp. 5 148.23 370.48 244.99 63 30.86 3,262.77 275.82 
 Highway Exp. 5 252.54 584.04 416.04 63 136.27 839.61 410.52 
 Welfare Exp. 5 0.00 600.90 226.42 63 0.00 666.18 314.46 
 Police Exp. 5 60.98 106.54 86.84 63 55.80 153.64 91.03 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 5 0.00 0.01 0.00 63 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 5 0.00 0.01 0.01 63 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 
Percent American 
Indian 5 0.00 0.50 0.16 63 0.00 18.40 1.39 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 5 0.74 0.80 0.77 63 0.58 0.83 0.73 
 Per Capita Income 5 9,626.00 11,799.00 10,895.00 63 7,133.00 13,493.00 9,913.60 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
MS Game (1,0) 57 0.00 0.00 0.00 18 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 57 2,403.00 72,636.00 24,163.91 18 8,770.00 78,066.00 24,655.39
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Urban Influence 
Code 57 4.00 9.00 7.30 18 6.00 9.00 7.61 
 Total Revenue 57 1,232.01 9,212.26 2,182.96 18 1,185.97 2,750.13 1,939.13 
 Sales Tax 57 0.00 25.13 6.06 18 0.14 32.45 8.17 
 State IGR 57 647.27 2,525.84 916.68 18 614.09 1,579.41 861.27 
 Property Tax 57 161.84 1,428.05 294.44 18 178.20 384.42 253.66 
 Total Expenditures 57 1,120.72 5,990.46 2,045.94 18 1,163.71 2,663.26 1,918.99 
 Capital Outlays 57 22.27 949.16 241.07 18 50.20 599.53 254.58 
 Construction Exp. 57 0.00 721.37 183.75 18 23.93 569.87 201.37 
 Highway Exp. 57 115.98 585.61 252.45 18 91.71 476.21 226.57 
 Welfare Exp. 57 0.00 115.34 7.48 18 0.00 13.34 4.67 
 Police Exp. 57 27.79 96.96 51.59 18 31.08 89.38 50.21 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 57 0.00 0.05 0.01 18 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 57 0.00 0.04 0.01 18 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 57 0.00 0.50 0.07 18 0.00 10.60 1.04 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 57 0.54 0.78 0.65 18 0.57 0.71 0.64 
 Per Capita Income 57 5,553.00 10,706.00 7,830.54 18 6,149.00 9,913.00 7,670.33 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
MT Game (1,0) 30 0.00 0.00 0.00 13 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 30 637.00 45,372.00 8,211.50 13 2,775.00 75,242.00 18,204.46
 
Urban Influence 
Code 30 6.00 9.00 7.90 13 7.00 9.00 8.23 
 Total Revenue 30 1,583.68 5,553.41 2,935.27 13 2,139.20 4,806.00 2,858.40 
 Sales Tax 30 0.00 23.11 0.77 13 0.00 0.90 0.07 
 State IGR 30 239.75 910.73 590.82 13 212.15 1,002.47 645.24 
 Property Tax 30 546.42 3,867.16 1,534.81 13 639.05 2,660.55 1,346.02 
 Total Expenditures 30 1,536.97 6,899.44 2,736.01 13 2,016.55 4,241.44 2,692.56 
 Capital Outlays 30 66.39 4,047.35 335.04 13 107.53 690.76 319.00 
 Construction Exp. 30 12.59 3,910.51 236.26 13 23.46 391.62 183.80 
 Highway Exp. 30 82.78 1,651.93 312.82 13 120.45 571.64 274.33 
 Welfare Exp. 30 7.64 416.78 60.29 13 16.85 93.50 34.10 
 Police Exp. 30 40.04 184.72 100.36 13 58.95 120.10 93.37 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 30 0.00 0.06 0.01 13 0.00 0.11 0.02 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 30 0.00 0.07 0.01 13 0.00 0.10 0.02 
 
Percent American 
Indian 30 0.00 31.80 2.65 13 0.20 36.90 5.48 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 30 0.59 0.83 0.72 13 0.53 0.82 0.69 
 Per Capita Income 30 7,324.00 11,908.00 9,808.47 13 8,106.00 12,393.00 10,458.46
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  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
NC Game (1,0) 45 0.00 0.00 0.00 13 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 45 4,059.00 103,114.00 31,835.87 13 6,878.00 84,487.00 35,873.23
 
Urban Influence 
Code 45 3.00 9.00 6.73 13 3.00 9.00 6.31 
 Total Revenue 45 1,168.38 3,689.49 1,941.14 13 1,093.76 2,887.67 1,908.97 
 Sales Tax 45 20.84 216.17 65.35 13 42.03 98.85 69.73 
 State IGR 45 597.93 1,370.52 898.47 13 657.37 1,098.41 808.29 
 Property Tax 45 165.65 886.38 330.13 13 153.93 377.24 268.98 
 Total Expenditures 45 1,064.33 3,504.59 1,925.24 13 1,141.66 2,751.39 1,860.52 
 Capital Outlays 45 5.77 702.69 182.41 13 31.52 758.19 205.40 
 Construction Exp. 45 0.00 533.85 144.20 13 14.49 736.61 167.52 
 Highway Exp. 45 0.00 73.27 24.94 13 3.40 39.30 21.24 
 Welfare Exp. 45 57.75 161.60 89.61 13 44.23 92.72 71.93 
 Police Exp. 45 12.85 181.21 61.60 13 31.83 75.87 53.69 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 45 0.00 0.01 0.00 13 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 45 0.00 0.01 0.00 13 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 45 0.00 34.90 1.52 13 0.10 24.20 3.17 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 45 0.53 0.80 0.68 13 0.60 0.81 0.69 
 Per Capita Income 45 7,069.00 11,994.00 8,863.84 13 7,042.00 10,952.00 9,175.69 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
NE Game (1,0) 58 0.00 0.00 0.00 25 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 58 516.00 49,344.00 10,000.79 25 810.00 35,820.00 7,914.04 
 
Urban Influence 
Code 58 5.00 9.00 8.26 25 5.00 9.00 8.08 
 Total Revenue 58 1,693.77 30,436.33 3,657.57 25 1,626.80 4,921.08 2,930.45 
 Sales Tax 58 0.00 110.05 9.25 25 0.00 43.51 8.64 
 State IGR 58 376.35 907.09 559.62 25 404.97 936.88 569.81 
 Property Tax 58 753.97 2,558.26 1,233.85 25 653.75 2,401.25 1,096.44 
 Total Expenditures 58 1,666.15 34,729.47 3,823.64 25 1,603.81 4,532.23 2,943.24 
 Capital Outlays 58 34.36 7,970.54 607.95 25 90.81 794.96 333.70 
 Construction Exp. 58 0.00 7,852.17 490.39 25 28.56 663.31 210.37 
 Highway Exp. 58 112.33 767.36 373.29 25 135.35 579.91 363.28 
 Welfare Exp. 58 11.45 363.49 65.06 25 20.48 122.49 48.85 
 Police Exp. 58 29.78 149.69 65.63 25 20.91 101.82 60.64 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 58 0.00 0.03 0.00 25 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 58 0.00 0.04 0.01 25 0.00 0.03 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 58 0.00 1.70 0.19 25 0.00 33.90 1.98 
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Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 58 0.67 0.90 0.80 25 0.71 0.85 0.78 
 Per Capita Income 58 7,543.00 13,193.00 10,442.55 25 7,758.00 12,076.00 9,578.44 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
ND Game (1,0) 19 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 19 1,129.00 28,107.00 5,974.26 30 3,486.00 59,935.00 10,492.77
 
Urban Influence 
Code 19 6.00 9.00 8.21 30 6.00 9.00 7.97 
 Total Revenue 19 2,035.02 8,837.14 3,091.26 30 1,851.10 4,946.09 2,524.08 
 Sales Tax 19 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 0.00 4.79 0.23 
 State IGR 19 721.12 3,886.89 1,255.26 30 754.19 2,061.77 1,155.71 
 Property Tax 19 487.18 1,129.71 751.15 30 264.11 1,093.93 666.03 
 Total Expenditures 19 1,905.18 6,836.18 2,761.85 30 1,749.65 3,534.33 2,344.96 
 Capital Outlays 19 100.05 2,334.24 501.96 30 58.54 978.78 295.03 
 Construction Exp. 19 13.74 1,498.33 366.38 30 2.89 861.41 193.94 
 Highway Exp. 19 207.53 3,000.16 564.01 30 89.79 1,068.58 363.08 
 Welfare Exp. 19 0.00 109.03 68.72 30 38.75 172.34 71.55 
 Police Exp. 19 26.32 259.36 73.91 30 16.32 112.75 65.39 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 19 0.00 0.05 0.01 30 0.00 0.08 0.01 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 19 0.00 0.05 0.01 30 0.00 0.08 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 19 0.00 2.50 0.32 30 0.00 64.70 6.88 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 19 0.66 0.85 0.74 30 0.59 0.83 0.71 
 Per Capita Income 19 7,759.00 13,825.00 9,992.16 30 6,221.00 12,921.00 9,656.20 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
NM Game (1,0) 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 12 1,016.00 64,227.00 20,714.92 8 2,666.00 88,833.00 29,304.00
 
Urban Influence 
Code 12 5.00 9.00 7.67 8 5.00 9.00 6.75 
 Total Revenue 12 1,848.10 3,951.61 2,896.77 8 2,063.81 3,190.30 2,666.18 
 Sales Tax 12 16.74 141.71 81.02 8 3.00 143.74 67.60 
 State IGR 12 1,165.63 2,519.04 1,661.28 8 1,129.31 2,370.28 1,730.80 
 Property Tax 12 120.85 581.45 261.15 8 80.99 473.73 233.20 
 Total Expenditures 12 1,834.47 4,445.98 2,846.31 8 2,286.62 5,733.84 3,006.96 
 Capital Outlays 12 128.58 1,640.30 535.93 8 174.48 2,056.57 549.40 
 Construction Exp. 12 46.66 1,435.27 438.26 8 73.49 1,927.59 434.16 
 Highway Exp. 12 94.05 374.51 196.15 8 46.99 464.85 158.39 
 Welfare Exp. 12 0.00 19.55 3.40 8 0.00 94.38 27.87 
 Police Exp. 12 72.26 238.69 121.46 8 34.00 157.87 98.13 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 12 0.00 0.07 0.01 8 0.00 0.08 0.02 
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Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 12 0.00 0.06 0.02 8 0.00 0.06 0.02 
 
Percent American 
Indian 12 0.00 1.40 0.50 8 0.00 65.70 14.94 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 12 0.55 0.74 0.66 8 0.44 0.66 0.58 
 Per Capita Income 12 6,576.00 11,821.00 9,347.92 8 5,814.00 9,930.00 7,526.63 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
NY Game (1,0) 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 8 4,982.00 157,770.00 58,219.13 8 24,747.00 112,660.00 63,374.75
 
Urban Influence 
Code 8 5.00 6.00 5.75 8 5.00 8.00 6.38 
 Total Revenue 8 2,475.60 4,743.36 3,444.54 8 2,617.97 3,688.00 3,233.70 
 Sales Tax 8 4.43 370.49 238.59 8 0.77 289.53 199.71 
 State IGR 8 800.44 1,487.29 1,122.59 8 1,156.15 1,910.18 1,544.85 
 Property Tax 8 721.22 3,193.67 1,404.50 8 657.90 1,025.36 833.67 
 Total Expenditures 8 2,565.64 5,042.46 3,546.19 8 2,601.90 3,895.79 3,315.58 
 Capital Outlays 8 196.22 538.36 336.25 8 240.27 511.43 357.52 
 Construction Exp. 8 119.99 430.64 226.43 8 172.89 426.22 256.28 
 Highway Exp. 8 203.77 1,134.10 485.71 8 227.80 386.25 333.24 
 Welfare Exp. 8 323.42 747.94 478.94 8 319.43 728.39 508.16 
 Police Exp. 8 35.62 100.88 59.03 8 25.86 67.31 45.80 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 8 0.00 0.01 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 8 0.00 0.01 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Percent American 
Indian 8 0.10 0.30 0.20 8 0.10 4.80 0.79 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 8 0.58 0.73 0.67 8 0.53 0.74 0.64 
 Per Capita Income 8 9,341.00 11,331.00 10,218.38 8 9,005.00 9,765.00 9,341.13 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
SC Game (1,0) 21 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 21 7,413.00 82,909.00 31,935.33 9 20,671.00 54,088.00 38,979.33
 
Urban Influence 
Code 21 5.00 8.00 6.43 9 4.00 6.00 5.44 
 Total Revenue 21 817.40 3,122.69 1,759.07 9 1,731.06 2,483.47 2,113.60 
 Sales Tax 21 0.00 13.50 1.99 9 0.00 6.83 2.86 
 State IGR 21 359.94 986.72 732.55 9 578.17 941.56 693.53 
 Property Tax 21 87.80 489.05 297.81 9 290.88 540.06 372.53 
 Total Expenditures 21 806.25 3,359.36 1,800.57 9 1,701.53 2,455.12 2,063.61 
 Capital Outlays 21 27.79 586.67 200.07 9 66.02 492.89 189.35 
 Construction Exp. 21 0.00 571.42 161.37 9 34.20 425.43 149.58 
 Highway Exp. 21 15.25 52.16 31.77 9 26.51 115.79 49.67 
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 Welfare Exp. 21 0.00 29.41 6.99 9 1.06 48.38 10.83 
 Police Exp. 21 39.73 95.87 62.31 9 53.96 85.46 67.39 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 21 0.00 0.02 0.01 9 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 21 0.00 0.03 0.01 9 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 21 0.00 1.50 0.21 9 0.10 0.20 0.11 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 21 0.47 0.78 0.68 9 0.70 0.81 0.75 
 Per Capita Income 21 6,993.00 11,722.00 8,187.19 9 7,679.00 10,296.00 9,322.44 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
SD Game (1,0) 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 12 1,670.00 37,045.00 9,565.33 50 1,421.00 24,958.00 7,287.48 
 
Urban Influence 
Code 12 6.00 9.00 8.17 50 6.00 9.00 8.30 
 Total Revenue 12 1,537.16 3,229.28 2,304.00 50 341.88 7,449.04 2,430.55 
 Sales Tax 12 0.00 106.84 36.00 50 0.00 127.29 30.90 
 State IGR 12 321.67 911.38 575.48 50 66.86 808.32 552.28 
 Property Tax 12 431.23 1,429.23 976.62 50 34.23 2,514.40 903.65 
 Total Expenditures 12 1,388.42 2,997.62 2,126.45 50 301.51 10,291.00 2,296.21 
 Capital Outlays 12 43.48 453.20 256.27 50 0.00 4,510.68 353.36 
 Construction Exp. 12 36.43 426.19 227.89 50 0.00 4,484.48 311.75 
 Highway Exp. 12 121.34 833.73 335.40 50 0.39 813.84 289.26 
 Welfare Exp. 12 3.17 30.76 11.63 50 0.00 103.02 10.34 
 Police Exp. 12 44.74 97.58 67.60 50 0.00 156.21 62.40 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 12 0.00 0.07 0.01 50 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 12 0.00 0.06 0.01 50 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Percent American 
Indian 12 0.00 58.10 5.76 50 0.00 93.40 12.09 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 12 0.59 0.85 0.74 50 0.49 0.88 0.76 
 Per Capita Income 12 5,196.00 10,571.00 8,498.00 50 4,504.00 12,327.00 8,182.14 
          
  Non-Gaming Gaming 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean 
WY Game (1,0) 16 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Population 16 3,109.00 45,750.00 16,182.63 4 5,142.00 38,492.00 18,219.75
 
Urban Influence 
Code 16 6.00 9.00 7.81 4 8.00 9.00 8.25 
 Total Revenue 16 2,891.24 10,951.24 5,407.52 4 3,794.31 6,199.07 4,985.91 
 Sales Tax 16 1.65 417.21 162.70 4 2.89 196.51 53.04 
 State IGR 16 564.76 2,191.81 1,232.37 4 595.57 1,469.96 963.68 
 Property Tax 16 440.31 3,847.13 1,904.64 4 1,377.63 4,290.49 2,841.66 
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 Total Expenditures 16 2,950.13 6,772.48 4,655.77 4 3,419.83 4,399.34 4,076.21 
 Capital Outlays 16 518.01 2,529.37 1,129.68 4 426.63 917.42 698.40 
 Construction Exp. 16 216.96 2,117.48 801.31 4 158.49 514.54 295.81 
 Highway Exp. 16 106.54 1,069.66 375.04 4 194.22 345.04 263.14 
 Welfare Exp. 16 0.00 26.76 3.67 4 0.72 9.41 3.11 
 Police Exp. 16 93.00 227.26 171.66 4 129.76 205.04 164.29 
 
Percent of Total 
Payroll in State 16 0.00 0.12 0.03 4 0.00 0.06 0.03 
 
Percent of Total 
Establishments in 
State 16 0.01 0.07 0.03 4 0.01 0.08 0.04 
 
Percent American 
Indian 16 0.20 1.20 0.64 4 0.40 11.50 3.55 
 
Ratio Employed to 
Working Age 16 0.65 0.82 0.76 4 0.75 0.81 0.77 
 Per Capita Income 16 10,333.00 15,790.00 12,795.00 4 11,958.00 12,415.00 12,188.00
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Appendix F: State Fixed Effects 
 
Table 24: Total Revenues 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate  
0.616163898 0.379657949 0.3695 1398.9725  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 2031.5064 264.7391 7.6736 0.0000
LA_D -145.2611 230.1037 -0.6313 0.5279
MI_D -428.7326 207.3243 -2.0679 0.0388
MN_D 738.2026 181.3093 4.0715 0.0000
MS_D -582.6263 187.4273 -3.1085 0.0019
MT_D -363.1436 193.1585 -1.8800 0.0603
NE_D 394.5446 154.0538 2.5611 0.0105
NM_D 256.6392 269.6645 0.9517 0.3414
NY_D 719.0448 287.3999 2.5019 0.0124
NC_D -861.4955 183.7477 -4.6885 0.0000
ND_C -537.9573 186.6705 -2.8819 0.0040
SC_D -696.2001 229.4239 -3.0346 0.0024
SD_D -912.1093 183.3942 -4.9735 0.0000
Al_D -822.6366 233.9217 -3.5167 0.0004
CO_D 657.1443 185.6456 3.5398 0.0004
FL_D -389.3803 245.8583 -1.5838 0.1134
ID_D -474.9445 200.0438 -2.3742 0.0177
IA_D -557.5016 152.3618 -3.6591 0.0003
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Table 25: Total Expenditures 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate  
0.6079704 0.369628008 0.359355786 1411.6793  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 1493.9108 267.1437 5.5922 0.0000
LA_D -89.5041 232.1937 -0.3855 0.6999
MI_D -239.4801 209.2075 -1.1447 0.2525
MS_D -523.5205 189.1297 -2.7680 0.0057
MT_D -1291.8960 216.0992 -5.9783 0.0000
NE_D 503.3419 155.4531 3.2379 0.0012
NM_D 347.1076 272.1138 1.2756 0.2023
NY_D 250.5467 294.4177 0.8510 0.3949
NC_D -1584.5670 205.7020 -7.7032 0.0000
ND_C -1494.8055 206.9740 -7.2222 0.0000
SC_D -1429.5937 247.4348 -5.7777 0.0000
SD_D -870.5006 185.0600 -4.7039 0.0000
Al_D -1463.8285 247.0938 -5.9242 0.0000
CO_D -62.2120 211.4683 -0.2942 0.7686
FL_D -308.4879 248.0914 -1.2434 0.2139
ID_D -428.6331 201.8608 -2.1234 0.0339
IA_D -492.6899 153.7456 -3.2046 0.0014
AFDC/Child Welf. at County Level 881.8672 182.9561 4.8201 0.0000
 
Andrews, Courtney, 2007, UMSL, p. 208 
 
 
 
Table 26:  Sales Tax  
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7620 0.5806 0.573798107 110.9306  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 71.0101 20.9923 3.3827 0.0007
LA_D 329.1274 18.2459 18.0384 0.0000
MI_D -80.3149 16.4397 -4.8854 0.0000
MN_D -52.7977 14.3768 -3.6724 0.0002
MS_D 15.3827 14.8619 1.0350 0.3008
MT_D -50.9175 15.3164 -3.3244 0.0009
NE_D 6.7975 12.2156 0.5565 0.5780
NM_D 124.1449 21.3829 5.8058 0.0000
NY_D 216.6481 22.7892 9.5066 0.0000
NC_D 68.1007 14.5702 4.6740 0.0000
ND_C -33.4757 14.8019 -2.2616 0.0238
SC_D 2.5121 18.1920 0.1381 0.8902
SD_D 68.0983 14.5421 4.6828 0.0000
Al_D 143.2404 18.5487 7.7224 0.0000
CO_D 237.7735 14.7206 16.1524 0.0000
FL_D 78.4824 19.4952 4.0257 0.0001
ID_D -40.3116 15.8624 -2.5413 0.0111
IA_D -48.6883 12.0814 -4.0300 0.0001
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Table 27:  Property Tax 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7492 0.5613 0.5542 407.1203  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 627.5228 77.0427 8.1451 0.0000
LA_D -786.8080 66.9633 -11.7498 0.0000
MI_D -500.1380 60.3342 -8.2895 0.0000
MN_D -600.3584 52.7635 -11.3783 0.0000
MS_D -705.6996 54.5439 -12.9382 0.0000
MT_D 40.0733 56.2118 0.7129 0.4760
NE_D -41.3590 44.8318 -0.9225 0.3564
NM_D -733.2700 78.4761 -9.3439 0.0000
NY_D 42.3013 83.6373 0.5058 0.6131
NC_D -830.7654 53.4731 -15.5361 0.0000
ND_C -360.9229 54.3237 -6.6439 0.0000
SC_D -643.2320 66.7655 -9.6342 0.0000
SD_D -210.2926 53.3702 -3.9403 0.0001
Al_D -1002.5999 68.0744 -14.7280 0.0000
CO_D -153.0978 54.0254 -2.8338 0.0046
FL_D -672.0018 71.5482 -9.3923 0.0000
ID_D -507.4373 58.2155 -8.7165 0.0000
IA_D -413.2930 44.3394 -9.3211 0.0000
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Table 28:  Construction Expenditures 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.324140563 0.105067104 0.090483733 441.5569  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 422.4487 83.5595 5.0557 0.0000
LA_D 150.4659 72.6275 2.0717 0.0384
MI_D 7.5452 65.4377 0.1153 0.9082
MN_D 195.9044 57.2266 3.4233 0.0006
MS_D 121.7020 59.1576 2.0573 0.0398
MT_D 8.4744 60.9665 0.1390 0.8895
NE_D 181.6626 48.6239 3.7361 0.0002
NM_D 298.8916 85.1140 3.5117 0.0005
NY_D 272.7933 90.7119 3.0072 0.0027
NC_D 62.8803 57.9962 1.0842 0.2784
ND_C 64.8042 58.9187 1.0999 0.2715
SC_D 102.5197 72.4129 1.4158 0.1570
SD_D 123.9369 57.8846 2.1411 0.0324
Al_D 213.7690 73.8326 2.8953 0.0038
CO_D 287.8791 58.5952 4.9130 0.0000
FL_D 126.8001 77.6001 1.6340 0.1024
ID_D 117.3456 63.1397 1.8585 0.0633
IA_D 105.3495 48.0899 2.1907 0.0286
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Table 29:  Highway Expenditures 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.6799 0.4623 0.4535 167.4990  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 82.5156 31.6972 2.6032 0.0093
LA_D -70.8410 27.5503 -2.5713 0.0102
MI_D -2.6520 24.8229 -0.1068 0.9149
MN_D 167.1440 21.7082 7.6996 0.0000
MS_D -15.4272 22.4407 -0.6875 0.4919
MT_D -17.9524 23.1269 -0.7763 0.4377
NE_D 46.6568 18.4449 2.5295 0.0115
NM_D 3.6957 32.2869 0.1145 0.9089
NY_D 132.6835 34.4104 3.8559 0.0001
NC_D -263.1791 22.0001 -11.9626 0.0000
ND_C 158.5175 22.3501 7.0925 0.0000
SC_D -202.0269 27.4689 -7.3547 0.0000
SD_D 38.2171 21.9578 1.7405 0.0819
Al_D -84.9120 28.0074 -3.0318 0.0025
CO_D 136.7599 22.2273 6.1528 0.0000
FL_D -61.8571 29.4366 -2.1014 0.0357
ID_D 23.5534 23.9513 0.9834 0.3255
IA_D 10.1858 18.2423 0.5584 0.5767
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Table 30:  Welfare Expenditures 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7091 0.5029 0.4948 112.6506  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D -0.0953 21.3178 -0.0045 0.9964
LA_D -17.4926 18.5288 -0.9441 0.3453
MI_D 61.7962 16.6945 3.7016 0.0002
MS_D -20.7837 15.0924 -1.3771 0.1686
MT_D -254.7562 17.2445 -14.7732 0.0000
NE_D 48.2497 12.4050 3.8895 0.0001
NM_D -23.2077 21.7144 -1.0688 0.2853
NY_D 225.7802 23.4942 9.6100 0.0000
NC_D -164.2930 16.4148 -10.0088 0.0000
ND_C -235.9540 16.5163 -14.2861 0.0000
SC_D -317.9127 19.7451 -16.1009 0.0000
SD_D 1.5072 14.7676 0.1021 0.9187
Al_D -327.2486 19.7178 -16.5966 0.0000
CO_D -105.3099 16.8750 -6.2406 0.0000
FL_D -16.7293 19.7974 -0.8450 0.3982
ID_D 4.6290 16.1083 0.2874 0.7739
IA_D 29.7197 12.2687 2.4224 0.0155
AFDC/Child Welf. at County Level 305.1638 14.5997 20.9020 0.0000
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Table 31:  Police Expenditures 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.6908 0.4772 0.468661909 51.7380  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 74.5830 9.7908 7.6177 0.0000
LA_D 41.1924 8.5099 4.8405 0.0000
MI_D -28.0587 7.6674 -3.6595 0.0003
MN_D 19.0540 6.7053 2.8416 0.0045
MS_D 14.3340 6.9316 2.0679 0.0388
MT_D 32.5399 7.1436 4.5551 0.0000
NE_D -22.1328 5.6973 -3.8847 0.0001
NM_D 56.0484 9.9730 5.6200 0.0000
NY_D -38.7639 10.6289 -3.6470 0.0003
NC_D -9.8771 6.7955 -1.4535 0.1463
ND_C -20.3895 6.9036 -2.9535 0.0032
SC_D 7.3435 8.4847 0.8655 0.3869
SD_D -7.9783 6.7824 -1.1763 0.2396
Al_D -4.9390 8.6511 -0.5709 0.5681
CO_D 61.3549 6.8657 8.9364 0.0000
FL_D 63.4078 9.0925 6.9736 0.0000
ID_D 27.7064 7.3982 3.7450 0.0002
IA_D -14.5563 5.6348 -2.5833 0.0099
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Table 32: State IGR 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.7529 0.5668 0.5598 388.1680  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
WY_D 957.5811 73.4562 13.0361 0.0000
LA_D 248.4899 63.8461 3.8920 0.0001
MI_D 278.4527 57.5256 4.8405 0.0000
MN_D 838.3828 50.3073 16.6652 0.0000
MS_D 109.1738 52.0048 2.0993 0.0359
MT_D 67.0345 53.5950 1.2508 0.2112
NE_D -169.8546 42.7448 -3.9737 0.0001
NM_D 1134.6394 74.8229 15.1643 0.0000
NY_D 795.0487 79.7439 9.9700 0.0000
NC_D 293.4973 50.9838 5.7567 0.0000
ND_C 239.4108 51.7948 4.6223 0.0000
SC_D 34.9880 63.6575 0.5496 0.5826
SD_D -311.0434 50.8858 -6.1126 0.0000
Al_D 51.5440 64.9054 0.7941 0.4272
CO_D 424.2115 51.5104 8.2354 0.0000
FL_D 343.1440 68.2174 5.0302 0.0000
ID_D 338.1856 55.5055 6.0928 0.0000
IA_D 154.2719 42.2753 3.6492 0.0003
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Appendix G: Propensity Score Models 
 
Using the propensity score sample to examine total revenues the DID estimator 
continues to be insignificant.  Significant factors include total slots, percent of state 
payroll,  percent of establishments in the state, rural adjacent/rural non-adjacent and per 
capita income.  Total slots again demonstrated an inverse relationship with total revenues.   
Table 34: Total Revenues (PS Sample) 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.59354631 0.352297223 0.3346486 1571.362  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 1549.1301 649.3321 2.3857 0.0172
Gaming (1, 0) -221.9433 187.1550 -1.1859 0.2359
Post Period -18.5138 236.1061 -0.0784 0.9375
DID Estimator -192.5949 322.9871 -0.5963 0.5511
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -306.6937 112.4726 -2.7268 0.0065
Total Slots in County Area -0.1188 0.0583 -2.0377 0.0418
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 24.9316 21.8650 1.1403 0.2544
Number AI Gam. Ops. 18.1959 57.4278 0.3168 0.7514
Pct. State Payroll 25717.2261 9942.4220 2.5866 0.0098
Pct. State Establishments -36494.3350 11892.7115 -3.0686 0.0022
Percent Indian 9.5633 5.8139 1.6449 0.1003
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 1286.8992 832.4604 1.5459 0.1224
Per Capita Income 0.1769 0.0282 6.2757 0.0000
WY_D 1180.8978 350.2536 3.3716 0.0008
KS_D -983.7617 239.8595 -4.1014 0.0000
LA_D -880.5256 314.6930 -2.7980 0.0052
MI_D -1155.1201 252.1497 -4.5811 0.0000
MS_D -1403.2048 307.5481 -4.5626 0.0000
MT_D -1168.2900 291.4777 -4.0082 0.0001
NE_D -255.0796 240.5368 -1.0605 0.2892
NM_D -718.3479 385.4639 -1.8636 0.0626
NY_D -162.2869 438.9637 -0.3697 0.7117
NC_D -1797.4261 291.2497 -6.1714 0.0000
ND_C -1486.6345 267.6072 -5.5553 0.0000
SC_D -1449.2908 363.7450 -3.9844 0.0001
SD_D -1705.4217 237.6420 -7.1764 0.0000
Al_D -1551.6868 335.0596 -4.6311 0.0000
CO_D -295.6570 321.3477 -0.9201 0.3577
FL_D -1003.2027 494.5055 -2.0287 0.0427
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ID_D -1311.3475 282.2904 -4.6454 0.0000
IA_D -1391.5088 243.5818 -5.7127 0.0000
 
When using the propensity score sample to examine expenditures the DID estimator 
remains insignificant.  This model’s results are similar to that in the full sample with total 
slots, percent of state payroll, percent of establishments in the state, rural adjacent/rural 
non-adjacent and per capita income and AFDC/Child Welfare provided at the county 
level being significant factors.   
Table 35: Total Expenditures (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.58243886 0.339235026 0.3212305 1598.141  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -63.0946 689.4833 -0.0915 0.9271
Gaming (1, 0) -195.3840 190.3444 -1.0265 0.3049
Post Period 75.8160 240.1298 0.3157 0.7523
DID Estimator -247.9689 328.4913 -0.7549 0.4505
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -306.6524 114.3893 -2.6808 0.0075
Total Slots in County Area -0.1120 0.0593 -1.8903 0.0590
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 28.3107 22.2376 1.2731 0.2033
Number AI Gam. Ops. 15.5440 58.4064 0.2661 0.7902
Pct. State Payroll 28684.2256 10111.8570 2.8367 0.0046
Pct. State Establishments -36571.0309 12095.3825 -3.0236 0.0026
Percent Indian 11.4280 5.9130 1.9327 0.0535
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 1129.8307 846.6469 1.3345 0.1823
Per Capita Income 0.1686 0.0287 5.8842 0.0000
WY_D 2230.3735 347.2880 6.4223 0.0000
KS_D 674.3588 246.5600 2.7351 0.0063
LA_D 718.6009 346.6686 2.0729 0.0384
MI_D 644.5323 303.5290 2.1235 0.0339
MS_D 163.5166 326.5923 0.5007 0.6167
MT_D -1465.9279 296.4449 -4.9450 0.0000
NE_D 1558.2840 232.4514 6.7037 0.0000
NM_D 984.9647 401.8510 2.4511 0.0144
NY_D 67.3600 446.4443 0.1509 0.8801
NC_D -1812.5103 296.2130 -6.1189 0.0000
ND_C -1679.7332 272.1677 -6.1717 0.0000
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SC_D -1453.4893 369.9438 -3.9289 0.0001
Al_D -1443.7213 340.7696 -4.2366 0.0000
CO_D -195.8049 326.8240 -0.5991 0.5492
FL_D 758.7831 523.0826 1.4506 0.1472
ID_D 299.4359 291.7794 1.0262 0.3050
IA_D 334.4309 256.9630 1.3015 0.1934
AFDC/Child Welf. at County Level 1796.6738 241.6918 7.4337 0.0000
 
When using the propensity score sample to examine sales taxes the DID estimator 
becomes insignificant.   Significant factors included total number of slots, number of 
years with a gaming operation, rural adjacent/non-adjacent, ratio of employed to working 
age and per capita income.  The total number of slots again showed an inverse 
relationship with  sales tax revenues.   
Table 36:  Sales Tax (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.778031039 0.605332298 0.594578 118.5671  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Std. 
Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -260.9886 48.9953 -5.3268 0.0000
Gaming (1, 0) 22.0184 14.1218 1.5592 0.1192
Post Period -97.2363 17.8154 -5.4580 0.0000
DID Estimator 20.7918 24.3710 0.8531 0.3938
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural NonAdj -16.4502 8.4866 -1.9384 0.0528
Total Slots in County Area -0.0161 0.0044 -3.6614 0.0003
Number of Yrs AI Gam. -4.7817 1.6498 -2.8983 0.0038
Number AI Gam. Ops. 4.8984 4.3332 1.1304 0.2585
Pct. State Payroll 2232.0675 750.2051 2.9753 0.0030
Pct. State Establishments -2694.0147 897.3641 -3.0021 0.0027
Percent Indian 1.1969 0.4387 2.7284 0.0065
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -172.5254 62.8133 -2.7466 0.0061
Per Capita Income 0.0344 0.0021 16.1779 0.0000
WY_D 126.6276 26.4284 4.7913 0.0000
KS_D 46.9656 18.0986 2.5950 0.0096
LA_D 386.9202 23.7451 16.2947 0.0000
MI_D -28.0374 19.0259 -1.4736 0.1409
MS_D 62.5613 23.2060 2.6959 0.0071
MT_D -3.8475 21.9934 -0.1749 0.8612
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NE_D 53.2073 18.1497 2.9316 0.0034
NM_D 182.7723 29.0852 6.2840 0.0000
NY_D 259.8439 33.1220 7.8451 0.0000
NC_D 117.0647 21.9762 5.3269 0.0000
ND_C 18.3759 20.1923 0.9100 0.3630
SC_D 26.2945 27.4464 0.9580 0.3383
SD_D 124.7613 17.9313 6.9578 0.0000
Al_D 192.1168 25.2819 7.5990 0.0000
CO_D 393.9554 24.2473 16.2474 0.0000
FL_D 116.4804 37.3129 3.1217 0.0018
ID_D 10.2492 21.3002 0.4812 0.6305
IA_D -6.8080 18.3795 -0.3704 0.7111
 
 
 Using the propensity score sample to examine property taxes the DID estimator 
becomes significant demonstrating that there is a significant positive correlation between 
property tax revenues and the opening of a gaming operation.  The β=196.0887 (p < .01) 
indicates that the opening of a gaming operation is correlated with an increase in property 
tax revenues of $196 per capita.  Additional significant factors included rural 
adjacent/non-adjacent, percent of total payroll in the state, percent American Indian and 
per capita income.  The percent of the population which was American Indian again 
showed an inverse relationship with property taxes.   
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Table 37:  Property Tax (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.762275903 0.581064553 0.569649 394.9134  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -163.2430 163.1896 -1.0003 0.3174
Gaming (1, 0) -26.6051 47.0356 -0.5656 0.5718
Post Period -452.3753 59.3380 -7.6237 0.0000
DID Estimator 196.0887 81.1728 2.4157 0.0159
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -129.4206 28.2665 -4.5786 0.0000
Total Slots in County Area -0.0155 0.0146 -1.0601 0.2893
Number of Yrs AI Gam. -5.6834 5.4951 -1.0343 0.3012
Number AI Gam. Ops. -7.5912 14.4327 -0.5260 0.5990
Pct. State Payroll 13389.7520 2498.7207 5.3586 0.0000
Pct. State Establishments -22867.4321 2988.8657 -7.6509 0.0000
Percent Indian -4.3902 1.4611 -3.0046 0.0027
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 355.8939 209.2132 1.7011 0.0892
Per Capita Income 0.0738 0.0071 10.4177 0.0000
WY_D 1337.0394 88.0254 15.1892 0.0000
KS_D 549.6147 60.2813 9.1175 0.0000
LA_D -159.5498 79.0884 -2.0174 0.0439
MI_D 112.5622 63.3701 1.7763 0.0760
MS_D -152.1601 77.2927 -1.9686 0.0492
MT_D 645.6739 73.2539 8.8142 0.0000
NE_D 549.0324 60.4515 9.0822 0.0000
NM_D -74.3988 96.8744 -0.7680 0.4427
NY_D 251.4896 110.3200 2.2796 0.0228
NC_D -259.4589 73.1966 -3.5447 0.0004
ND_C 241.5939 67.2548 3.5922 0.0003
SC_D -13.1950 91.4161 -0.1443 0.8853
SD_D 363.2897 59.7240 6.0828 0.0000
Al_D -380.7954 84.2069 -4.5221 0.0000
CO_D 422.0449 80.7608 5.2259 0.0000
FL_D 59.8971 124.2787 0.4820 0.6299
ID_D 110.1404 70.9450 1.5525 0.1208
IA_D 193.2665 61.2168 3.1571 0.0016
 
Using the propensity score sample to examine construction expenditures yields results 
similar to that of the full sample.  Percent of total establishments in no longer significant, 
while gaming (β=-124.2986, p < .05) and the percent American Indian (β=4.5014, p < 
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.01) become significant.  While the gaming factor indicates construction expenditures are 
lower with the presences of a gaming operation, the latter suggests that the larger the 
percent of the population that is American Indian the larger the construction 
expenditures.  This might possibly suggest that the correlation of an Indian gaming 
operation and local government construction expenditures is tied to the size of the 
American Indian population in the area.   
Table 38:  Construction Expenditures (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.354643917 0.125772308 0.101951 502.5507  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 61.2824 207.6684 0.2951 0.7680
Gaming (1, 0) -124.2986 59.8556 -2.0766 0.0381
Post Period -391.4132 75.5111 -5.1835 0.0000
DID Estimator 91.2901 103.2972 0.8838 0.3770
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -27.0093 35.9708 -0.7509 0.4529
Total Slots in County Area -0.0034 0.0186 -0.1825 0.8552
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 2.5684 6.9928 0.3673 0.7135
Number AI Gam. Ops. 2.9070 18.3665 0.1583 0.8743
Pct. State Payroll 6642.9428 3179.7702 2.0891 0.0369
Pct. State Establishments -5673.7249 3803.5088 -1.4917 0.1361
Percent Indian 4.5014 1.8594 2.4209 0.0156
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -92.4604 266.2362 -0.3473 0.7284
Per Capita Income 0.0483 0.0090 5.3535 0.0000
WY_D 164.0271 112.0176 1.4643 0.1434
KS_D -212.1515 76.7115 -2.7656 0.0058
LA_D -84.2068 100.6446 -0.8367 0.4030
MI_D -197.7621 80.6421 -2.4523 0.0143
MS_D -127.1894 98.3596 -1.2931 0.1962
MT_D -302.8964 93.2199 -3.2493 0.0012
NE_D 35.4169 76.9281 0.4604 0.6453
NM_D -29.1493 123.2785 -0.2365 0.8131
NY_D 106.7774 140.3887 0.7606 0.4471
NC_D -170.0368 93.1470 -1.8255 0.0682
ND_C -163.1636 85.5857 -1.9064 0.0569
SC_D -116.9746 116.3324 -1.0055 0.3149
SD_D -62.2897 76.0023 -0.8196 0.4126
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Al_D 62.2866 107.1583 0.5813 0.5612
CO_D 211.1894 102.7729 2.0549 0.0401
FL_D -103.2735 158.1520 -0.6530 0.5139
ID_D -190.4148 90.2817 -2.1091 0.0352
IA_D -85.7055 77.9020 -1.1002 0.2715
 
Using the propensity score sample also yielded similar results to the full sample when 
examining highway expenditures, with the addition of a significant relationship between 
the number of years with a gaming operation and highway expenditures.  This was a 
positive relationship indicating that as the number of years with a gaming operation 
increases, highway expenditures increases as well (β=-4.4909, p < .05).   
Table 39:  Highway Expenditures (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.707365578 0.500366061 0.486752 155.9394  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 182.0477 64.4386 2.8251 0.0048
Gaming (1, 0) 25.9703 18.5729 1.3983 0.1623
Post Period -95.4479 23.4308 -4.0736 0.0000
DID Estimator 19.4853 32.0527 0.6079 0.5434
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural NonAdj -55.1243 11.1616 -4.9387 0.0000
Total Slots in County Area -0.0237 0.0058 -4.0921 0.0000
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 4.4909 2.1698 2.0697 0.0387
Number AI Gam. Ops. 0.4782 5.6990 0.0839 0.9331
Pct. State Payroll 4976.0103 986.6693 5.0432 0.0000
Pct. State Establishments -9968.7205 1180.2127 -8.4465 0.0000
Percent Indian -1.7399 0.5770 -3.0157 0.0026
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 208.3894 82.6120 2.5225 0.0118
Per Capita Income 0.0174 0.0028 6.2064 0.0000
WY_D -107.4918 34.7586 -3.0925 0.0020
KS_D -149.0095 23.8033 -6.2600 0.0000
LA_D -229.0372 31.2296 -7.3340 0.0000
MI_D -167.6078 25.0229 -6.6982 0.0000
MS_D -204.9542 30.5206 -6.7153 0.0000
MT_D -195.8834 28.9258 -6.7719 0.0000
NE_D -105.2860 23.8705 -4.4107 0.0000
NM_D -176.9922 38.2528 -4.6269 0.0000
NY_D -125.6137 43.5620 -2.8836 0.0040
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NC_D -428.5792 28.9031 -14.8281 0.0000
ND_C -57.5568 26.5569 -2.1673 0.0304
SC_D -375.5611 36.0974 -10.4041 0.0000
SD_D -147.2499 23.5832 -6.2438 0.0000
Al_D -251.8573 33.2508 -7.5745 0.0000
CO_D 19.6097 31.8900 0.6149 0.5387
FL_D -252.6033 49.0739 -5.1474 0.0000
ID_D -165.8906 28.0140 -5.9217 0.0000
IA_D -154.6991 24.1727 -6.3998 0.0000
 
Again, using the propensity score sample to examine welfare expenditures results in 
similar results with the DID estimator being significant at the p < .01 level (β=-48.8690).  
Other significant factors are this same as the full sample with the addition of the gaming 
factor now being significant.  Both models support the conclusion that the opening of a 
gaming operation is correlated with a reduction in local government welfare related 
expenditures. 
Table 40:  Welfare Expenditures (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.829025813 0.687283799 0.678763 80.31674  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Std. 
Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 38.5831 34.6509 1.1135 0.2657
Gaming (1, 0) -22.8557 9.5660 -2.3893 0.0170
Post Period 24.5166 12.0680 2.0315 0.0424
DID Estimator -48.8690 16.5088 -2.9602 0.0031
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -2.7293 5.7488 -0.4748 0.6350
Total Slots in County Area -0.0003 0.0030 -0.1143 0.9090
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 4.6019 1.1176 4.1177 0.0000
Number AI Gam. Ops. 12.1046 2.9353 4.1238 0.0000
Pct. State Payroll 72.9365 508.1851 0.1435 0.8859
Pct. State Establishments -202.5098 607.8698 -0.3331 0.7391
Percent Indian -0.1321 0.2972 -0.4445 0.6568
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -46.7025 42.5494 -1.0976 0.2726
Per Capita Income 0.0004 0.0014 0.2959 0.7674
WY_D -6.2610 17.4534 -0.3587 0.7199
KS_D -13.1238 12.3912 -1.0591 0.2898
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LA_D -5.5867 17.4223 -0.3207 0.7485
MI_D 58.5954 15.2543 3.8413 0.0001
MS_D -5.0514 16.4133 -0.3078 0.7583
MT_D -294.4400 14.8982 -19.7634 0.0000
NE_D 39.0196 11.6822 3.3401 0.0009
NM_D -24.6132 20.1956 -1.2187 0.2232
NY_D 204.4512 22.4367 9.1124 0.0000
NC_D -176.2695 14.8866 -11.8408 0.0000
ND_C -236.1346 13.6782 -17.2636 0.0000
SC_D -305.2178 18.5920 -16.4166 0.0000
Al_D -328.2257 17.1258 -19.1655 0.0000
CO_D -173.1651 16.4250 -10.5428 0.0000
FL_D -7.9584 26.2882 -0.3027 0.7621
ID_D 6.1232 14.6638 0.4176 0.6763
IA_D 24.5664 12.9140 1.9023 0.0574
AFDC/Child Welf. at County Level 308.2596 12.1466 25.3784 0.0000
 
Using the propensity score model to examine police expenditures provides somewhat 
different results.  The gaming (β=10.7800, p= 0.0881) and rural adjacent/non-adjacent 
(β=-6.4701, p=0.0885) factors are now ‘almost’ significant.   The only other significant 
factors were the ratio of employed to working age and per capita income. 
Table 41:  Police Expenditures (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate  
0.732093681 0.535961158 0.523317 53.01958227  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Std. 
Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 4.9210 21.9092 0.2246 0.8223
Gaming (1, 0) 10.7800 6.3148 1.7071 0.0881
Post Period -25.1423 7.9665 -3.1560 0.0016
DID Estimator -3.1676 10.8980 -0.2907 0.7714
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural NonAdj -6.4701 3.7950 -1.7049 0.0885
Total Slots in County Area -0.0023 0.0020 -1.1895 0.2345
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 0.0896 0.7378 0.1215 0.9034
Number AI Gam. Ops. -0.9029 1.9377 -0.4660 0.6413
Pct. State Payroll 447.7314 335.4688 1.3346 0.1823
Pct. State Establishments -685.1964 401.2738 -1.7076 0.0880
Percent Indian 0.2591 0.1962 1.3210 0.1868
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age -57.4812 28.0882 -2.0465 0.0409
Per Capita Income 0.0132 0.0010 13.9324 0.0000
WY_D 55.9866 11.8180 4.7374 0.0000
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KS_D -22.6327 8.0931 -2.7965 0.0053
LA_D 16.0117 10.6181 1.5080 0.1319
MI_D -45.9395 8.5078 -5.3997 0.0000
MS_D -19.9759 10.3770 -1.9250 0.0545
MT_D 10.8461 9.8348 1.1028 0.2703
NE_D -39.7793 8.1160 -4.9013 0.0000
NM_D 30.2278 13.0060 2.3241 0.0203
NY_D -62.8485 14.8111 -4.2433 0.0000
NC_D -35.0562 9.8271 -3.5673 0.0004
ND_C -45.5059 9.0294 -5.0398 0.0000
SC_D -20.9439 12.2732 -1.7065 0.0882
SD_D -27.6725 8.0183 -3.4512 0.0006
Al_D -24.4619 11.3053 -2.1638 0.0307
CO_D 81.7020 10.8426 7.5352 0.0000
FL_D 125.6350 16.6852 7.5297 0.0000
ID_D 4.7866 9.5248 0.5025 0.6154
IA_D -40.0316 8.2187 -4.8708 0.0000
 
Looking at the propensity score sample to examine State IGR we see similar results.  The 
DID estimator again shares a significant inverse relationship with State IGR (β=-
269.7944, p < .001) and also a significant positive relationship between the total number 
of gaming operations and State IGR (β=27.1419, p < .05).  Additional significant factors 
include the percent of total establishments in the state, ratio of employed to working age 
and per capita income.   
Table 42: State IGR (PS Sample) 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate  
0.79207384 0.627380968 0.617228 366.6943  
     
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 1602.7709 151.5286 10.5773 0.0000
Gaming (1, 0) 50.2555 43.6746 1.1507 0.2501
Post Period 931.7756 55.0979 16.9113 0.0000
DID Estimator -269.7944 75.3725 -3.5795 0.0004
Dummy for Urb. Infl. 1=Rural Adj., 0=Rural 
NonAdj -33.8613 26.2467 -1.2901 0.1973
Total Slots in County Area 0.0135 0.0136 0.9919 0.3215
Number of Yrs AI Gam. 8.0463 5.1024 1.5770 0.1151
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Number AI Gam. Ops. 27.1419 13.4014 2.0253 0.0431
Pct. State Payroll 1117.6917 2320.1711 0.4817 0.6301
Pct. State Establishments -6282.8766 2775.2921 -2.2639 0.0238
Percent Indian -0.8313 1.3567 -0.6127 0.5402
Ratio Emp. to Wrking Age 387.5698 194.2636 1.9951 0.0463
Per Capita Income -0.0393 0.0066 -5.9810 0.0000
WY_D 81.7261 81.7355 0.9999 0.3176
KS_D -841.4505 55.9738 -15.0329 0.0000
LA_D -619.7568 73.4370 -8.4393 0.0000
MI_D -599.2128 58.8419 -10.1834 0.0000
MS_D -818.7915 71.7697 -11.4086 0.0000
MT_D -706.7212 68.0194 -10.3900 0.0000
NE_D -987.4030 56.1319 -17.5908 0.0000
NM_D 22.9588 89.9521 0.2552 0.7986
NY_D 147.0878 102.4369 1.4359 0.1513
NC_D -595.6676 67.9662 -8.7642 0.0000
ND_C -638.0109 62.4490 -10.2165 0.0000
SC_D -827.5824 84.8838 -9.7496 0.0000
SD_D -1158.4295 55.4563 -20.8890 0.0000
Al_D -794.3712 78.1898 -10.1595 0.0000
CO_D -379.6303 74.9900 -5.0624 0.0000
FL_D -715.0086 115.3982 -6.1960 0.0000
ID_D -537.2535 65.8755 -8.1556 0.0000
IA_D -668.3104 56.8424 -11.7572 0.0000
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